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ABSTRACT
RELIGIOUS BELIEF, SOCIAL ESTABLISHMENT AND AUTONOMY
MAY, 1997
CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, B.A., GETTYSBURG COLLEGE
M.A., CALVIN COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
I attempt to analyze, reconstruct, and otherwise defend William Alston's vindication of
the cognitive status of mystical experience. I begin by reconstructing Alston’s doxastic
practice approach to epistemology, which provides him with general criteria by which to
determine whether or not mystical experience contributes to the justification of an agent's
mystical beliefs. I then present Alston’s case for the claim that, according to his general
epistemic position, there is a way of forming beliefs about God on the basis of the
perception of God which we have adequate epistemic reason to believe is reliable. At the
heart of Alston’s case are the claims that a way of forming beliefs should be regarded as
presumptively reliable so long as it is socially established and that the beliefs generated
by autonomous ways of forming beliefs are not necessarily subject to epistemic norms de
jure for other practices. I attempt to discredit Alston s appeal to social establishment as
grounds for imputing presumptive epistemic innocence and I attempt to provide
a
rationale for Alston’s claim that mystical beliefs should not be subject to the
same
epistemic norms to which we subject sense-perceptual beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
Religious belief is a popular whipping boy for the philosophic community.
Whether as a crushing counter-example to some proposal in epistemology— “your
epistemic principles would license the rationality of belief in God, hence they must be
wrong!”— or the object of full scale critique, religious belief serves well its function as
the "other’ of well-formed, rational, epistemically proper, scientific, belief. But not all of
us think that religious belief is all that irrational; at least, its not any more dubious than
other, more well-regarded ways of forming beliefs. And every once in a while, we put up
a fight, or at least, we try to. I will discuss one such attempt in what follows.
The most promising option for vindicating the rationality of religious belief of
which I am aware is that movement in the philosophy of religion which has acquired the
moniker "Reformed Epistemology.’ 1 The most prominent participants in that movement
are also its founding members, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Alvin
Plantinga. Although their several formulations of the Reformed approach differ as to
'. The moniker is self-imposed (at least by Plantinga and Wolterstorff) in the introduction to Faith
and Rationality, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., (Notre Dame, IN.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1983), a volume widely regarded as fundamental to the Reformed corpus.
1
their details
,
2
and sometimes in much more than the details, the triumvirate has pursued a
recognizably coherent project for the past twenty years. What is that project?
Reformed Epistemology is not a positive program; it is not an account of the way
in which we ought to form beliefs, even form beliefs about God; it is not an account of
epistemic justification or of knowledge; it is not an attempt to identify the reliable belief-
forming practices to which human beings have access; it is not an apology to religion’s
cultured despisers. It is, rather, unabashedly destructive; the heart of the Reformed
approach is to discredit an interlocking set of prejudices which is extremely influential in
modernity, viz., that belief in God requires propositional support in order for an agent to
be justified an adhering to that belief, that belief in God lacks that support, and thus that
those who believe in God are epistemically defective. In each of its various
manifestations, Reformed Epistemology incorporates the claim that we should consider
religious belief “innocent until proven guilty” rather than “guilty until proven innocent.”
Religious belief can be rational even if religious agents have access to no evidence which
they may employ to convince their non-theistic compatriots of the truth of their
convictions.
2
.
For example, each of the three differ significantly in where they come down on the
internalism/externalism debate. Wolterstorff rejects reliabilism in all of its manifestations, Alston
retains it with an internalist twist, and Plantinga subsumes reliabilism as an element in his broader
Theory of Proper Function. See “Can Belief in God be Rational if it has no Foundations?” in
Faith and Rationality, and Divine Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
for Wolterstorff s views on the matter, “An Internalist Externalisin,” in Epistemic Justification:
Essays on the Theory of Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1989), for Alston's,
and Warrant and Proper Function, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), for
Plantinga’s.
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More recently, however, Reformed Epistemologists have made the transition from
a critical to a constructive enterprise. Alston, Plantinga and Wolterstorff have attempted
to provide an account of how we do and should form beliefs about God. In this essay, I
will attempt to articulate, defend and criticize William Alston's version of that story.
Alston focuses primarily on the contribution of ‘mystical experience’ to the formation
and justification of belief about God. (Although his focus is on religious experience,
Alston is no Schleiermacher, that is, he does not believe that the entirety of a given
agent’s theological convictions are generated by her experience of God. Appeal to sacred
texts, tradition and reason have their role to play as well.) We will get into the details
soon enough. Before we begin, however, I want to indicate why I decided to tackle
Alston’s version of the Reformed Project, and not Wolterstorff s or Plantinga’ s. (Or, God
forbid, each of their versions!) Three features of Alston's version of Reformed
Epistemology are particularly attractive.
First, Alston has articulated an account of the way theists form beliefs about God
in which he accords systematic significance to the social dimensions of belief. Alston has
articulated a doxastic practice approach to epistemology according to which the beliefs an
agent forms are the consequence of her participation in and socialization into socially
established and socially monitored ways of evaluating and corroborating belief. He does
not construe the problem of the epistemic status of religious belief as that of whether or
not the individual, regarded independently of her relations to, and dependance on, others,
has enough evidence for her beliefs. In this respect he differs importantly from Plantinga
3
in particular and Wolterstorff to some degree. ' Rather, he construes the problem of the
epistemic status of religious belief as that of whether or not an agent who already finds
herself participating in various socially established ways of forming beliefs is rational if
she continues to adhere to her practices of forming beliefs about God, specifically, the
practice of forming beliefs about God on the basis of what she takes to be perceptions of
God.
Second, Alston provides a spirited defense of the autonomy of distinct belief-
forming practices, especially religious practices. The way an agent forms and evaluates
beliefs about God on the basis of religious experience is very different from the way she
forms and evaluates, for example, sense-perceptual beliefs. Alston argues that, though
different, religious and sensory experience are appropriately different. We should not
evaluate the beliefs formed by engaging religious belief-forming practices in light of the
same criteria we employ to evaluate the beliefs formed in our sense-perceptual belief-
forming practice. Otherwise put, the social practice of forming beliefs on the basis of
apparent experience of God differs quite properly from the social practice of forming
beliefs about the physical world on the basis of sensory experience.
When put that way, however, Alston’s version of Reformed Epistemology takes
on a predictable, even pedestrian, tone. After all, hasn’t that territory already been staked
out by Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion like D. Z. Phillips? This brings me to the
third point of interest. Alston combines an appreciation both for the social embeddedness
3
.
Plantinga’s individualist bias is reflected in his construal of the problem of the epistemic status
of religious belief (and of belief generally) as whether or not the cognitive faculties which produce
a given belief are functioning properly.
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of the way we form beliefs and the distinctiveness of the way agents form religious
beliefs with a realist understanding of religious belief. Unlike sprachspeilists like
Phillips, Alston argues that religious forms of life involve the making of truth-claims
about an objective reality which is what it is independently of any possible or actual
epistemic relations between cognitive agents and that reality.
Alston, then, articulates a metaphysically robust defense of religious belief which
recognizes the historicity and autonomy of religious belief. What results is his own blend
of religious epistemology and, more particularly, a strategy for defending the rationality
of religious belief which ineradicably hinges on each of the three points of interest I have
noted. As I will argue, the social entrenchment of religious ways of forming beliefs is
crucial to Alston’s claim that religious ways of forming beliefs are presumptively
innocent; the autonomy of religious practices is crucial to a defense of mystical
experience from imputations of guilt, and the realism of religious belief-forming practices
is crucial to vindicating the autonomy of religious ways of forming beliefs. (This latter
point is strikingly in contrast to most attempts to vindicate the autonomy of religious
belief, in which its defenders claim that, because religious beliefs make no truth claims
about objective realities, religious believers are free to form beliefs in as idiosyncratic and
eccentric a way as their form of life allows.)
The structure of my presentation and evaluation of Alston's defense ot religious
belief is very simple: it is organized around the claim that religious belief is innocent until
proven guilty. In the first chapter, I articulate Alston’s doxastic practice approach to
epistemology. The discussion therein provides an opportunity to identify the criteria
5
[(EP9) and (EP10)] Alston claims that wc should employ to evaluate the epistemic
standing of any and every doxastic practice. Those criteria encode Alston s version of the
innocent until proven guilty’ dictum. Note that those criteria make no reference at all to
religious belief; they are guidelines for imputing presumptive innocence to any and every
belief forming practice, whether religious or not.
In the second chapter, I reconstruct Alston’s argument in support of the claim that
religious belief enjoys positive epistemic status, at least, as judged according to the
doxastic practice approach sketched in the first chapter. Note that my reconstruction of
Alston’s argument is selective with a purpose: I highlight those aspects of Alston's
argument in which the appeal to the autonomy of religious belief is crucial to the
argument. I have therefore included focused on aspects of Alston’s version of Reformed
Epistemology which other treatments, governed by other concerns, may very well regard
as of little importance and therefore as not meriting sustained consideration. I justify my
selectivity because I believe that a proper appreciation of the autonomy of religious ways
of forming beliefs is essential to a fair and even-handed evaluation of their epistemic
status.
In the third chapter, I attempt to provide an argument in support of Alston's claim
that religious belief is autonomous. I argue that the claim that distinct belief-forming
practices are autonomous is derivable from what I call the Ontological Principle, viz., the
claim that the way a rational agent forms beliefs is constrained by the nature of that about
which she forms beliefs. Unfortunately, the appeal to autonomy engenders the concern
that Alston attempts to undermine criticism of religious belief altogether. I attempt to
6
show, therefore, that a healthy appreciation for the autonomy of religious belief-forming
practices does not render impossible attempts to show that such practices are unreliable.
That religious ways of forming beliefs are autonomous does not render vacuous the
Reformed claim that religious belief is only presumptively innocent.
In the fourth chapter, I focus, not on the second part of the Reformed mantra, but
on the first. Alston asserts that only socially established practices enjoy presumptive
innocence. I take issue with that claim. I argue, on the contrary, that we should place no
restrictions at all on the practices a rational agent regards as presumptively innocent.
In a concluding reflection, I provide the merest hint of a more adequate avenue for
reflection for the Reformed Epistemologist. Instead of appealing to the social
entrenchment of religious belief-forming practices in support of the claim that religious
belief is rational, the Reformed Epistemologist should investigate the ways in which
religion’s social entrenchment, its habitual alliance with the powers that be, renders it
unreliable. A doxastic practice approach to epistemology provides an opportunity to
address those political and moral questions which I believe are inextricably entwined with
epistemic questions but which Alston ducks entirely.
Before we get started, I believe I owe the reader an apology. There are very few
dead horses beaten more times and with greater vim and vigor than issues of the
rationality of religious belief.4 I am afraid I will inflict the community of philosophers
4
. There is, of course, a reason why we keep beating that horse. Discussions of the rationality of
religious belief are generally conducted in secularized or secularizing societies, or at least, in
societies which are perceived by its members to be secularized or secularizing. In a context in
which more and more people cease to believe in God, its natural to raise the various
epistemological questions which inhabit analytic philosophy of religion. Its only when we rub
(continued...)
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with another. I think, however, that I have an excuse. (Like many excuses, I’m not sure
it shows me in a better or worse light.) The excuse is that I didn’t want to address that
problem in the first place; originally, I wanted to discuss much more interesting moral
and political questions like, “Is religious belief irremediably ideological?” and “Does
religious belief provide us with grounds for moral critique to which we have no access
apart from religious belief?” But it turned out that addressing those kinds of questions
lands one right in the middle of the thicket of epistemological questions which are the
fare of more traditional philosophy of religion. After all, it hardly makes sense to ask
whether or not religious belief provides us with adequate grounds for social critique if we
lack the confidence that religious ways of forming belief are anything but irrational mush.
What good would it do to “to take up a prophetic stance” in the name of God (as the lingo
goes nowadays) against the state, or capitalism, or even the institutional church, if we are
reasonably confident that God does not exist? So, although I think that the most
interesting questions religious belief raises for the philosophy of religion are moral and
political, I have pulled in my horns and addressed just a few more conventional questions
regarding the rationality of religious belief. (I wanted to write one dissertation, not two or
three.)
4
(.. .continued)
elbows with lots of people who doubt what we believe that we begin to ask ourselves whether or
not what we believe is rational, justified, warranted, epistemically apt, etc. This implies, what I
take to be the case, that the issue of the epistemic status of religious belief is most insistently raised
in some social contexts and is relatively unimportant in others. Insofar as 'first world societies are
more secular than, say, ‘third world societies, the problem of the rationality of religious belief is a
‘first-world problem.’ Other kinds of social context breed other priorities. Perhaps, as Gustavo
Guttierrez has claimed, the central problem for religious belief in ‘third world is the problem of
gratuitous and undeserved suffering.
8
A caveat to supplement my apology and excuse. Although I am concerned
primarily with the rationality of religious belief, I do not assume for a moment that
religious belief is primarily or most importantly a matter of adhering to propositions or of
entertaining hypotheses. As I think is clear in the following, although I take it that
religious beliefs make truth claims, and that religious beliefs enjoy cognitive status, so
recognizing militates not a whit against a thoroughgoing appreciation of the fact that
religion is a way of life, a way in which agents express themselves, to which they are
hardly indifferent, and in which they participate long before they are capable of reflecting
abstractly on the epistemic status their religious convictions enjoy. Religious beliefs can
make truth claims, and we can attempt to determine whether or not a given religious
belief is true, without transmuting passionately held religious convictions into tepidly
held hypotheses.
Why do that? Why bother with the truth claims and epistemic status of religious
belief? Because I think that long term survival in modernity requires rational vindication;
transmitting religious convictions to future generations requires that we use the currency
of rational argumentation. The problem, as I will attempt to show in the sequel, is to
make room for epistemic criteria which do not cook the game against religious belief
from the start.
9
CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY OF DOXASTIC PRACTICES
Our central epistemic aim, according to Alston, is to amass a large body of beliefs
with a favorable truth-falsity ratio, i.e., to maximize our true and minimize our false
beliefs.
1 Whether or not the way an agent forms beliefs puts her in a "strong position" to
achieve that aim, that is, whether or not the way she forms her beliefs renders it likely that
her beliefs are true, 2 determines whether or not she is epistemically justified in forming
her beliefs. I outline Alston's account of epistemic justification in ( 1 . 1 ).
The discussion of epistemic justification provides the background for an account
of what Alston regards as the most fundamental problem of epistemology. 3 Given that
our central epistemic aim is to believe the true and not to believe the false, can we show
that the basic ways in which we customarily form our beliefs are reliable? An adequate
answer to that question requires reflection on our general epistemic, and indeed human,
condition. The fruits of Alston's reflections are an account of the nature of doxastic
practices (1.2), and a denial that we can show that engagement in such practices puts us in
a strong position (1.3). All is not lost, however, as Alston argues that it is weakly rational
A Realist Conception of Truth, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 231-64;
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of
Knowledge
,
(Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 83, 97; The Reliability of Sense
Perception, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3-4. See Alvin Goldman,
Epistemology and Cognition, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 97-103;
Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1985), pp. 6-7.
2
.
"Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," in Epistemic Justification, pp. 200-201.
3
. The Reliability Of Sense Perception, pp. 2-4.
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for an agent to believe that socially and psychologically entrenched practices are reliable
( 1 .4), and that it is moderately rational for an agent to believe that weakly rational
practices are reliable, the outputs of which are both internally consistent and compatible
with the outputs of other such practices (1.5). Moreover, there is a way of further
strengthening the epistemic standing ot the belief that moderately rational practices are
reliable, viz., by showing that they enjoy significant self-support (1.6). Engaging in such
practices is strongly rational. Alston, surprisingly, fails to address the question as to the
standing of non- socially and psychologically entrenched practices; I indicate Alston's
likely position on the issue (1.7). In a final section, I defend Alston from the claim that
his resolution of the fundamental problem of epistemology commits him to an anti-realist
metaphysic which is incompatible with his defense of religious belief (1.8).
1.1 Epistemic Justification
What is it for some belief to be epistemically justified? According to Alston, an
agent's belief is prima facie justified if and only if her belief is based on an adequate
ground. 4 An agent's belief is ultima facie justified if and only if she lacks sufficient
4
. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell
University Press, 1991), p. 73, 108, 147; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” p. 99; "Goldman
on Epistemic Justification," in Philosophia 19\2 (October, 1989): 1 19-20; “An Internalist
Externalism,” in Epistemic Justification, p. 227. Alston distinguishes between two generic
concepts of epistemic justification, an evaluative and a deontological. The latter concept is framed
as an agent’s being permitted to assent to some proposition in virtue of her assent’s not violating
some epistemic obligation; the deontological concept is internally related to normative
prohibitions, permissions, and forbiddings. The evaluative concept is framed as an agent s so
believing as to achieve some epistemic good, more precisely, believing the truth and avoiding the
false. I mention this because the term ‘justification’ would seem to have affinities to the
deontological conception which Alston rejects; most centrally, because it assumes that we have
greater control over what we believe than we in fact have. Any deontological connotations
11
reason to regard as inadequately grounded what is in fact a belief based on an adequate
ground . 5
First, grounds. In asking whether or not an agent's belief B is justified, we are
interested in whether her beliefs and experiences sufficiently indicate the truth of B . 6
Beliefs which simply pop into an agent's mind without any connection to other of that
agent's psychological states cannot be justified. Flence, an agent has to have something to
"go on" in forming her beliefs, that is, she must have grounds for her beliefs . 7 What an
agent has to go on is limited to her beliefs and experiences. That A has adequate grounds
‘justification’ has should be suppressed for the remainder.
5
. "To be ultima facie justified in believing that p by virtue of the satisfaction of conditions, C, is
to be so situated that one will be unqualifiedly justified in that belief provided there are no
sufficient 'overriders,' that is, no sufficient reasons to the contrary." Perceiving God, p. 72.
6
. "Level Confusions in Epistemology," in Epistemic Justification, p. 170; "An Internalist
Externalism," p. 230; "The Role of Reason in the Regulation of Belief," in Rationality in the
Calvinian Tradition, Hendrik Hart, Johann van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds.,
(Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 139.
1
. Alston believes that, in order for an agent to be justified in assenting to p, she must not only
base that belief on an adequate ground, but also have fairly direct access to the ground on which
she bases her belief (not, however, to the adequacy of those grounds). See Perceiving God, 75;
"An Internalist Externalism," p. 238 and "Goldman on Epistemic Justification," pp. 125-27.
Because this internalist twist does not play much of a role in his argument in support of the
rationality of religious belief, he suppresses it in Perceiving God.
Nevertheless, it is an important qualification because certain critics, e.g., Susan Haack,
reject reliabilism on the grounds that, if true, reliabilism would entail that an agent could be
epistemically justified in adhering to some belief even if she has no idea at all as to the grounds on
which that belief is based. See Evidence and Inquiry, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp.
139ff. Alston’s reliabilism is not of that sort. A justified belief must based on a ground, and
“facts that obtain independently of the subject’s psyche, however favorable to the truth of the
belief in question, cannot be grounds of the belief in the required sense. "An Internalist
Externalism,” p. 237. See “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” p. 109 for more on this last
point.
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for a belief to which B adheres is, by itself, irrelevant to the epistemic status of B's
belief.
8
That an agent s justification for adhering to some belief depends upon the grounds
within her purview has as a consequence that justification is always person-relative.
Different agents have different perspectives on the world, and because justification
depends upon the grounds available to a given agent, different agents may be justified in
adhering to different and incompatible beliefs. 9
Note that the ground of a belief is not identical to the “total concrete input” on
which a given agent could base a given belief, but on those aspects of the input which an
agent in fact takes into account when forming her beliefs. 10 An agent who believes that a
given animal is a collie in virtue of recognizing certain distinctive collie-indicative
features forms her beliefs on the basis of different grounds than does another agent who
takes any large dog to be a collie. Even though both agents may have access to the same
input — they make be looking at the collie from basically the same vantage point, have
roughly equivalent perceptual skills, etc., the two agents take into account different
features of their perceptual experience, i.e., they base their beliefs on different grounds.
In short, “the ground of a belief is made up of those features of the input to the formation
of that belief that were actually taken account of in the belief-formation.”
11
8
. See Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 74-7.
9
. A Realist Conception of Truth, p. 192; see Paul Moser, Knowledge and Evidence,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 43ff.
10
. “An Internalist Externalism,” p. 23 1 . For discussion of this claim, see Marshall Swain,
“Alston’s Internalistic Externalism,” in Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 468-72.
". “An Internalist Externalism,” p. 23 1 . A brief note. Plantinga argues that there are certain types
of belief for which it is not at all plausible to suppose that there is any ground at all. Memory
13
Second, adequacy. A belief is based on an adequate ground iff that belief is
probably true given that it was formed on the ground that it was, i.e., if a ground is
sufficiently indicative of the truth of the belief formed on its basis . 12 (Alternatively, a
given belief is adequately grounded iff that ground reliably indicates the truth of that
belief.) What makes a ground adequate (a reliable indicator) has to do with the way in
which an agent's doxastic dispositions mesh with the way the world is . 13
Suppose, for example, that the world is such that those who agree with Rush
Limbaugh on economic policy normally vote Republican. If Sally believes that Johnny is
a Republican because she overheard him claiming that Limbaugh's analysis of progressive
taxation is right on target, then Sally's belief is adequately grounded. It is so grounded
because the world is such that agreement with Limbaugh on economic matters reliably
indicates party affiliation. "It is an objective probability that is in question here. The
world is such that, at least in the kinds of situations in which we typically find ourselves,
the ground [that Johnny agrees with Limbaugh] is a reliable indication of the truth of the
belief [that Johnny is a Republican]." 14
beliefs, for example, are “simply formed in you,” passively and without being generated by
antecedent states of mind. A priori beliefs as well seem to lack any identifiable ground. Alvin
Plantinga, “What’s the Question?,” in The Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 25.
However, Alston claims that “with the former I take the conscious basis to be the ‘sense of
pastness’ with which the proposition comes to one; and as for the latter, there is the air of
obviousness (‘clear and distinct perception’) that accompanies the entertainment of the
proposition.” “Goldman on Epistemic Justification,” p. 125. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and
Proper Function, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 185-93.
12
. Perceiving God, p. 74.
13
. See 1.3.1 for more on the concept of reliability.
14
.
"An Internalist Externalism," p. 232.
14
Third, based on. An agent must not only have an adequate ground for her belief
that p, she must also base her belief on that ground
.
15 Suppose once again that Sally has
good reason to regard Johnny as a Republican. If the ground of her conviction — what
she actually goes on in forming her belief - is the irrational and unfounded belief that
overweight people are normally Republicans (and that Johnny is overweight), then Sally
is not justified in believing that Johnny is a Republican . 16 She has an adequate ground for
her belief but, because she fails to base it on that ground, her belief lacks justification
.
17
What is it for a belief to be based on a ground? Crudely put, it is for that belief to
be causally dependent upon that ground . 18 What kind of causal dependence? After all,
Sally’s belief is causally dependent on certain brain states, yet her belief is not based on
those brain states . 14 Briefly, according to Alston, the type of causal relation proper to
15
. Perceiving God, p. 74; 84-5; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” pp. 99-100; "An
Internalist Externalism," p. 229; "Our Knowledge of God," in Faith, Reason and Skepticism,
Marcus Hester (ed.), (Philadelphia. PA.: Temple University Press, 1992), p. 30; “Richard Foley’s
Theory of Epistemic Rationality,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44
(September, 1989): 144-45. See Alvin Goldman's defense of this source-relevant account of
justification in Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 80-93 and Paul Moser’s defense in Knowledge
and Evidence, pp. 156ff..
16
. Perceiving God, p. 74. For the contrary, compare Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic
Rationality, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 174-208.
17
. An agent must base her belief on adequate grounds, and not just have those grounds, “because
adopting the latter strategy would require us to approve beliefs that are adopted on wildly irrational
bases." William Alston, "Alvin Plantinga’s Epistemology of Religious Belief," in Alvin
Plantinga, J. E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, eds., (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1985), p. 292. See “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” p. 103; “Swinburne on Faith and
Reason,” in Reason and the Christian Religion, Alan Padgett, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994), p. 31.
18
. Perceiving God, p. 175. See Robert Audi, "The Causal Structure of Indirect Justification," in
The Structure of Justification, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 214-232;
Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, pp. 76f.
19
.
Alternatively, Sally’s reasons may cause her to believe in some wayward manner; her belief
that Johnny rejects progressive taxation may upset her, which causes her to leap up, hit her head,
15
basing relations is that of taking account ot features of the experiences and forming
beliefs in the light of them, rather than just involving some subcognitive transaction. ’20
What an agent takes account ot is distinct from, not only the causal underpinnings
of belief-formation, but also various other beliefs which are a necessary condition of her
forming that belief. Agent A couldn t form the belief, e.g., that there is a purple flower
within her purview, if she didn’t also adhere to certain other beliefs, e.g. that colored
objects exist, that purple is a color, that something exists, etc. Forming a given belief
requires, presupposes, a whole network of other beliefs. Although the beliefs constitutive
of that network constitute a necessary condition of the formation of her belief, they do not
count as part of the basis ot her belief. Because A fails to take them into account when
forming her belief, they do not count as part of the basis of her belief. “A necessary
condition of my having the belief at all (whatever its epistemic status) is not a necessary
condition of the belief s being justified rather than unjustified.”21
Consider another example. When normal agents form perceptual beliefs, they
typically assume that the conditions of perception are normal. When A apparently
perceives a purple flower, she will normally assume that she is not in an environment
bathed by purple light, such that, were she to believe that conditions were abnormal, she
would not form beliefs as she does. Nonetheless, that A makes that assumption, and that
she would not believe as she does if she did not believe that the assumption holds, does
and subsequently affirm Johnny’s Republicanhood. See Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic
Rationality, p. 177f.
20
. “An Internalist Externalism,” p. 229.
21
.
Perceiving God, p. 78.
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not imply that she bases her belief that there is a purple flower in the center of her visual
field on her assumed belief that the conditions are normal.
Of course, an adequate defense of her perceptual belief would require her to take
into account the conditions of observation. Although A’s belief that there is a purple
flower in front of her may be based upon the flower’s looking purple, an adequate defense
of her belief would no doubt advert to the claims (1) that an object’s looking purple in
normal circumstances reliably indicates the proximity of purple objects and (2) that
conditions were in fact normal. But that A would have to advert to some such normality
and adequacy assumptions in order to defend her belief in no way implies that her belief
was based on those assumptions. 22 Of course, her belief is justified only if these
assumptions are true; but they may be true without A’s believing them, being justified in
believing them, thinking about them, having the conceptual apparatus necessary for
forming those beliefs, or the like.
1.1.1 Prima vs. Ultima Facie Justification
Obviously enough, an agent may have good reasons for regarding as inadequately
grounded what is normally an adequately grounded belief , 23 For example, Sally may
22
. “Whatever the basis of a belief, that basis can serve to justify the belief only if it is adequate to
the task, only if it is true that that basis constitutes a sufficient indication of the truth of the target
belief. ...Supposing that the adequacy of my justifying grounds must itself be one of those
justifying grounds confuses the role of what justifies and that by virtue of which it does so, just as
surely as confusing the premises of a valid argument and that by virtue of which they suffice to
entail the conclusion.” Perceiving God, p. 86.
23
. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 109; "Justification and Knowledge," in Epistemic
Justification, p. 177; "An Internalist Externalism," p. 238; "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief," in Faith and Rationality, p. 112; “The Autonomy of Religious Experience,” in
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 31 (June, 1992): 2. Alston s claim that an
agent who is justified in believing that a reliably formed belief is unreliable is not ultima facie
justified in adhering to that belief indicates a respect in which he resists identifying justification
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learn, on good authority, that Johnny's heaping of encomiums on Limbaugh is subtly
expressed satire, and that Johnny is in fact a closet radical. Though Sally's ground for
believing that Johnny is a Republican may normally be adequate - what could better
indicate an agent's convictions than an apparently sincere expression of belief - that
ground may be overridden by her justified belief that that ground lacks its ordinary
justificatory force - by her justified belief that Johnny’s professions of faith are satirical.
Hence, Alston distinguishes between prima facie and ultima facie (unqualified)
justification. 4 An agent's belief is prima facie justified iff it is based on an adequate
ground. In order for an agent’s belief to be ultima facie justified, that agent must have no
sufficient reason to regard as inadequately grounded what is in fact an adequately
grounded belief. An agent S is ultima facie justified "in believing that p iff S's believing
that p, as S did, was a good thing from the epistemic point of view, in that S's belief that p
was based on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding reasons to the
contrary ."
25
It does not work the other way around though . 26 No matter how justified an
agent is in believing that belief B is adequately grounded, if B is not in fact adequately
with reliability. Just as reliably formed beliefs which are not based on any grounds at all cannot
count as prima facie justified, so also do reliably formed beliefs which an agent has good reason to
believe are false, or have been unreliably formed, lack ultima facie justification. In both cases,
Alston complicates the straightforward externalist account. See “A Doxastic Practice Approach to
Epistemology,” in Knowledge and Skepticism, Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, eds., (Boulder,
CO.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 2.
24
. Perceiving God, p. 72; "The Role of Reason," p. 141.
25
. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 77.
26
. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 95; "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic
Justification," in Epistemic Justification, p. 145-46; “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"
p. 115.
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grounded, then B is not justified, not even prima facie justified. 27 (See 1 .2.2 for more on
overriding prima facie justified beliefs.)
1.1.2 Justification as Property and as Process
Alston distinguishes between the state of being justified and the activity of
justifying. 28 To justify assent to a proposition, an agent must show that that beliefs
grounds are adequate, i.e., adduce evidence in support of the claim that that beliefs
grounds are adequate. To be justified in assenting to some proposition an agent need not
show anything: merely seeing a tree, or recalling a past event, or feeling depressed, may
reliably indicate the truth of, and thus suffice prima facie to justify, the beliefs to which
those mental states gives rise. An agent need be neither able nor willing explicitly to
articulate grounds for believing that a justified belief B's grounds are adequate in order for
B to be justified; much less need she actually do so. 29 As Alston notes in a discussion of
the knowledge of God, "knowing that one's beliefs are reliably formed is no more
necessary for their being reliably formed and hence their counting as knowledge ... than
knowing that one's food is nourishing is necessary for nourishment to take place." 30
27
. Note that an agent need not show that a given prima facie justified belief has not been defeated;
she need only have no sufficient defeaters of that belief. So long as Sally has no justified belief
that Johnny is speaking satirically, she is justified in believing him to be a Republican; she need
not show that he is not speaking satirically.
28
. Perceiving God, pp. 71-2, 85; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” pp. 82-3; " Level
Confusions in Epistemology," p. 154, 166; "Justification and Knowledge," p. 180; "An Internalist
Externalism," p. 235. Robert Audi Distinguishes between justification as a process and as a
property in "The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy," in The Structure of Justification,
pp. 122f.
29
. Perceiving God, P-71.
30
. "On Knowing That We Know," in Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, C. S.
Evans and Merold Westphal, eds., (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993 ), p. 22.
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1.1.3 Mediate vs. Immediate Justification
Alston also distinguishes between mediate and immediate justification
.
31 A belief
is mediately justified iff it is based upon reliably indicative beliefs; “the justification
comes via appropriate inferential or grounding relations between the target belief and the
beliefs that constitute one’s reasons for it.”32 A belief is immediately justified iff it is
based on non-doxastic reliable indicators . 33 (A beliefs justification may be a function of
both mediate and immediate justification. 34 ) Thus, for example, if my belief that you are
in the room is based upon my perception that you are, then that belief is immediately
justified; if I form that belief by inferring it from the fact that I smell your perfume, then
that belief is mediately justified.
31
"The Role of Reason," p. 140-141; "Intemalism and Externalism in Epistemology," p. 189;
"Two Types of Foundationalism," in Epistemic Justification, p. 20; "Has Foundationalism Been
Refuted?" in Epistemic Justification, p. 42; What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge," in
Epistemic Justification, p. 58; “Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access,” in
Epistemic Justification, pp. 292-93.
32
. Perceiving God, p. 71.
33
. “This is a wastebasket category; it includes any justification by something other than justified
beliefs on the subject. Prominent candidates for immediate justifiers are (a) experience of what the
belief is about, (b) the self-evidence of the proposition believed, and (c) the proposition's being of
a certain category, for example, a proposition about one’s current conscious experience.”
Perceiving God, p. 71 . Alston denies what John Pollock calls ’doxastic assumption,' that is, that
epistemic justification is a function solely of the relation between one's beliefs. Rather, "both
beliefs and non-doxastic perceptual and memory states are relevant to the justifiedness of a
belief." Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Savage, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1986), p. 90. He is committed to denying, therefore, claims made by the likes of
Richard Rorty, that "there is no such thing as justification which is not a relation between
propositions." Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University
Press, 1979), pp. 182-83. See Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, p. 69.
34
.
Perceptual beliefs are often based upon both doxastic and non-doxastic inputs, as when I see a
car which, though indistinguishable from many others, I believe to be yours, because 1 believe that
it is located in your driveway. Perceiving God, pp. 78-9.
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1.1.4 Higher-level Epistemic Requirements
For any belief B, an agent may form various beliefs about B, e.g., that B has been
reliably formed, that it is based upon an adequate ground, that adhering to B violates no
epistemic norms, etc. In general, for any belief B, we may distinguish between B and a
plethora of'“higher-lever beliefs about B’s epistemic status. That is, there is always a
hierarchy of epistemic levels correlated to a given belief, and those levels are marked off
by the iteration of pistic and epistemic operators. For example,
P
justified that p
justified that justified that p...
P
believe that p
believe that believe that p...
P
justified in believing that p
justified in believing that justified in believing that p....
Why is it important to distinguish among epistemic levels? First, what it takes for a
belief to be justified at one level often differs from what it takes for a belief to be justified
at another. This is apparent with respect to perceptual beliefs. An agent may be justified
in believing that there is a green tree in front of her in virtue of the fact that sensory
presentations of the sort she just experienced and in the context in which she experienced
them normally give rise to true beliefs about green trees. 0 But having that experience in
35
. That is, those sensory impressions constitute adequate grounds.
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those circumstances need not contribute to the justification of the (2nd level) belief that
she is justified in believing anything about green trees. In order for that (2nd level) belief
to be justified, an agent must show that having that sort of sensory experience in that kind
of environment normally results in the formation of true beliefs. Hence, what is required
for a belief to be justified differs given a difference in epistemic level. (In this the case,
the difference in requirement is a beliefs being based on an adequate ground as distinct
from showing that that belief is based on an adequate ground.)
Second, lack ofjustification at higher levels is not retroactive: it does not impugn
the justification of lower level beliefs. ' 6 That an agent is not justified in believing that her
belief B is based on an adequate ground need not impugn the adequacy of the ground for
B and hence whether or not she is justified in that belief. If, for example, she is incapable
of showing that B is based on an adequate ground, that only impugns the justification of
her (2nd level) belief that she is justified in adhering to B (not of B itself). 37 More
generally, being justified in believing that one is justified in believing that B is not a
36
. Perceiving God, p. 147; "Our Knowledge of God," p. 38; “Level Confusions in
Epistemology,” passim; “Higher Level Requirements in Epistemology,” in The Opened Curtain:
A U.S.-Soviet Philosophy Summit, Keith Lehrer and Ernest Sosa, eds., (Boulder, CO.: Westview
Press, 1992), passim.
37
. A level confusion of this sort vitiates Robert Pasnau's argument that, given the unreliability of
the meta-practice by which an agent determines whether or not it is rational for her to engage in a
practice (that practice constituted by an agent's pursuing the epistemic policy Alston recommends
in Perceiving God), it follows that none of the beliefs formed by engaging in the latter practices
are justified. According to Pasnau, if an agent decides to engage in a reliable belief-forming
practice on the basis of inadequate grounds, she is lucky, has stumbled on to the truth, and is not
justified in so forming beliefs. "Justified Until Proven Guilty," in Philosophical Studies 72
(1993): 23-28. Alston argues that, no matter how an agent happens to engage in a reliable
practice, so long as that practice is reliable, and she has no good reason to believe that it is not, she
is not epistemically derelict in so doing. Pasnau confuses "the reliability of a certain way of
forming beliefs" with "the reliability of choosing a way forming beliefs...." "Reply to Pasnau," in
Philosophical Studies 72 (1993): 42.
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necessary condition of being justified in believing that B. That is just another way of
denying that there are any higher level requirements for justified belief.
1.1.5 Summary
Note that Alston's reliabilist account of epistemic justification presupposes the
legitimacy of the distinctions between being justified and justifying, mediate and
immediate justification, and among epistemic levels. According to Alston, if an agent
bases her belief B on a ground G, and ifG reliably indicates the truth of belief B, B is
pnma facie justified; she need not show that G is in fact reliably indicative of B in order
for B to be prima facie justified. That is just another way of denying that the second level
activity ofjustifying B is necessary for B to be prima facie justified . 38 If one claims, to
the contrary, that, in order for B to be justified, an agent must further show that G reliably
indicates B, then one is committed to denying that B is immediately justified. If one
adopts this stance as a general policy, one is committed to denying that there are any
immediately justified beliefs. (Alternatively, conflation of the state of being justified and
the activity ofjustification leads one to think that all justification is mediate. 39) That is, to
38
. Why does Alston refuse to impose higher level requirements on lower level beliefs? Because
so to impose commits one to requiring of epistemic agents that they adhere to an infinite hierarchy
of beliefs. Because it is impossible for a human agent to form an infinity of beliefs, imposing that
requirement is absurd. Why does Alston believe that imposing higher level requirements has this
absurd implication? If, for S to be justified in assenting to B, S must be further justified in the
higher level belief B' that the grounds on which S bases B are adequate, then, for S to be justified
in assenting to B', she must further be justified in B" that the grounds on which B' are based are
reliable indicators. Similarly for B". And so on. See “Epistemic Circularity,” in Epistemic
Justification, p. 332; "Level Confusions in Epistemology," pp. 153-71; "Higher Level
Requirements in Epistemology," pp. 9-25; "Reply to Critics," in Religious Studies, 30 (1994):
171.
39
. Perceiving God, p. 71
.
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impose on an agent the requirement that for any belief B (whether reliably formed or not)
she must engage in the second level activity ofjustifying B is to be committed to claiming
that all justification is mediate.
1.2 A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology
Having articulated what it is for a belief to be justified, and what it is for an agent
to show that some belief is justified, Alston addresses what he takes to be the central
epistemic question, viz., can we show that our basic ways of forming beliefs are
reliable?40 It is not difficult to understand why this question looms so large in
Alston's scheme of things. If we are justified in adhering to belief B, that the flock of
geese flying overhead is headed south for the winter, B must be based on grounds that
reliably indicate the truth of that belief. If we want to be justified in believing that B is
justified, we must show that B is based on adequate grounds. Suppose we do so by
empirical investigation into the facts of the matter, e.g., by determining whether anyone
else saw them, whether anyone further south saw them, whether those who saw them
know enough about birds to distinguish between ducks, geese, swans, etc. Though we
may succeed in justifying our belief that B is justified, the beliefs by appeal to which we
justify it will have been formed at least partly on the basis of a process of belief-formation
similar to that on the basis of which B was formed. That is, they will be grounded at least
40
. "Epistemic Circularity," p. 321. According to Alston, this is the central question of the Theory
of Knowledge for Thomas Reid, by whom Alston has been greatly influenced. See "Thomas Reid
on Epistemic Principles," in The History of Philosophy Quarterly 214 (October, 1995): 436-3 7.
See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Can Belief in God be Rational if it has no Foundations?,” pp.
149ff.; Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Hume and Reid,” The Monist 70 (October, 1989): 406f.
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in part on a configuration of sensory impressions indicative of some state of affairs in the
physical world.
Those beliefs may be justified. But we will stand with respect to those beliefs in
exactly the same situation that we stood with respect to B. We will naturally want to
justify them. We may do this by following the same procedure as before. Hence, we will
attempt to determine whether the conditions in which we engaged in our previous bout of
empirical investigation were normal, whether we collected all the evidence necessary to
making an informed judgement, whether we made any inferential gaffs, etc. At least
some of the beliefs we arrive at via our second tier of empirical investigation will have
been based on our practice of forming beliefs about the natural and social worlds given
specific configurations of sensory impressions.
Those beliefs may be justified. But we will stand with respect to those beliefs in
exactly the same situation as we found ourselves twice before with perceptual beliefs
which we desired to show were adequately grounded. And so on. Clearly, we will nip
this regress in the bud only if we can provide adequate grounds for trusting our whole
practice of forming beliefs about our environment on the basis of sense perception (SP ).41
41
. Because it is not at all plausible to suppose that we have experiential grounds indicative of SP’s
reliability, our belief that SP is reliable is not immediately justified. Ifjustified, we will have to
show that it is reliable, which requires that we adduce reasons in its support, in which case it will
be mediately justified. See, however, Stephen Jacobsen, “Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and
Cartesian Epistemology,” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22/1 (March, 1992): 133-44.
This point exemplifies a hitherto suppressed point. Alston's multi-tiered account of
epistemic justification has as a consequence that, although our lower-level beliefs may enjoy either
mediate or immediate justification, our higher level beliefs invariably enjoy only mediate
justification. Beliefs about the epistemic status of beliefs are mediately, not immediately, justified.
Although an agent may be immediately justified in believing that there is a purple flower in the
center of her visual field as a consequence of her experiential awareness of that flower, she will
have to adduce reasons in support of the claim that presentations of that sort are truth-conducively
25
Although we are capable indefinitely ofjustifying particular beliefs by appeal to other
beliefs, that those other beliefs depend for their justification on the reliability of the same
type of belief-forming process raises the question as to whether or not that whole way of
doing things is reliable. Hence the importance of the central epistemic question for
Alston. 42
In order to broach that question, which I address in the next subsection, Alston
develops the notion of a doxastic practice (DP). A DP is a two-tiered way of forming
beliefs. 4 " The first tier is composed of a family of belief-forming dispositions (1.2.1).
The second is composed of procedures and beliefs in light of which agents evaluate the
beliefs formed in the first tier (1.2.2). A genuine DP has several other properties which I
discuss in 1.2.3.
1.2.1 Doxastic Practice as a Family of Belief-forming Dispositions
A belief-forming disposition (bfd) is an input-output mechanism by which an agent's
being in a given type of mental state causes her to assent to a proposition the content of
connected with beliefs with that content if the higher level belief that her belief is justified is to be
justified. See Michael Sudduth, “Alstonian Foundationalism and Higher-Level Evidentialism,” in
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 37 (February, 1995): 33.
42
. The Reliability of Sense Perception, pp. 19-22. Note that Alston does not claim that
addressing this most fundamental question is required of an agent in any strong sense. That is,
because he imposes no higher level requirements on justified beliefs, he does not claim that an
agent must be justified in believing that our basic ways of forming beliefs are reliable if we are to
be justified in forming beliefs in those ways. We may be epistemically justified in forming beliefs
about middle-sized physical objects on the basis of SP even if we have no idea how to go about
showing that SP is reliable. Rather, Alston believes that the question is of intrinsic interest and
will naturally occur to the reflective and inquisitive agent. See “Epistemic Circularity,” pp. 32 1 -
23.
43
.
Perceiving God, p. 104.
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which is determined by the correlated mental state
.
44
In the terminology articulated in the
previous subsection, a bfd is a tendency to form a certain kind of belief given a certain
kind ot ground. That ground may be another belief, an experience, or some combination
thereof
.
45 Each belief- forming disposition realizes a function which takes the cognitive
agent whose disposition it is from a doxastic and/or experiential input to a correlated
doxastic output. Which function a bfd realizes individuates that bfd . 46
Thus, for example, many ot us have a maple-tree bfd, i.e., we tend to form beliefs
about maple trees upon having a experience of the sort we would expect to have were we
being appeared to' by an actual maple tree. That disposition realizes a function that takes
us from sensory inputs of a specific type of (maple-tree-like) configuration to beliefs with
a specific kind of content (about maple trees). Our maple-tree bfd is thereby
distinguished from those bfds the function realized by which goes from sensory inputs of
an elm-tree-like sensory configuration to doxastic outputs with an elm-tree output.
4J
. Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," in Socializing Epistemology, Frederick Schmitt,
ed., (Lanham, MD.: Rovvman and Littlefield Publishers, 1994), p. 30.
4\ Perceiving God, P- 71.
46
. A lot of epistemological hay has been made recently by the problem of individuating bfds.
According to Alston, in order to determine whether or not a given belief has been reliably formed,
we need to determine whether or not the grounds on which that belief is based are reliable
indicators, "what it was that the psyche was taking account of in forming that belief. So the
question of whether this belief was reliably formed is the question of whether the activation of a
function of going from inputs ofjust that sort to a belief output ofjust that sort would, in a suitable
spread of cases, yield mostly true beliefs." "Our Knowledge of God," p. 33. The answers to such
questions are, according to Alston, properly provided by cognitive psychology, however
inadequate it currently is to that task. See "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 3 1 ; and
"Goldman on Epistemic Justification," pp. 1 19-20.
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The first tier of a DP is composed of a grouping of many bfds. 47 Which bfds
belong to that grouping is determined, among other things, by similarity among the
functions realized by those bfds and by the inputs/outputs operated on by those
functions. For example, our basketball, tree, television, mountain, and centipede bfds
each take as inputs sensory impressions and eventuate in beliefs about the external,
physico-temporal world. Hence, they are similar in respect of the inputs by which they
are activated and by the outputs eventuating from their activation. Moreover, each of
those bfds realizes a function, roughly, of going from 'appears to be an X' to 'is an X.’ As
a consequence of their similar functions, inputs, and outputs, these dispositions are nested
in a more general DP, which Alston calls a sense-perceptual practice (SP).
All human beings are genetically predisposed to develop the kinds of bfds
constitutive of SP. Alston considers several other universal doxastic practices. All
normal human beings have a mnemonic doxastic practice, by which we form beliefs
about our past experience or that some state of affairs obtained in the past. All of us have
an introspective DP, made up of mechanisms that go from a "current conscious state to
the belief that one is in that state. 49 All of us have an inferential DP, by which we form
beliefs based on the formal properties of other beliefs. All of us have a testimonial DP.
by which we form beliefs by relying on the testimony of competent authorities. 50
47
. Perceiving God, pp. 155-57, 165-67; The Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 7-8; "Christian
Experience and Christian Belief," p. 110; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 31;
“Taking the Curse Off Language Games: A Realist Account of Doxastic Practices,” in Philosophy
and the Grammar of Religious Belief, Timothy Tessin and Mario van der Ruhr, eds., (London:
St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 34.
4\ Perceiving God, p. 157, 185.
49
. Perceiving God, p. 1 56.
50
. C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
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Alston also mentions various particular doxastic practices. Only some of us
adhere to religious beliefs, and thus engage in religious DPs, ordinarily as a consequence
ol socialization or decision. Such religious DPs are similar to other practices, like the
reading of entrails, astrology, theoretical physics, and wine-tasting, in respect of the
extent to which human beings engage in them.
Alston also distinguishes between basic and non-basic doxastic practices
.
51 A
basic practice is one which can be shown to be reliable by only those arguments at least
one premise to which an agent is justified in adhering only if that practice is reliable: "O
is an (epistemically) basic source of belief =df Any (otherwise) cogent argument for the
reliability ofO will use premises drawn from O ." 52 A non-basic practice is one the
reliability of which may be supported by sound arguments the conclusion of which an
agent need not be justified in believing if she is to be justified in assenting to (at best) one
of its (crucial) premises. (As we will see further on, a basic practice can be supported by
epistemically circular arguments and no other.) Alston claims that SP, memory,
inference, and introspection, as well as the various practices of forming beliefs about God
discussed in the next chapter, are basic practices . 53
1.2.2 Evaluative Aspects of Doxastic Practices
Doxastic practices are not just ways in which we form beliefs, but also ways in
which we evaluate them. In addition to being a nexus of dispositions, a given practice is
51
. Perceiving God, p. 107; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 37-8; “Religious
Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,” in Faith and Philosophy 5/4 (October, 1988): 436.
52
. "Epistemic Circularity," p. 326.
53
. Coady argues similarly for testimony. Testimony, pp. 133-51.
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composed of evaluative procedures and justified beliefs a participant uses to corroborate
and disqualify beliefs. They are evaluative in two respects.
First, "a fundamental presupposition of any DP" is that to form a belief on the
basis of one of its constituent dispositions is for an agent to be prima facie justified in
assenting to that belief. 4 According to the standards internal to a given practice, a
disposition to go from inputs of a certain type to outputs of a certain type is at the same
time a principle ofjustification: "when a belief of type B is formed on the basis of an
input of type I, that belief is thereby (prima facie) justified ." 55 Those who already engage
in a given practice, that is, those who are committed to regarding a given practice as
reliable, take having a disposition to form a belief B on the basis of input I as sufficient
for prima facie justification. This of course leaves open the question as to whether or not
an agent is actually justified in the beliefs so formed . 56
Second, central to the evaluative tier of a doxastic practice is its overrider
system .'' 7 "Attached to each practice is an ’overrider system’ of beliefs and procedures
54
. "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 32.
55
. Perceiving God, p. 158.
56
. Thus, we may distinguish between internal and external evaluations of a given belief. An
agent’s belief B is prima facie justified in an internal sense just when, according to the standards
partly constitutive of a given practice, that belief is reliably formed. Thus, given SP as we
currently engage in it, forming the belief that there is a computer in the center of my visual field
upon having the kind of visual experience I normally have when perceiving a computer, is no
doubt prima facie justified internally. An agent’s belief B is prima facie justified in an external
sense just when it is based on an adequate ground. So if SP is in fact reliable, I am no doubt
justified externally when I form beliefs about computers in the conditions just specified. (A
parallel distinction applies, obviously, for ultima facie justification.) See Robert Adams,
“Religious Diversity and Doxastic Practices,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
54/4 (December, 1994): 885.
57
. Perceiving God, p. 79, 104; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” p. 35.
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that the subject can use in subjecting prima facie justified beliefs to further tests when
that is called for .’08 An overrider system is a stock ofjustified beliefs and investigative
procedures by which an agent may determine whether the prima facie justification of
some belief is ultima tacie, that is, whether or not it is overridden
.
59 A prima facie
justified belief may be overridden in one of two ways. An agent may have independent
grounds for believing that that belief is false (a rebutter); or she may have reason to
believe that a ground lacks its usual justificatory force (an underminer or neutralizer). 60
Thus, for example, my belief that my cat is sitting on the window sill may have
initial credibility (be prima facie justified) because I see a cat on the window sill which
looks very much like my cat. But if I know that I took my cat to the vet, and have no
reason to believe it has escaped and returned home, then my prima facie justified belief is
rebutted and I am not ultima facie justified in adhering to it. Alternatively, if I am taking
care of my neighbor's cat, and her cat looks very much like my own, then I will have to
regard my prima facie justified belief as neutralized until such time as I determine on
closer inspection whose cat it is.
Note that, the tests and procedures constitutive of an overrider system not only
disqualify prima facie justified beliefs, they also corroborate them. Beliefs do not just fail
the relevant tests, they also pass them . 61 Hence, if I know that my cat wags her tail in a
58
. Perceiving God, p. 159.
59
. Perceiving God, p. 189, 262.
60
. Perceiving God, p. 79; "An Internalist Externalism," p. 228. See John Pollock,
Contemporary Theories of Epistemology, pp. 36-39.
61
.
Perceiving God, p. 209.
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particularly unique way, then to perceive the cat on the window sill wagging its tail in
that unique way corroborates my prima facie justified belief.
Note further the circularity of the evaluative function performed by my overrider
system
.
62 The beliefs by reference to which I check whether or not the cat in my window
is my own depends upon other beliefs I have acquired by means of SP, e.g., where my cat
tends to be at that time of the day. I identify that pattern in my cat's behavior by acquiring
and dismissing beliefs in light of other beliefs formed by engaging in SP, e.g., about the
reliability of the clock on the mantelpiece, the watch on my wrist, etc. In short, we make
use of what we learn by engaging in a given practice to evaluate beliefs formed by
engaging in that practice. A practice "grades its own examinations ." 63 As noted later on,
what an agent learns from a practice grounds both the beliefs she uses to defeat a prima
facie justified belief and the procedures she uses to evaluate prima facie justified beliefs.
Note finally that overrider systems will have different features given different
doxastic practices. Although beliefs formed by engaging in SP, for example, are
normally subject to checks by independent observers, imposing that requirement on our
introspective practice would have as a result that no beliefs formed by engaging in the
latter practice are ultima facie justified. And clearly that would be absurd. It would be
equally absurd to discriminate against our mnemonic practice because it does not admit of
prediction and therefore of checking memory beliefs by the degree to which its
62
.
Perceiving God, p.211,217; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 9- 1 0.
63
. Perceiving God, p. 217; "Is Religious Belief Rational?," in The Life of Religion, Stanley M.
Harrison and Richard C. Taylor, eds., (New York, NY.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 10.
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predictions are accurate. The moral of the story? That the properties in virtue of which
we distinguish different DPs often warrant us in imposing different evaluative norms on
those DPs . 64 This will be extremely important later on (in chapter two) when we discuss
the epistemic standing of religious ways of forming beliefs.
1.2.3 Miscellaneous Features of Doxastic Practices
Every doxastic practice has a two-tiered structure: we form beliefs via the
activation of our bfds and we evaluate those beliefs in light of a nexus of background
beliefs and investigative procedures. Every DP also has the following six properties.
First, DPs do not operate independently of each other . 65 In evaluating my belief
that my cat is sitting on the window sill, I appeal to other justified beliefs stored in my
memory — where my cat tends to be at a given time of day, whether she is at the
veterinarian, etc. Indeed, it is difficult to see how SP could have a viable overrider
system were it not to rely on our memory . 66 Nor is it clear how we could adequately
evaluate perceptual beliefs without relying on the testimony of others . 67
64
. "The tests that are relevant to a given doxastic practice are determined by the nature of the
subject matter dealt with therein." "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 10.
65
. "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 6; "Belief-Forming Practices and the
Social, " p. 32; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” p. 35.
66
. There are other respects in which our doxastic practices function interdependently. Our
inferential practices gets their premises from other practices, just as our mnemonic practice gets its
information from sense-perception, or introspection. Our evaluation of sense-perceptual beliefs
nearly always relies on generalizations about the way the world functions, and hence is beholden
to our (inductive) inferential practice. See Perceiving God, pp. 159-161.
67
. Coady, Testimony, p. 147.
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Second, we acquire and engage in DPs prior to our 'age of accountability,' that is
before we are able explicitly to thematize and reflect on them
.
68 For example, our
practice of forming beliefs about the natural and social environments is well-grounded in
our psyche long before we are aware that this is the case. So ingrained, the practices in
which we engage contribute crucially to the continuity and content of our personality,
identity, dispositions, and character. This makes impossible a reflection on the epistemic
propriety of engaging in a given practice without practical implications: to evaluate a
practice is to risk changing one’s lifestyle, identity, purpose in life, etc.
Third, we form beliefs, and hence engage in DPs, in the context of our pursuit of
ends other than the mere formation of beliefs . 69 We form beliefs, not just because we are
intrinsically interested in truth, but also because we need something to eat, or because we
are looking for something we have lost, etc. We recall people to re-experience old joys,
to locate misplaced possessions, to ruminate over bygone days, etc. Recognition of this
point is particularly important given the common misunderstanding that those intent on
determining the epistemic standing of religious belief are somehow or other committed to
68
. Perceiving God, p. 163; "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 7;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 32.
69
. Perceiving God, p. 163-64; "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 8;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social, p. 32; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,’' p. 36.
Charles Taylor, in his essay “Overcoming Epistemology,” in After Philosophy: End of
Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy, eds., (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), claims that traditional philosophy, understood as an amalgam
of representationalism and foundationalism, is plausible in large part because it satisfies certain
moral ideals, viz., a model of the knowing subject as disinterested, isolated and punctual. Alston,
though a foundationalist, rejects those ideals; his doxastic practice approach to epistemology is
thoroughly inimical to attempts to bracket the social embeddedness and historicity of cognitive
subjects. See section 1 .8 below.
34
the claim that religious belief is a hypothesis to be entertained, divorced from everyday
life, has no relation to praxis, consists of disinterested or tepid endorsement of
propositions, etc.
Fourth, whatever the role played by innate mechanisms, DPs are socially
established and socially monitored . 70 We acquire them via socialization and hence via
our initiation into empirically effective social institutions. Although Alston does not
specify the mechanisms by which DPs are institutionalized - indeed, given the centrality
of this feature of DPs to his argument, he spends surprisingly little time analyzing it -
one can assume that we are initiated into the DPs in which we engage by institutions like
the family, church, public and private schools, mass media, work place, etc.
Fifth, DPs change . 71 This is obviously the case with overrider systems, since our
justified beliefs change, as do our investigative procedures. It is equally obviously the
case with the degree of social establishment, witness the decline in membership and
social influence of the Western Church, the primary institutional carrier of the religious
DPs discussed in the next chapter.
70
. Perceiving God, p. 163; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” p. 36. "The most obvious
reason for this is that the concepts that provide the content for one's doxastic outputs are not
themselves innate, at least for the most part. ...The mere fact that learned concepts are involved in
any belief-formation, and that concept-acquisition invariably involves socialization, is enough to
show that even perceptual and simple inferential belief formation have a social aspect."
"Belief-Formation and the Social," pp. 30-3 1 . Note that Alston's claim that our conceptual
structures are, by and large, acquired via socialization is in no way inconsistent with his claim that
the distinguishing feature of perception is a presentation of objects to consciousness without the
necessary mediation of conceptual structure. (See. 2.1 below.) Why? Crudely, concepts are
necessary to the formation of perceptual beliefs but not to the 'animal' presentation of physical
objects, to the output of perceptual belief formation but not to its input.
71
.
Perceiving God, p. 163-64; “A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,” p. 4.
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Sixth, there is an irreducible plurality of [doxastic] practices
.
72
There is no
Ur-practice of which our sense-perceptual, introspective, mnemonic, inferential and other
practices are constituent elements. They enjoy this autonomy in virtue of differences of
inputs/outputs, functions realized, conceptual structure, object domain, overrider system
conditions ofjustification and/or universality. "There is no unique source ofjustification
or knowledge," 7 ' even though, as mentioned above, the various practices often function
interdependently. As we will discuss later in chapter three, that different DPs are
autonomous is essential to Alston's approach to epistemology and to his defense of
religious experience as a source ofjustified beliefs about God.
1.3 Alston’s Central Epistemic Question
Alston argues that there are no, nor are there are likely to be, extant arguments
which show that the practices constitutive of the "standard package,’ viz., SP, memory,
introspection, and inference . 74 Hence, we enjoy, and are likely to enjoy, no arguments
which show that we are justified in regarding such practices as reliable. (That we lack
such arguments does not, of course, imply that those practices are unreliable, or that we
are not epistemically justified in regarding them as reliable.)
72
. Perceiving God, p. 162; “A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,” pp. 5-7; “Taking
the Curse Off Language Games,” p. 35-6.
73
. "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 15.
74
. Actually, Alston vacillates between the claim that it is impossible non-circularly to show that
SP is reliable (Perceiving God, p. 76) and the claim that, because all such arguments to the
conclusion that SP is reliable have failed thus far, we are unlikely to discover an adequate
argument to that conclusion (Perceiving God, p. 143). The latter claim seems the wiser.
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I outline Alston's argument in two steps. First, I briefly indicate what he means by
a practice's being reliable (1.3.1). Second, I indicate why he believes that all otherwise
adequate arguments which purport to show that any of our universal DPs are reliable
suffer from what Alston calls epistemic circularity (1.3.2).
1.3.1 Reliability
A doxastic practice is reliable iff the beliefs formed on its basis are (1 ) likely to be
true (2) in the circumstances in which the practice is normally employed. 75
Ad ( 1 ): In order to be reliable, a DP need not invariably produce true beliefs; it
need do so only most of the time. (Alston does not get very specific about what 'most'
amounts to -- nor can he be expected to given the nature of the case. 76 ) Moreover, this
tendency must not just be true of a practice as agents have in fact engaged in that practice.
A practice which because of limited or selected employment produces a high proportion
of true beliefs, but would not have produced that high proportion were agents to have
engaged in it in a systematic and sustained manner, ought not be regarded as reliable.
Rather, only those practices are reliable which would produce a high proportion of true
beliefs were they employed in a systematic, sustained, and varied manner, whether or not
they have in fact been so employed.
75
. Perceiving God, p. 104; The Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 8; "Epistemic Circularity,"
pp. 320-23; "On Knowing That We Know," pp. 17-19; "Our Knowledge of God," pp. 32-34;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," pp. 33-4; "Goldman on Epistemic Justification," p.
123-24.
76
. The Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 9. Alston also argues that different degrees of
reliability are rightly expected for different DPs. It is typically much more difficult to identify
another agent's state of mind than the number of objects on a nearby table; hence, we ought to
expect our interpersonal DP to be less reliable than SP. See "Goldman on Epistemic Justification,"
p. 121.
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This counter-factual feature of the concept of reliability is internally related to
Alston's requirement that an adequate ground render objectively probable the belief based
upon it. What is that relation? A DP is a grouping of bfds, and a bfd is a tendency an
agent has to form a belief B upon having a correlated ground G. G reliably indicates B
just in case an agent’s having G (in normal circumstances) renders objectively probable
that B is true. And it the world is such that a given belief is likely true if a given ground
obtains, then that would be the case whether or not anyone ever has that ground or forms
that belief. And because a DP just is a grouping of bfds, "a practice is reliable iff its
distinctive belief-forming [dispositions] ... are reliable." 77 Hence, if a given DP is
reliable, it would be reliable even if no-one engaged in it; if it is not reliable, it would not
be reliable whether or not anyone ever engaged in it.
Ad (2): An agent who engages in a practice reliable in standard conditions — in
the spatio-temporal world, of sound mind and body, etc. — may form few or no true
beliefs if she is in non-standard conditions, e.g., ones subject to interference by evil
demons, manipulation by aliens, or, more generally, those environments sufficiently
different from those in which that practice was acquired. That a practice is not reliable
under any and every condition does not imply that it is unreliable in all, especially
normal, conditions. But Alston is concerned with whether we can show that our —actual
human being's — DPs are reliable. Hence, he need be concerned only with whether or not
engaging in our practices tends to produce true beliefs in the contexts in which we
normally find ourselves.
77
. "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 7.
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Suppose that normal human beings do in fact form beliefs reliably; our native
cognitive faculties are adequate to the epistemic task. Were we whisked, suddenly and
secretively, to a world governed by a Cartesian demon, we would form beliefs in the same
way we currently do, although in that world we would fail to discharge our epistemic
obligation. Because, by hypothesis, we would form beliefs in exactly the same way in
either world, Alvin Goldman “intuits” that we form beliefs justifiably in both cases.
Hence, he adopts “normal worlds reliabilism;” a belief is formed reliably when it is
generated by a process which enjoys a high truth-falsity ratio in normal worlds, where a
normal world is one “consistent with our general beliefs about the actual world .”78
Alston rejects Goldman’s proposal, charging it with normal world “chauvinism of the
most blatant sort .” 74 Whether or not a given belief is formed reliably depends upon the
conditions which standardly obtain in that world, not upon the similarity of those
conditions to the standard conditions in our (actual) world. Thus, if God so hard wired
cognitive agents as to form beliefs on a mere whim, and so governed their cognitive
processes as to forestall massive contradictions, that is, if God had created a world in
which DPs unreliable in the actual world were standardly reliable in that world, then
forming beliefs on a whim would be justified for inhabitants of that world. Reliability,
then, is relativized to standard conditions of employment, not to closeness to the actual
world.
8
. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 107.
79
.
“Goldman on Epistemic Justification,” p. 124.
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1.3.2 Epistemic Circularity and Sense Perception
In his attempt to show that there are no non-circular and sound arguments
underwriting the reliability of our most familiar practices - Alston has his eye initially on
the universal ones - Alston pursues the following strategy. First, he restricts his attention
to arguments which purport to show that SP is reliable, primarily because more energy
has been expended on that effort than lor any other practice. Second, he criticizes the
most important extant arguments in support of SP’s reliability. Third, Alston indicates a
problem likely to vitiate any such argument, and concludes that it is unlikely that we will
ever construct sound arguments in support of the practices constitutive of the standard
package.
(Note, however, that Alston never claims to suspend belief in SP's reliability.
Indeed, he assumes that SP is reliable and that claims to the contrary are false. Rather,
Alston's task is "to determine what, if anything, can be done to show that it is reliable.”80)
It would take us too far afield to respond to Alston's formulation and critique of
each of the arguments he canvasses . 81 Anyway, I agree with his conclusion. Hence, I will
just indicate the kind of problem Alston claims afflicts otherwise adequate arguments in
support of the reliability of SP.
Consider the following argument in support of SP's reliability.
80
. Perceiving God, p. 106.
81
. Alston presents the most thorough treatment of arguments in support of the reliability of SP of
which I am aware. See The Reliability of Sense Perception, passim; Perceiving God, pp.
102-145; “Epistemic Circularity,” pp. 323-36; and "The Role of Reason," pp. 157-167. He
concludes that none of them, whether empirical, transcendental, inference to the best explanation,
or linguistic, carry the day.
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( 1 ) Only reliable access to the social and physical world is conducive to our
survival as a species.
(2) We have survived as a species.
(3) Hence, we have reliable access to the social and physical world.
(4) Our only access to the social and physical world is by sense-perception
(5) Hence, sense-perception is reliable. 82
What is wrong with this argument, even granting that all of its premises are true?
It is undoubtedly valid. It is not logically circular - the conclusion is not to be found in
one of the premises. It is what Alston calls epistemically circular', the proponent of the
argument is justified in believing (1) and (2) only if she is already justified in believing
(5). We believe the first premise only by totting up a lot of evidence for the theory of
evolution, and we gather that evidence by forming beliefs about the world by
sense-perception. Hence, if sense-perception is not trustworthy (5), we are not justified in
assenting to (1).
What is epistemic circularity? An argument is epistemically circular iff it
"involves a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing ourselves
to be justified in holding the premises...." 8 . An agent's belief that p commits her to the
belief that q if assenting to p but not q would be irrational, incomprehensible, etc. Why
would assenting to q but not p be irrational? Alston does not say, but I think that the
following is consonant with Alston's approach to epistemology. An agent S is irrational
82
. The argument here is of the same spirit as Quine's observation that "creatures inveterately
wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their
kind." Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press,
1969), p. 126.
83
.
Perceiving God, p. 108; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 37; “A Doxastic
Practice Approach to Epistemology,’' pp. 2-3; "Epistemic Circularity," passim.; "Perceiving God,"
in Journal of Philosophy 83 (November, 1986): 658.
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in assenting to p but not q, and is thus committed to assenting to q if she assents to p, iff
either S could not detend p without also defending q or her reasons for assenting to p
would lack probative force were q false. Thus, S is committed to the reliability of SP
given that she adheres to the theory of evolution because a critic who successfully
undermined her confidence in SP would render her incapable of defending the theory of
evolution. Again, S is committed to the reliability of SP given that she adheres to the
theory of evolution because the evidence on which she might base that theory is probative
only if it indicates something about the physical world, which would not be the case were
SP unreliable.
What is wrong with epistemic circularity? Recall that Alston imposes no higher
level requirements on epistemic justification. I need not be justified in believing that my
belief that p is justified in order for my belief that p to be justified; I need not be justified
in believing that SP is reliable in order for my belief that my cat is sitting on the window
sill to be justified (1.1 .2). Hence, what is wrong with epistemic circularity is not that 1
am not justified in some perceptual belief (2) because I cannot show that SP is reliable
(5).
84
Indeed, that I may be justified in perceptual beliefs without being justified in
believing SP to be reliable allows me to adduce the various beliefs formed by engaging in
SP in support of SP's reliability. Because I need not be "justified in making th[e]
assumption [that SP is reliable], in order to be justified in the perceptual beliefs that give
me my premises..., epistemic circularity does not prevent justification from being
84
. “Epistemic Circularity,” p. 33 1
.
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transmitted from the premises to a conclusion that would have been unjustified except for
this argument ." 85 If SP is reliable, then beliefs formed by engaging in SP are justified and
I may therefore appeal to those beliefs to show that SP is reliable
.
86
What, then, is wrong with epistemic circularity? That arguments of this sort are
insufficiently discriminating
.
87 Any practice, no matter how dubious from an epistemic
point of view, may be justified by arguments afflicted with epistemic circularity. If, say,
astrology is reliable, the beliefs formed by engaging in that practice will be justified and
hence may be used to show that astrology is reliable. But is the antecedent true? Is
Astrology reliable? Do we have reason for supposing that SP is reliable and Astrology is
not?
88
Our epistemic activity appears to be like a black box: we engage in a variety of
DPs - any of which may be reliable, all of which surely are not — without being able to
discriminate among those practices as to their reliability. And to discriminate is clearly
what we require: "...when we ask whether one or another source of belief is reliable, we
85
. The Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 17.
. "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 3.
87
. Perceiving God, p. 148; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 40.
88
. Perhaps an analogy would be helpful. Suppose that I owned two barometers 1 wanted to use to
determine how humid it was outside. I decide to take the first barometer and use it to test itself: at
t, I take a reading and shortly, thereafter, at t2 , 1 take another. I repeat this test over an extended
period of time. If the second reading corroborates the first, and they no doubt will unless the
instrument is wildly defective, I conclude that the first barometer is reliable. I repeat the test for
the second barometer, with the same results. Suppose further that the first barometer is highly
accurate but that the second is dismally unreliable. If the first barometer is reliable, I have
sufficient evidence for the barometer's reliability. Unfortunately, an exactly parallel claim could
be presented in support of the second barometer: if it is reliable, then I have sufficient evidence tor
its reliability. Because the first barometer is reliable, I have adequate evidence for its reliability.
Because the second is not, I lack that evidence. Unfortunately, if 1 desire to distinguish the reliable
from the unreliable barometer, neither argument helps me a whit.
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are interested in discriminating those that reasonably can be trusted from those that
cannot."
89
That we, apparently, lack adequate grounds so to discriminate constitutes our
most important epistemic predicament.
1.4 Alston’s Proposal for Evaluating Doxastic Practices
What should we do given that we cannot show that our basic DPs are reliable
without falling prey to epistemic circularity? Alston argues that, given an adequate
understanding of the human condition, the practically rational course of action is to
engage in socially and psychologically established DPs. And because to engage in a
given practice is to be committed to the belief that it is reliable, it is practically rational
for an agent to regard socially and psychologically established practices as reliable. 90
I present Alston's argument in two steps. First, I distinguish epistemic
justification from practical rationality (1.4.1). Second, I present Alston's central argument
in support of the claim that it is practically rational for an agent to regard as reliable
socially and psychologically established DPs (1.4.2).
89
. Perceiving God, p. 148.
90
. Note the importance of the way in which Alston has framed the central epistemic question to
the plausibility of his argument. Only because doxastic practices are the focus of attention,
because Alston is concerned with our doxastic activity, are considerations of a practical sort
relevant. Were Alston concerned to prove the truth of some principle of epistemic justification,
questions as to what is the most rational course of action would not arise, "since we would not be
discussing doings." Perceiving God, p. 174.
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1.4.1 Practical Rationality and Epistemic Justification
Alston s defense of his account of the epistemic norms governing a rational agent's
belief- forming activity makes use of both instrumental and epistemic premises
.
91 He
does not, however, describe in great detail what he takes instrumental rationality (or as he
calls it 'practical rationality') to be. Nor, more importantly, does he indicate the proper
function of instrumental grounds in epistemic discourse. In this section, I outline an
account which I take to comport with Alston's argument, though I admit that I formulated
it by engaging in a fair amount of poetic license.
1.4.1. 1 Types of Evaluative Criteria
An agent may evaluate engagement in a given DP in light of various types of
criteria - instrumental, aesthetic, moral, religious, epistemic, etc . 92 Which criteria she
employs will be determined by the purpose for which she evaluates her beliefs. Thus, for
example, instrumental evaluation has as its goal the determination of whether or not
engaging in some practice enables an agent efficiently to satisfy her norms, desires, etc.
Agents who so evaluate will therefore have recourse to a criterion like: a given action is
instrumentally rational only if it is the most efficient means to a desired end — the end not
91
. On the importance of distinguishing between practical rationality and epistemic justification,
see William Alston, "Reply to Pasnau," pp. 36-39; and William Alston, "Reply to Critics," in
Journal of Philosophical Research 20 ( 1 995): 68-7 1
.
92
. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 84, 97; "The Deontological Conception of
Epistemology," p. 116; "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 113; and Lawrence
Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 5-8; Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and
Evidence, pp. 47ff. The following relies somewhat on a train of thought Habermas articulates in
"On the Employments of Practical Reason," in Justification and Application: Remarks on
Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran P. Cronin, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 1-17; and
Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, pp. 130-45 and 209ff.
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being subject to critique. Moral evaluation has as its goal the determination of whether or
not engaging in some practice enables an agent to further the common good, discharge
her obligations, etc. The relevant criteria are familiar, e.g., an agent is morally permitted
to act in accord with a given maxim iff a rational agent could will that maxim to be a
universal law, etc. Epistemic evaluation has as its goal the determination of whether or
not engaging in some practice enables an agent to maximize her true, and minimize her
false, beliefs. Thus the proposal: an agent is justified in assenting to a given proposition
iff that belief coheres sufficiently with her other beliefs. Whether or not engaging in a
given kind of practice satisfies the relevant criteria, and is therefore conducive to
achieving the desired goal, determines whether or not engaging in that kind of practice is
instrumentally, morally or epistemically a good thing.
The priority of different kinds of criteria for evaluation demarcate different kinds
of discourse. For example, in instrumental discourse, instrumental criteria are more
important, relevant, germane, etc., than other kinds of criteria. Hence, if an agent's goal is
to determine which kind of car will enable her to travel to and from work the most
rapidly, then the speed of the different candidates (say, a Mazzeratti vs. a Lada) will be
relevant to determining how she ought to achieve her goal; the exploitative conditions of
their production will not. What does it mean for certain kinds of consideration to be
relevant? At the very least, that they override other kinds: faced with a choice between a
fast car produced under exploitative conditions (the Mazzeratti) or a slow car produced in
a just economy (the Lada), the rational interlocutor in an instrumental discourse chooses
93
. A Realist Conception of Truth, pp. 231-64.
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the former
.
94 More precisely, instrumental considerations override all others when
instrumental considerations decide the issue; other kinds of consideration are permissible
in instrumental discourse only if instrumental considerations are indecisive. Given two
equally speedy kinds ot car (a Lada or a Chevrolet), an agent may choose the one (the
Lada) because the other (the Chevrolet) was produced in an unjust economic system.
Similarly for epistemic and moral discourse
.
95
Instrumental conditions are properly
adduced in an epistemic discourse only when epistemic considerations do not decide the
issue . 96
1.4.1.2 Epistemic Justification, Weak and Moderate Rationality
Alston intends to show that engaging in a religious doxastic practice (to be
specified in the next chapter) is epistemically proper . 97 He therefore intends his defense
94
. I admit that this can not be the whole story, because Alston regularly dismisses epistemic
proposals on the ground that they are too demanding, or too rigorous, even though, strictly
speaking, the more demanding or rigorous policy is more conducive to achieving our central
epistemic aim.
9\ An agent might wish to engage in a discussion of the epistemic value of performing some
action, say, torturing a captive so that she divulges information about the enemy, and bracket either
moral or instrumental considerations. When the epistemic issues have been resolved, the
interlocutors may subsequently evaluate the moral standing of performing that action. In that
subsequent discussion, they may conclude that, though the epistemic value of engaging in the
practice in question is very high, engaging in the practice is morally objectionable and, therefore,
objectionable all things considered. Hence, that epistemic considerations override moral
considerations in instrumental discourse does not entail that epistemic considerations, all things
considered, override moral considerations.
96
. To anticipate, Alston will argue that, because we cannot provide truth conducive reasons for
regarding our basic practices as reliable, we can only have recourse to practical considerations for
regarding certain practices as reliable. When addressing issues at the foundations of epistemology,
epistemological considerations fail us and we have to decide those issues on the basis of
instrumental considerations. Perceiving God, p. 182.
97
. Epistemic propriety should not be confused with epistemic justification. Moreover, showing
that a DP is epistemically proper is not necessary for that DP's being epistemically proper, nor
even to claiming that that DP is epistemically proper. Much confusion — see Gale's "The Overall
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of that practice to be a contribution to epistemic discourse about religious belief. But he
does so by weaving together two different types of ground: epistemic, which are
truth-conducive (that is, which render the belief based on them probably true), and
instrumental, which are not truth-conducive.
In order clearly to mark the difference between arguments employing
truth-conducive (epistemic) and those employing non-truth-conducive (e. g.,
instrumental) grounds, and thus to pinpoint why Alston regards his argument as a
contribution to epistemology, I will distinguish between weak practical rationality,
moderate practical rationality and epistemic justification. (Later I discuss strong practical
rationality.)
Alston admits that it would be ideal were he able directly to show that our central
DPs are trustworthy. Were he successful in doing so, and were we to base our belief in
their trustworthiness on the premises of his argument, we would be epistemically justified
in a strong sense in believing them to be reliable. For the kind of positive epistemic
status a belief enjoys which is based solely on truth-conducive grounds, I reserve the
concept epistemic justification. Using the distinction between prima facie and ultima
facie justification discussed earlier:
Argument of Perceiving God," in Religious Studies 30 (1994): 144-45 and Norman Kretzmann's
"St. Theresa, William Alston and the Broad-minded Atheist," in the Journal of Philosophical
Research 20 (1995): 45-66, for two examples -- is caused by overlooking that point. Alston
writes, "...I have made epistemic claims for CMP, e.g., that CMP is reliable. But I do not say here
that I have provided epistemicjustification for those claims," in "Response to Critics," in
Religious Studies 30 (1994): 172. See William Alston, "Reply to Critics,’ in Journal of
Philosophical Research, pp. 76-77
.
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(EP1): An agent’s belief B is prima facie epistemically justified iff B is based on
grounds which render B objectively probable.
(EP2): An agent’s belief B is ultima facie epistemically justified iff B is based on
grounds which render B objectively probable and B is neither undermined
nor rebutted by truth-conducive grounds.
(This is just a recapitulation of the concept of epistemic justification articulated in 1.1.)
Alston denies that we are likely to show that SP, or any other basic DP, is reliable,
and thus that we are capable of showing that we are epistemically justified in believing
that our basic DPs are reliable. As will be clear shortly, Alston’s reasons for regarding
universal and basic DPs as reliable are instrumental and thus have no direct bearing on
the issue as to whether or not such DPs are reliable. If there is good instrumental reason
to engage in those practices, if engaging in those practices enables an agent to satisfy deep
and enduring needs, Alston will have shown that we are practically rational in a weak
sense in regarding those practices as reliable. For beliefs which pass evaluative muster
with respect to instrumental criteria, I reserve the term weak rationality, or rationalityw .
(EP3): An agent's belief B is rational,, iff B is based on adequate instrumental
grounds.
To remain satisfied with showing only that an agent is rational,, in regarding a
given DP as reliable would take Alston outside of the bounds of an epistemic discourse.
As Alston notes, for S "to believe that p because it gives peace of mind or because it
stimulates effort [or one might add, contributes to social stability] may not be conducive
to the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error"; hence, "none of this would render it
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a good thing for S to believe that p from the epistemic point of view." 98 Alston therefore
employs a hybrid concept which employs both epistemic and instrumental considerations
and which is such that, if a belief meets the criteria for the application of that term, that
belief would enjoy (some) positive epistemic status, that is, moderate rationality or
rationality,,,. Recall that a discourse counts as epistemic iff epistemic considerations
override all others when epistemic considerations decide the issue. So long as epistemic
considerations override instrumental considerations, we remain within the ambit of
epistemic discourse. Thus,
(EP4): An agent's belief B is rationalm iff (1) no considerations are available
which indicate the truth of B; (2) adhering to B is weakly rational; and (3)
B is not overridden by truth-conducive grounds.
Alternatively put: if S has no way of showing B to be true, has compelling interests in
assenting to the truth of some belief B and has no reason whatever to believe that B is
false, then B is moderately rational for S.
An argument, therefore, to the conclusion that a given belief is either
epistemically justified or rational^, is properly advanced in an epistemic discourse. An
argument to the conclusion that a given belief is solely rational,, is not relevant to a
discourse concerning the epistemic standing of that belief. However, showing that an
agent is rational,, in believing as she does is essential to showing that she is also rational^
98
. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 96.
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1.4.2 A Practical Argument in Support of Basic Doxastic Practices
Alston begins his argument in support of the rationalitym of believing our central
DPs to be reliable by showing that it is rationalw to believe that those DPs are reliable. He
does so in two steps. First, he shows that it is rational for an agent to engage in socially
and psychologically established DPs (1.4.2.1)." Second, he shows that an agent for
whom it is rationalw to engage in a given practice is committed to believing that that
practice is reliable (1 .4.2.2).
1.4.2. 1 Reflections on the Human Condition
Recall that it is rationalw for an agent to assent to some proposition, or engage in
some activity, if so doing is essential to satisfying crucial interests or desires. It is clearly
rationalw for an agent to engage in certain central DPs (memory, SP, etc.) essential as that
is to the satisfaction of deep and enduring human interests. They are "intimately
intertwined" with wider cultural, economic, political, religious, and social forms of life
and we engage in them well before we are able to reflect on that fact. 100 They have
therefore sunk their roots deep into our self-identity and ceasing to engage in them would
be, to put it mildly, "a very arduous task." 101 They are therefore a "going concern" for
99
. Although (EP3) isolates what it is for an agent to have practical-rational grounds for believing
some proposition, considerations of instrumental rationality also apply to actions like engaging in a
doxastic practice. In the rest of this chapter, in order to avoid proliferating distinctions
unnecessarily, I will use rationalityw and rationality,,, to evaluate not just believings but other
actions as well, such as engaging in belief-forming practices.
I0
°. Perceiving God, p. 169; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 20.
101
.
Perceiving God, p. 169.
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those who engage in them
.
102
In short, engaging in socially established DPs is essential to
engaging in the forms of life in which we always already
find ourselves implicated. All this is ot course seriously understated: the certain
consequence of refusing to remember, smell, look, touch, etc. is death.
Given that most people have good practical reason to participate in the forms of
life of which they are always already members, and given that most people have good
practical reason to engage in those forms of life which sustain their identity, and given
that engaging in the DPs which partly constitute those forms of life is essential to
membership in those forms of life, most people have good practical reason to continue
engaging in socially and psychologically established DPs. Alternatively put, given certain
social and personal goals, and given that she who wills the ends is committed to willing
the means to those ends, and given that engaging in socially established DPs is essential
to achieving those social and personal goals, it is rationalw for an agent to engage in
socially established DPs. To quote Alston, "the most basic way in which social
establishment renders it practically rational [w] to engage in a DP is that to abandon it
would be a disruption of established modes of social life and hence that this should not be
done unless there is sufficient reason to do so ." 103
Since we cannot non-circularly show that socially and psychologically established
practices are reliable, and since we have good practical reasons for continuing to engage
in those practices, "there are no alternatives that commend themselves to rational
102
.
Perceiving God, p. 248.
103
.
Perceiving God, p. 276.
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reflection as superior" than to engage in those practices in which we in have a going
concern
.
104
Given that we will inevitably run into epistemic circularity at some point(s) in
any attempt to provide direct arguments for the reliability of one or another
DP, we should draw the conclusion that there is no appeal beyond the
practices we find firmly established, psychologically and socially. We cannot
look into any issue without employing some way of forming and evaluating
beliefs; that applies as much to issues concerning the reliability of DPs as to
any issue. Hence what alternative is there to employing the practices we find
ourselves using, to which we find ourselves firmly committed, and which we
could abandon or replace only with extreme difficulty if at all? 105
Note that the only practices in which it is practically rationalw for an agent to engage are
those in which she has a going concern. That a practice is socially and psychologically
entrenched is not adequate reason for engaging in it; only if that practice is entrenched in
her society and psyche is it rational for her to engage in it . 106
104
. Perceiving God, p. 168. As this statement makes clear, Alston purports to show that his
epistemic policy is at least as rational as any other, not that it is the most rational, or that it is just
rational. To show that his argument is unsound, therefore, I will need to show that there is some
alternative which is rationally superior to his policy, not that that alternative is the most rational
one. I attempt to do so in 4.3.
105
. Perceiving God, pp. 149-50. Here is another formulation of Alston's argument. Given that
we cannot non-circularly show that any basic DP in which we currently engage is reliable, we are
faced with three alternatives:
(a) continue to engage in the practices in which we already engage;
(b) change practices;
(c) stop forming beliefs altogether.
(C) is impossible for actual human beings. (B) won't extricate us from our epistemic
predicament; we have no reason to believe that any alternative practices in which we might choose
to engage fare any better than SP with respect to the ubiquity of epistemic circularity. So, (a)
seems to be the only rational choice (unless those practices are themselves massively inconsistent,
in which case we ought to cease from engaging in some of those practices).
106
. I note just in passing that Alston provides no precise criteria which are of use in determining
degrees of social and psychological establishment. Although this generates some confusion as to
whether certain doxastic practices count as socially established and therefore as presumptively
innocent for those who engage in them, he can hardly be faulted for failing to provide such
criteria: clear criteria are not forthcoming because the subject matter doesn’t lend itself to precise
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1.4.2.2 Practical Implication
In judging it to be rationalw to engage in a given DP, an agent thereby commits
herself to the rationalityw ofjudging that practice to be reliable
.
107 Why? A DP just is a
way forming beliefs. In judging that it is rational, for an agent to engage in some DP, an
agent commits herselt to judging that she is rational, in forming beliefs in the way
constitutive ol that practice. Similarly, for example, an agent who judges that it is
rational, to engage in the practice of playing chess is committed to judging that it is
rational, to play according to the rules of chess. To form beliefs via DPs is to form
beliefs which participating agents are committed to taking to be true, just as to play chess
is to perform a series of moves designed to win the match by checkmating an opponent . 108
So to judge that it is rational, for an agent to engage in some DP is to judge that she is
rational, in forming beliefs she is committed to taking to be true. Generalizing, it is
rational, for an agent to take the beliefs formed via a DP to be (by and large) true. And to
be committed to taking the outputs of a practice to be (by and large) true is ipso facto to
be committed to taking that practice to be reliable . 109 Hence, in judging it to be rational.
measurement.
107
. “A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,” p. 38; "Reply to Pasnau," p. 38.
108
. Pasnau argues that an agent need not be committed to taking the beliefs she forms by engaging
in a given practice as true; why not treat them 'as if they are true? "Justified Until Proven Guilty,"
p. 12. Alston admits that he and Pasnau may be faced with a "rock bottom clash of intuitions."
"Reply to Pasnau," p. 38. Just because doxastic practices are practices of forming beliefs in which
an agent engages over long stretches of time, beliefs are the kinds of things one takes to be either
true or false, and such that, if one confidently forms them (as we do), one naturally takes them to
be true, Alston finds irrational an agent who forms beliefs without taking them to be true.
109
. Perceiving God, p. 179.
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to engage in some DP an agent is committed to judging it to be rational to believe that
that DP is reliable.
Alston is very clear that judging it to be rationalw to engage in a given DP is not
tantamount to judging it to be rational, to believe that DP is reliable. 110 Consider a
parallel example. An agent who judges X to be a Bible does not thereby judge that X is
God's revelation to human beings, even if that is in fact the case. Simply put, an agent
may never have thought to reflect on the Bible's authorship or know what a revelation is.
Hence, she needn t judge that of X. Rather, to judge that it is rational, to engage in a
given practice is to be committed to judging that it is rational, to believe that SP is
reliable. To be committed to judging q to be the case given that an agent judges p to be
the case is for it to be irrational, incoherent, senseless, etc. for her to assert p and take any
other attitude towards q than acceptance.
111 As Alston notes, his argument hinges on the
validity ofpragmatic implication : even though p does not entail q, nor does it provide
sufficient evidence for q, assenting to p renders incoherent a refusal also to assent to q.
112
It would certainly be desirable directly to prove (provide truth-conducive grounds
showing) that our most familiar and fundamental DPs are reliable. But given the paucity
uo
. Thus, for example, Richard Gale incorrectly formulates one step in the above argument as
follows: "If one accepts as true the beliefs derived from engagement in a DP, one thereby accepts
the DP as reliable...." He then argues that it is possible for those unfamiliar with logic "not to
realize that truth is agglomerative or collective with respect to a conjunction and thus believe of
every output of a DP that it is true, but not believe that all or even most of these propositions and
that the practice is thereby reliable." "The Overall Argument of Perceiving God," pp. 141-42. So
long as Alston does not claim that an agent "thereby" regards a practice as reliable given that she
believes that most of the beliefs formed by it are true, but only that it is irrational for her not so to
conclude if she asks the question. Gale's objection lacks force.
m
. Perceiving God, p. 1 78-79.
I12
. Perceiving God, p. 1 80.
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ot the resources available to us — given the ubiquity of epistemic circularity — at this
fundamental epistemic level, showing that we are rational in believing that they are
reliable is the best we can do. Recognizing that is of the essence of practical rationality,
insofar as to be practically rational is to grasp as clearly as possible the limitations forced
upon us by our human condition. And that we can do no better is a consequence of our
human condition:" '
We are just not in a position to get beyond, or behind, our familiar practices
and criticize them from that deeper or more objective position. Our human
cognitive situation does not permit it. ... We cannot take a step in intellectual
endeavors without engaging in some doxastic practice(s) or other, and what
reasonable alternative is there to practicing the ones with which we are
intimately familiar?" 4
1.4.2.3 Reliability as the Best Explanation of Social Establishment
Just a bookkeeping matter. I will assume for the duration that Alston’s social
establishment criterion does not presuppose that the social entrenchment of a given
practice is indicative of the reliability of that practice. He does seem to be of two minds
about this; sometimes he claims that the fact that large numbers of individuals have
engaged in a given practice over long periods of time is best explained by the fact that
that practice provides its members with the insight into reality that they take it to provide.
Thus, we may infer from the fact that a practice has been socially established that that
practice is reliable. Thus, Alston writes,
" 3
. A position in which Alston follows Reid's lead; see "Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles," p.
447.
" 4
. Perceiving God, p. 1 50.
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When a doxastic practice has persisted over an number of generations, it has
earned a right to be considered seriously in a way that [idiosyncratic practices
have] not. It is a reasonable supposition that a practice would not have
persisted over large segments of the population unless it was putting people
into effective touch with some aspect(s) of reality and proving itself as such
by its fruits. But there are no such grounds for presumption in the case of
idiosyncratic practices. Hence, we will proceed more reasonably, as well as
efficiently, by giving initial, ungrounded credence to only the socially
established practices
.
115
Alston’s endorsement of this “reasonable supposition” is not, fortunately, always so
ringing. He also notes that there are alternative explanations available for the social
entrenchment of a given way of forming beliefs and that these alternatives weaken the
inference from social entrenchment to reliability. Thus,
There are, of course, other possible explanations of the social establishment of
a doxastic practice. The beliefs it yields may satisfy deep human needs, as
Freud supposes that religious beliefs do. It may be in the interest of some
power elite that the beliefs it yields be generally shared. And there are other
possibilities. Since reliability is not the only explanation with some
antecedent plausibility, social establishment does not constitute a very strong
reason for reliability. But since reliability does constitute one explanation that
would nicely account for the phenomenon, that phenomenon does give some
reason for supposing that explanation to obtain .' 16
It seems to me that even the last sentence is objectionable. The fact that the reliability of
a given practice is a possible explanation of its social entrenchment doesn't itself provide
us with any reason to believe of that practice that it is reliable. Apart from information
regarding the manner of its genesis and sustenance, it seems to me that the proper attitude
to take with respect to the reliability of socially established practices is agnosticism -- so
Perceiving God, p. 170.
" 6
.
“Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,” p. 47.
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long as we know only that a practice is socially entrenched, we have no basis at all on
which to judge its reliability. Ot course, Alston s appeal to social establishment criterion
does not require that social establishment is indicative of reliability. Rather, that appeal is
a fallback position to which Alston was compelled to retreat given our inability to show
that basic doxastic practices are reliable. Social establishment is relevant to determining
whether or not engaging in a practice is practically rational and not whether or not that
practice is reliable.
1.4.2.4 Practical Rationality and Epistemic Circularity
It seems on its face that Alston's practical argument is epistemically circular
.
117
The appeal to social establishment in support of the practical rationality of regarding
doxastic practices as reliable presupposes that we are justified in believing that the
doxastic practices in which we engage are in fact socially established. But how are we to
know, for example, that SP is socially established without relying on that very practice?
SP is the only means we have available to us which affords us reliable access to our
natural and social environment. But if epistemic circularity vitiates truth-conducive
arguments in support of SP, why doesn't it vitiate Alston's practical argument as well?
Responding to this objection provides the opportunity to clarify exactly what
Alston’s practical argument is supposed to show. Alston, as I noted, never doubts, nor
does he suggest that we doubt, the reliability of our standard package, viz., SP,
introspection, memory, and rational intuition. But whether or not the standard package is
" 7
. See Perceiving God, pp. 175-76; Richard Gale, “The Overall Argument of Perceiving God,”
pp. 140ff.; and Alvin Plantinga, “What’s the Question?,” passim.
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reliable is entirely distinct from whether or not we can show that they are reliable. Alston
attempts to determine whether or not we can show that our basic practices are reliable by
examining the various arguments in support of SP’s reliability. He argues that all fail.
This has an important implication: that we cannot show that even SP is reliable
undermines any general claim that an agent is epistemically up to snuff only if she can
provide adequate justification for believing that the practices in which she engages are
reliable. This is the crucial negative point Alston needs to make if he is to make good in
the claim characteristic of Reformed Epistemology, viz., that religious doxastic practices
are innocent until proven guilty.
Philosophers are generally in the business of providing reasons for and against
certain theses and so, given that he believes that SP is reliable, he attempts to provide a
less than direct vindication of that conviction. As a consequence of our inability to show
that the practices constitutive of the standard package are reliable, he casts about for some
other kind of consideration which supports the desired conclusion. He settles on practical
rationality. But because considerations of practical rationality are not truth conducive,
because those who present them do not claim that they indicate reliability, practical
arguments should be evaluated in light of different standards than are epistemic
arguments. Judged by the standards internal to epistemic discourse, epistemically circular
arguments fail: were we to accept as legitimate epistemically circular arguments when
attempting to determine whether or not some claim was true, we would not likely satisfy
the obligation to believe the true and not the false. But because practical arguments do
not purport to provide us with reason to believe that a given proposition is true, because
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they provide us with reason to believe that a given action is effective or something of the
sort, that which vitiates the former does not necessarily vitiate the latter. Practical
arguments are relevant because we don’t have anything else to go on; but they should be
evaluated in light of the criteria appropriate to practical discourse and not epistemic
discourse. So long, then, as we keep clear about the point of the appeal to practical
arguments, so long as we remember that Alston is just trying to provide reason of a non-
epistemic sort in support ot a conclusion for which we wish we had epistemic support, we
will not dismiss Alston's practical argument without adequate justification.
1.5 Grounds for Rejecting Socially Established Doxastic Practices
If Alston's argument is sound, it is rationalw for an agent to believe that a given
socially established DP is reliable iff she has a sufficient stake in it. This, Alston is
aware, appears to be unduly conservative. He attempts to dispel that appearance by
indicating (truth-conducive) grounds for disqualifying DPs from rational engagement,
i.e., by providing criteria for determining whether rationalw DPs are epistemically subpar,
i.e., rational^ He identifies two such criteria.
First, any practice which persistently gives rise to a high ratio of contradictory
beliefs cannot be reliable. 118 Hence, it is not a good thing from the epistemic point of
" 8
. Perceiving God, p. 170, 234; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 18; “A Doxastic
Practice Approach to Epistemology,” p. 1 7; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games," p. 4
1
.
Actually, internal inconsistency is not a function solely of the incompatible beliefs generated by a
given doxastic practice, but of the incompatible beliefs generated by that practice which pass the
tests constitutive of its overrider system. That is, only that doxastic practice is unreliable which
generates a high degree of inconsistent ultima facie justified beliefs (justification in this sense
understood as internal justification).
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view for an agent to engage in it. Of course, our universal DPs give rise to contradictory
beliefs — recall the divergent versions of eyewitness' accounts of an accident. But only on
a "fantastically rigoristic epistemology" would an agent count as abdicating from her
epistemic good in regarding SP as reliable simply because engaging in that practice
sometimes produces contradictory beliefs. 11 " Only if the tendency to produce inconsistent
beliefs were extensive and persistent" would we have good reason to regard that practice
(or any other) as unreliable. (In the nature of the case, cashing out with precision to what
extensive and persistent amounts is impossible. 120)
Second, and more dicey than the first, extensive and persistent inconsistency
among the outputs of different DPs is sufficient reason for regarding as least one of those
practices as unreliable
.
1 ' 1
If, say, the products of engaging in SP are inconsistent with the
products of rational intuition and deduction (Parmenides and Zeno), then one of those
three practices is unreliable. And although some have claimed that in a conflict of that
sort, SP ought to be regarded as unreliable, this conclusion is not at all obvious. “Even if
there are such inconsistencies, that does not tell us which is to be condemned .” 122
According to Alston, that practice is to be condemned which is massively and
persistently inconsistent with the output of a "more firmly established" DP . 123 Wide
ll9
. Perceiving God, p. 171. This is not to say that this position has not been held. Alston
mentions Plato and Descartes as two who have.
12
°. Perceiving God, p. 236.
121
. Perceiving God, p. 171; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 18; “A Doxastic
Practice Approach to Epistemology,” pp. 17-8; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” p. 41
.
122
.
Perceiving God, p. 171.
123
.
Perceiving God, p. 171.
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acceptance, definite structure, importance for our lives, innateness, ineluctability, and
obvious truth are the kinds of properties which render one practice more firmly
established than another. To take the opposite course of action, e.g., to continue to
engage in less firmly established doxastic practices, would saddle us with all sorts of
bizarre beliefs. 124
Let me briefly summarize the epistemic principles Alston employs to evaluate the
standing of beliefs about the reliability of DPs. A belief is rational^ iff there are
compelling instrumental grounds for adhering to that belief (EP3). Although one would
think that there are acceptable instrumental grounds of other sorts, Alston appears to
argue that it is rationalw for an agent to regard a practice as reliable only if it is socially
and psychologically established. 12 ' Thus,
(EP5) It is rationalw for an agent to regard as reliable a given DP iff that DP
is socially and psychologically established.
A belief is rationalm iff there are no compelling truth-conducive grounds for refusing to
engage in a practice in which it is rationalw for an agent to engage (EP4). Once again, one
would think that Alston would condone instrumental grounds other than social and
psychological establishment by which the rationalitym of a given practice may be
established. He does not. Thus,
(EP6) It is rationalm for an agent to regard as reliable a given DP iff (1)
there are no truth-conducive grounds for believing that DP to be reliable; (2)
that DP is socially and psychologically established; and (3) the products of
124
.
Perceiving God, p. 172.
125
. That is, not just any old instrumental grounds are acceptable in epistemic discourse, e.g.,
happiness- conducivity, peace-of-mind-conducivity, political-expedience-conducivity, etc. This
dubious assumption causes problems for Alston's argument, as I argue in 4.2
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that DP are substantially internally consistent and cohere sufficiently with
other firmly established DPs.
Clearly, our basic DPs, introspection, SP, memory, rational intuition, are socially
established. And although there is a modicum of intra- and extrapractice inconsistency,
there is not enough to warrant our rejecting those basic practices. According to Alston’s
epistemic criteria tor evaluating doxastic practices, then, our basic DPs pass muster; that
it, it is rationalm for us to regard them as reliable.
[A close reading of Alston’s work indicates that he allows for another important
way of discrediting doxastic practices, viz., by what I shall comparison criticism. (See
chapter three.) By engaging in doxastic practices which we are confident put us in
contact with reality, we learn that certain features of those practices are responsible for its
so placing us. When other practices either lack those features, or lack the functional
equivalents thereof, we regard them as having a lesser epistemic status than the practices
which enjoy those features. Similarly, by engaging in our core doxastic practices, we
learn that certain ways of forming beliefs inhibit us from gaining access to reality. When
members of other practices form beliefs in just those ways, we regard them with
suspicion or outright reject them.]
1.6 Significant Self-Support
No doubt a DP's being socially established, internally consistent, and not
massively inconsistent with other DPs is a very slim reed indeed on which to ground the
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which we may bolster our confidence in the DPs in which we engage? Yes. A practice
which enjoys significant self- support" thereby enjoys a strengthening of its epistemic
status
.
126
What is significant self-support? Significant self-support involves an internal
coherence between the beliefs formed by engaging in a given practice; those beliefs ‘hang
together’ in appropriate ways . 127 Consider, for a final time in this chapter, SP. We may
use what we learn by engaging in SP to predict events in the future. We may determine
whether or not those events occur by employing SP. And the success we enjoy in so
predicting events underwrites our confidence in SP. Why? Not because the success of
SP in predicting events provides the basis for a non-circular argument in support of the
reliability of SP. The only way we know that our predictions are in general accurate — the
crucial premise in any such argument from prediction — is by employing SP to determine
whether or not our predications are accurate. But then we are justified in assenting to the
premises of that argument — namely that our predictions are accurate — only if we are
already justified in assenting to the conclusion we wish to prove — that SP is reliable.
Even if, however, SP is self-supporting in this way, it is significantly
self-supporting. Not only do many other DPs not enable us to predict events accurately,
SP need not have done so. Because not every DP supports itself in the way SP does, and
,26
.
Perceiving God, pp. 173-75; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 18;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," pp. 40-1 ; “A Doxastic Practice Approach to
Epistemology,” pp. 18ff; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” pp. 42f.
127
.
Significant self-support is similar to the various elements of coherence that some theorists
make the end all and be all of epistemic justification.
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because SP supports itself in a way it might not have, we are justly more confident in its
reliability than were SP not so to support itself. SP's claim to positive epistemic status is
therefore much stronger than is a DP which might have, but which in fact lacks,
predictive success — crystal ball gazing, astrology, etc.
Why is significant self-support epistemically important if any argument featuring
such support is epistemically circular? If epistemic circularity vitiates arguments in
support of the reliability of SP, why does Alston claim that significant self-support - or
self-support of any kind — strengthen claims to positive epistemic status? Because, as we
saw above, the problem with epistemically circular arguments was not that they are
unsound, but that they are insufficiently discriminating. And because self-support is
significant just in case it is a feature of some practices but not all, just in case it need not
"extend to every practice," 128 such arguments are not insufficiently discriminating. A
practice which enjoys significant self-support, then, enjoys a higher epistemic standing
than mere moderate rationality. It enjoys strong rationality or rationality,..
(EP7): It is rational,, for an agent to regard a given DP as reliable iff (1) she is
moderately rational in believing that that practice is reliable and (2) that DP
enjoys significant self- support.
Note that enabling an agent accurately to predict is not the only property
possession of which confers upon a practice the property of being significantly
self-supporting. 129 For to require of rational reflection and inference that they enable an
agent to predict is to require of those practices that which they cannot, in virtue of their
128
.
Perceiving God, p. 173.
129
.
Perceiving God, p. 250; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 9.
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"very nature," enable. 130 Moreover, the function of SP in an agent’s life is to enable her to
navigate her way through her social and psychological environment. The function of
rational intuition is very different. Hence, Alston suggests that the function of a DP in its
participants form of life determines what counts as self- support and what does not. 131
1.7 Status of Non-Socially Established Doxastic Practices
What of those practices in which we do not engage, which are not firmly
established? What is their epistemic status? Under what conditions is it a good thing
from the epistemic point of view for an agent to engage in a practice which is not socially
and psychologically established? Alston does not address this question systematically.
Apparently, however, social and psychological establishment is the only kind of
instrumental support Alston condones: that engaging in a practice would make an agent
happy, or further her vocational goals, or just be interesting, does not establish its
rationality, whether weak, moderate or strong. Social and psychological establishment is
not just sufficient but also necessary for the weak rationality of regarding a practice as
reliable. Thus, Alston takes the rather hard line that “newcomers will have to prove
themselves.” 132 Obviously, to prove itself, a newcomer can rely neither on practical
arguments of the sort Alston adduces in support of our familiar practices nor on
13
°. Perceiving God, p. 174.
m
.
Perceiving God, p. 25 1
.
132
. Perceiving God, p. 170; “A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,” p. 17.
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epistemically circular arguments. It would seem that the only other option is the
following:
(EP8) It is rational, (or rationalj for an agent to regard as reliable a given
non-socially and non-psychologically established DP iff that practice has been
shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging in practices in which it is
already rational, (or rationalm) for her to engage.
Let me sum up the epistemic principles Alston suggests we adopt for evaluating
the epistemic standing of doxastic practices. Given Alston s reliabilist rendering of the
concept of epistemic justification, according to which engaging in a practice is
epistemically justified iff that practice is in fact reliable, Alston adopts the following two
principles:
(EP9): It is rationalm for an agent to regard a DP as epistemically justified iff
that DP is (1) socially and psychologically established, substantially internally
consistent, and coheres sufficiently with other firmly established DPs; or (2)
or a non-socially and non-psychologically established practice that has been
shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging in practices in which it
is, in virtue of satisfying (1), already rationalm for her to engage.
(EP10): It is rational, for an agent to regard a given DP as epistemically
justified iff that DP is (1 ) socially and psychologically established,
substantially internally consistent, coheres sufficiently with other firmly
established DPs, and enjoys significant self-support; or (2) a non-socially and
non-psychologically established practice that has been shown to be reliable by
premises formed by engaging in practices in which it is, in virtue of satisfying
(1), already rational, for her to engage.
Recall that, at the heart of the Reformed approach, religious doxastic practices should be
regarded as innocent until proven guilty. (EP9) and (EP10) provide criteria for
distinguishing between presumptively guilty and presumptively innocent practices. In
both (EP9) and (EP10), (1) identifies those practices to which, according to Alston, we
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should impute presumptive innocence and, in both (EP9) and (EP10), (2) identifies those
practices we should regard as provisionally guilty. That is, an agent who engages in a
socially established practice should impute a presumptive reliability to that practice, and
she may remove that presumption by showing that it is internally or externally
inconsistent. An agent who engages in a practice which lacks social entrenchment should
regard her practice as guilty, that is, as unreliable, until shown to be reliable on the
evidence afforded by practices with an established epistemic standing.
Some blanche at the use of legal terminology such as the Reformed
Epistemologists are wont to employ. Thus, for example, Matthew Bagger writes, “the
frequent references to the principle ofjurisprudence, 'innocent until proven guilty,’ signal
Alston s
... protective intentions. Injudicial reasoning we employ this tenet in our
system, not because of its a priori necessity, but because we wish to protect the accused
individual as much as is feasible from mistaken prosecution and punishment. ...The
scholars who propose that we consider religious perception 'innocent until proven guilty’
should explain why we should wish to protect religious perception in this manner.” 133
Several reactions are in order. First, its hard to understand why one would object to a
principle proscribing mistaken prosecution and punishment whether in legal or epistemic
discourse. Second, Alston does not intend to protect only religious belief from external
critique. As the universal applicability of (EP9) and (EP10) testifies, all socially and
psychologically practices should be accorded presumptive innocence. Third, the legal
metaphor is of use in getting the points across that (a) we cannot but engage in certain
l33
. “The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism,” in Religious Studies 29 (1993): 303.
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doxastic practices without already having proven their reliability and (b) that this fact
does not render them immune from criticism. Insofar as that is what the ‘innocent until
proven guilty' metaphor means, I think it entirely defensible.
The use of legal metaphor, then, does not indicate some intention to protect
religious doxastic practices from external criticism. Nor does it connote, or presuppose,
that when we employ (EP9) and (EP10) we are attempting to determine epistemic
blameworthiness. Nor does it imply that the search for the truth is an adversarial rather
than cooperative process. Rather, the metaphor is a helpful device for expressing
guidelines governing what assumptions it is rational for an agent to adopt in her search
for the truth.
1.8 Realism, Foundationalism, and Doxastic Practices
To those for whom answering skepticism is “an essential task of a non-skeptical
theory ofjustification," 1 14 Alston's resolution of the central epistemic question will count
as an unadulterated failure. 1 "" By his own admission, it is possible that an agent be either
strongly or moderately rational in engaging in a given DP and nevertheless fail utterly to
achieve her central epistemic aim. 136 Indeed, that he admits to that possibility, and that he
accords systematic significance to the immersion of all human cognitive agents in social
practices which, with all of their pockmarks, foibles, and frailties, can hardly lay claim to
l34
. Paul Moser, Knowledge and Evidence, p. 91.
,35
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"Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 33. As Jeffrey Stout argues in The Flight from
Authority, (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 25-36.
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our uncritical acceptance, may seem to put Alston in a camp peopled by the likes of
Richard Rorty. According to Rorty, to show that our epistemic principles are rationally
compelling (to answer skepticism) requires that we are privy to a God's-eye view of
reality by which we may compare our beliefs and the realities about which we form
beliefs to determine whether or not the former accurately represent the latter
,
137
or a
"skyhook with which to escape the ethnocentricism produced by enculturation ." 138 That
actual human beings cannot achieve a God's-eye view of reality requires us to pull in our
epistemic horns, to weaken our understanding of truth as correspondence to reality to
truth as that with which our peers will let us get away. Recognizing, as Alston does, our
inability to show that our basic DPs are reliable, that our DP's function in, with, and under
(to wax theological) mere social practices, and that, therefore, "our acculturation [into
doxastic practices- cum-social practices] is what makes certain options live, or
momentous, or forced, while leaving others dead, trivial, or optional," 13" may indicate that
Alston is headed down the same primrose path to relativism paved (or at least, repaved)
by Rorty.
The kind of critique Rorty levels at objectivity, reality, representationalism, etc. is
one salvo in a long-lasting conflict which persists, I believe, primarily because the
disputants face their interlocutors with a series of false alternatives . 140 The incessant
137
. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 170, 176, 178,281,335,361,
etc.; Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth, (Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press,
1991), pp- 6-7, 13.
138
. Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, p. 2.
139
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Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth, p. 13.
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alternation between these alternatives is not necessary, and I believe that an appreciation
of some of the distinctions crucial to Alston's epistemology renders it clear that we are
not faced with only two alternatives: either we aspire to a God's-eye view of reality or we
settle for an identification of truth with adherence to community standards. I would like
to comment on the course Alston proposes to steer between the Scylla of relativism and
the Scarybdis of objectivism. I think that doing so will expose the dependence of Rorty
and those of his ilk on the posing of false alternatives to render their position more
plausible than it is. It will, more importantly, indicate why Alston believes that he is
entitled to the metaphysical realism which we will see (two chapters hence) is crucial to
his defense of religious belief.
1 he tack I will take to articulate Alston's attempt to navigate through these
treacherous waters is to argue that his doxastic practice approach to epistemology is not
in any way incompatible with foundationalism. Alston is, in fact, a foundationalist and
believes that his doxastic practice approach to epistemology is not in any way
inconsistent, or even in tension, with his foundationalism. Why take that tack? Because
Alston's version of foundationalism provides an account of how an agent can be justified
in forming beliefs as a consequence of contact with reality without assuming that she has
a 'skyhook' lifting her out of the mire of contingency, politics, self-deception, etc. By
showing that Alston’s modest foundationalism is fully compatible with his account of
doxastic practices, I propose to show how cognitive contact with reality is possible even
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis, (Philadelphia, PA.:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
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though we lack the 'unmediated' access to reality Rorty denies is available to mere
mortals like us and even though we cannot escape mundane processes like enculturation,
socialization, etc. Moreover, critics like Rorty assume that, when they demolish their
favorite version of foundationalism, they have succeeded in undermining various other
positions historically connected with foundationalism, viz., realism, the correspondence
theory of truth, objective knowledge, etc . 141
According to Alston, foundationalism is an account of the structure ofjustified
belief. 142 Foundationalists claim that justified beliefs are of two sorts: they are either
mediately or immediately justified . 143 As I mentioned earlier, a mediately justified belief
is one the justification of which depends upon its relation to some other justified belief;
an immediately justified belief is one the justification of which does not depend upon its
relation to some other justified belief(s). Foundational beliefs, those which constitute the
substructure of the edifice of knowledge, are immediately justified; they are justified, for
example, by virtue of their being based upon certain experiences, as of being appeared to
redly, rockly, etc. Superstructural beliefs may be proximately based upon other mediately
justified beliefs but somewhere along the line, on pain of either an infinite regress of
l4
‘. On the claim that access to reality presupposes indubitable, infallible modes of belief
formation, see A Realist Conception of the Truth, pp. 99f.
142
. "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?," pp. 41-2; "Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 19.
See Robert Audi, "Overview," p. 3; "Psychological Foundationalism," in The Structure of
Justification," pp. 49f.; Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, p. 95; Ernest
Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in Knowledge in Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 167f.; Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 67-69.
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Alston argues that although foundationalism presupposes that there are immediately justified
beliefs, the claim that some beliefs are immediately justified does not presuppose foundationalism.
"What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?," p. 61.
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justified beliefs or of circularity, those beliefs must be based upon immediately justified
beliefs. That is, superstructural (mediately justified) beliefs are, whether remotely or
proximately, based upon substructural (immediately justified) beliefs.
Various kinds of material may be poured into this structure. Of first importance
is the kind of material we use to construct the foundations. There are many different
possibilities, foundational beliefs must be indubitable, incorrigible, presenting,
self-presenting, reliably formed, certain, necessary, clearly and distinctly perceived, etc . 144
The version of foundationalism articulated by Descartes and Locke, sometimes called
classical foundationalism, placed severe restrictions on what can count as foundational
;
145
critics of foundationalism, mistaking the genus for the species, have identified classical
foundationalism with foundationalism tout court . 146 That is, critics identify
foundationalism with both an account of the structure ofjustification and certain
restrictions on what can count as foundational, they show that those restrictions are
indefensible, and on that basis reject foundationalism . 147 (Perhaps this is because the job
144
. See Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 55-9.
145
. Thus, Descartes: "Reason leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions
which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as 1 do from those which are
patently false." Meditations of First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
vol. 2, trans. John (Nottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), p. 12.
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.
Thus, Rorty conflates, not just foundationalism, but also epistemology, with classical
foundationalism. “The theory of knowledge will be the search for that which compels the mind to
belief as soon as it is unveiled. Philosophy-as-epistemology will be the search for the immutable
structures within which knowledge life and culture must be contained — structures set by
privileged representations which it studies.” Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 163.
147
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Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 79f; Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,
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of the epistemologist is assumed to be to answer the skeptic, and this requires us, in order
not to beg the skeptic's questions, to restrict what can count as foundational to the
indubitable, certain, etc.)
Alston has no intention of allowing the agenda to be set by the skeptic and thus
needs to require of foundational beliefs, in addition to being immediately justified, only
that they be reliably formed
.
148
Reliability, not indubitability, incorrigibility, clarity and
distinctness, is, together with immediacy, necessary and sufficient for a beliefs being part
of the substructure of an agent's cognitive edifice. On what, then, are foundational beliefs
based? On experiences of reality, for starts. If, for example, X’s appearing redly to S
reliably indicates the existence of a red object in S's vicinity, and if S forms the belief B
pp. 170-71; Paul Moser, Knowledge and Evidence, p. 2, 145. Here is a sampling of such
misconceptions. “From this perspective, foundationalists ... are those who want to
...
provide
[knowledge] with a justification where possible, and a critique where none is possible, in order to
rest all our knowledge on a firm, indubitable, unshakable basis. For foundationalists,
epistemology is the central, if not the only, philosophical discipline. Its task is to tell us in a
timelessly true way what can and cannot be counted on in the edifice of human knowledge.” Rick
Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (Oxford: St. Martin’s Press,
1986), p. 8. “A foundationalist position in philosophy is one which claims that philosophy can. by
some method, demonstrate the absolute, universal validity of some conception of knowledge or
morality.” Stephen K. White, The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 129. “A fallibilistic (as opposed to foundationalist) understanding of
validity takes into account that claims to validity are raised in actual, historical contexts, which do
not remain stationary but are subject to change, and also that no one can predict whether changes
in context will have an effect on what is accepted here and now as sufficient justification in
support of the validity of a given claim.” Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason, Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 2-3. “The epistemological hierarchy characteristic of foundational
theories of knowledge and justification, which makes experiential knowledge in some quite
general way epistemologically prior to knowledge of the world, emerges as a by-product of the
fundamental motives for skepticism.” Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological
Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 57-
8 .
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that there is a red object on the basis of her experiencing X, and if she doesn't base that
belief on any of her other beliefs, then B counts as foundational.
But if foundational beliefs need only be reliable, and reliably formed beliefs are
always subject to being overridden, doesn't that mean that B is not immediately justified?
If B is merely reliable and thus dubitable and corrigible, and if S may doubt its truth on
the basis ot the further belief that she is in a room bathed in red light, then isn't B
dependent for its justification on S’s belief that she is not in a room bathed with red light?
No. Although other beliefs may override the prima facie justification of B, B is not based
on those other beliefs; B is based on S's experience of being appeared to redly . 149 If it
turns out that B is false, then B no longer belongs to the substructure of her doxastic
edifice and all of S's beliefs essentially dependent for their (mediate) justification on B's
being justified also drop out. But so long as it is possible for an agent to base B on a
given ground without having to base B on other beliefs, that B is defeasible does not
render impossible immediate justification. In Robert Audi's terminology, B is positively
dependent on S's experience as of seeing a red object and B is negatively dependent on
the lack of defeaters. Foundational beliefs cannot be positively, but can be negatively,
dependent on other beliefs . 150 Foundationalists are committed to unmoving, but not
unmovable, movers.
In addition to denying that substructural beliefs must be based on indubitable,
incorrigible, etc., grounds, Alston also denies that substructural beliefs must be, not only
l49
. See section 1.1.
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°. "Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, Defeasibility," in Robert Audi, The Structure of
Justification, pp. 105-1 12; see also Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 185.
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immediately justified, but also shown to be justified. That is, for belief B to count as
foundational, B must be based on reliably indicative grounds, but S need not show that B
is based on reliably indicative grounds. Iterativefoundationalism is the claim that a
higher level requirement of this sort must be imposed on foundational beliefs . 151
Alston rejects both classical and iterative foundationalism, and he does so for the
same reason. The principle argument in support of a foundationalist epistemology is the
familiar regress argument
.
152 The following is a simplified version of that argument.
Suppose that, contra foundationalism, all justification of belief is mediate. A belief B is
justified, then, by being based upon a different justified belief B *. 153 B* must be justified
in some way or other; because all justification is mediate, B* must be based upon a
further justified belief B**. Similarly with B**. Either this sequence ofjustifications
never ends, or it terminates. If it does not terminate, then anyone who has a justified
belief must ipso facto have an infinite hierarchy of beliefs — which seems quite a burden
to impose on any and every justified belief no matter how simple and uncontroversial. If
the sequence ofjustification does terminate, it cannot conclude either with B**'s being
based on non-doxastic grounds (as foundationalists like Alston would have it) or with
B**'s being based on nothing at all. The first case would violate the condition that all
151
.
"Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 25.
152
. "Two Types of Foundationalism," pp. 26-7; Lawrence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge," pp. 17fi; Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, p. 21. Interestingly enough, Michael
Williams claims that it is the most powerful argument in support of skepticism as well! See
Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, pp. 6-8.
153
. I am simplifying for the sake of clarity. Most mediately justified beliefs are not just based on
just one other belief; hence the unilinear structure ofjustification employed in the argument is a
drastic oversimplification. But I cannot see that it prejudices the conclusion unfairly.
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justification is mediate; the second would render suspect the justification of earlier steps
in the sequence - its hard to see how B or B* could be justified if based on an unjustified
belief, which B** surely would be if it lacked grounds altogether. There is only one other
option. B is justified by being based on one ot the beliefs in the sequence prior to it.
But that gives rise to a vicious circularity: B is based on B*, B* on B** and B** on either
B or B*. It seems, then, that we must deny that all justification is mediate;
foundationalists are correct: all mediately justified beliefs must (proximately or remotely)
be based upon immediately justified beliefs.
According to Alston, the regress argument provides foundationalism with its
strongest support. Nothing in the regress argument, however, requires either (1) that
immediately justified beliefs must be indubitable, incorrigible, etc.; or (2) that an agent be
justified in believing that her immediately justified beliefs are immediately justified. 154
And, because neither (1) nor (2) are essential to foundationalism's strongest argument,
foundationists like Alston are free to reject them. Alston, as a reliabilist of sorts, requires
of substructural beliefs only that they be reliably formed, thus rejecting classical
foundationalism. As we saw earlier, Alston rejects higher-level requirements for
justification, and therefore denies that an agent can only be justified in adhering to some
belief B if she is justified in believing that B is reliably formed; hence his version of
foundationalism is inconsistent with iterative foundationalism. Nevertheless, because he
retains the structural claim distinctive to foundationalism, that is, the claim that beliefs
are of two sorts, mediate and immediate, with the former enjoying their justification by
l54
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being based on, whether remotely or proximately. the latter, he remains within the ambit
of foundationalism.
Note that Alston’s claim that substructural beliefs are immediately justified does
not entail that substructural beliefs do not depend for their generation and maintenance on
other beliefs, cultural mores, social practices, linguistic practices, forms of life,
conceptual structures, or the like . 155 The immediacy of a foundational belief does not
entail that it is absolutely independent of the social (any more, of course, than it entails
independence of an agent's neurophysiology); foundationalists are "not committed to the
view that the possibility of first cognitions in no way depends on the existence of
anything outside one's momentary states of mind ." 156 Were Alston to require of
substructural beliefs that they be causally independent of the social, there would be a
crucial incoherence in his general epistemology; his doxastic practice approach to
epistemology would be inconsistent with his foundationalism. Rather, according to
Alston, immediacy entails only that the justification of a belief, not its existence, is
155
. This pace, e.g., Charles Taylor. “Even in our theoretical stance to the world we are agents.
Even to find out about the world and formulate disinterested pictures, we have to come to grips
with it, experiment, set ourselves to observe, control conditions. But in all this, which forms the
indispensable basis of theory, we are engaged as agents coping with things.... But once one takes
this point, then the entire epistemological position is undermined. Obviously foundationalism
goes, since our representation of things— the kinds of objects we pick out as whole, enduring
entities, for instance— are grounded in the way we deal with these things.” “Overcoming
Epistemology,” p. 476. Taylor confuses the causally necessary conditions of the existence of some
belief with the necessary conditions for its justification. Just because an agent can form beliefs
about some object only because she manipulates it, interacts with it in various and sundry ways,
does not entail that her beliefs about that object are based on her manipulations and thus are
justified in virtue of being so based.
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independent of other beliefs, cultural mores, social institutions, and the like . 157 Alston
writes.
The question of what [justifies] a belief only arises once a belief is formed.
That question presupposes the existence of the belief and thus presupposes
any necessary conditions of that existence. ...To suppose that the conditions
tor forming the belief are themselves conditions of [justification], and hence
determinative of the choice between mediate and immediate, is to confuse the
levels of questioning. It would be like arguing that since a necessary
condition of my making a request (orally) is that I have vocal chords, part of
what makes me justified in making that request is that I have vocal chords.
The existence of immediate knowledge is quite compatible with a
thoroughgoing coherence theory of concepts, according to which one would
not have a single concept without having a whole system of concepts, and
even with the further view that the possession of a system of concepts requires
having various pieces of knowledge involving those concepts . 158
In short, a "minimal foundation is independent of every other cognition in that it derives
its justification from none. But that by no means implies that it is nomologically possible
for such a belief to occur without a supporting context of social practices ." 159
Alston's minimal foundationalism dovetails nicely with his doxastic practice
approach to epistemology. An agent learns to form beliefs as she does by being
socialized into a given social practice. The skills she acquires during the process of
socialization enable her to form beliefs as a consequence of contact with reality, in the
way minimal foundationalists like Alston would have it. That she cannot extricate herself
157
. Thus, Alston's version of foundationalism is compatible with Searle's thesis that "to have one
belief or desire, 1 have to have a whole Network of other beliefs and desires." The Rediscovery
of the Mind, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 176.
158
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 100.
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Irom her socio-cultural skin, in the sense that she cannot provide non-circular justification
for the claim that the way in which she has been socialized puts her in a strong position to
get at the truth, does not obviate the fact, if it is a fact, that she forms beliefs in a reliable
manner. (She A justified in forming beliefs as she has been socialized to form beliefs
even if she cannot show that she is so justified. 160 ) She has no epistemic reason to think
that she is not in a strong position and she has every instrumental reason for thinking that
she is. It is, therefore, moderately rational for her to continue forming beliefs in the way
she is accustomed to forming beliefs. In short, Alston’s doxastic practice approach to
epistemology allows an agent to claim that she forms her beliefs about reality without
saddling her with the impossible onus of attaining a God's-eye view of reality. As such, it
is appropriate to the human condition.
In this chapter, I have attempted to articulate the contours of Alston's doxastic
practice approach to epistemology. (EP9) and (EP10) are the apex of that approach.
Alston believes that rational reflection on the human condition, and more particularly, on
the limitations of our cognitive powers, commends (EP9) and (EP10) as the most rational
policy for us to adapt. He also claims that religious beliefs formed on the basis of
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. I mentioned earlier three distinctions crucial to Alston's doxastic practice approach to
epistemology: between the state of being justified and the activity ofjustifying, defending,
providing reasons, arguing, between mediate and immediate justification, and between epistemic
levels. Alston employs each in his formulation and defense of minimal foundationalism. One can
'reconcile' Alston's full appreciation of the immanence of human cognitive activity in socially and
culturally conditioned doxastic practices with his claim that human beings can form justified
beliefs about an independently existing reality if one appreciates (1 ) that an agent can Rejustified
in forming beliefs about reality without having any idea as to how to justify that claim; (2) that
requiring of an agent that she defend the (higher level) belief that she has justified beliefs about
reality should not be confused with the requirement that she be justified in the (lower level) beliefs
she forms about reality; and (3) that an inability to vindicate the higher level belief does not
impugn the justification of lower level beliefs.
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mystical experience count as epistemically proper according to that policy,
case for that matter now.
I turn to his
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CHAPTER 2
THE VINDICATION OF PERCEPTION OF GOD
Alston attempts to vindicate the epistemic standing of a practice of forming
beliefs about God which he calls the Christian Mystical Practice (CMP). He stipulates
that he cannot non-circularly show that CMP is reliable, just as he cannot show that SP is
reliable. He has to settle, therefore, for showing that it is rational and rational, for an
agent to believe that CMP is reliable. In order to show that it is rationalm for an agent to
regard CMP as reliable, Alston needs to show that engaging in CMP is weakly rational.
In order to show that CMP is weakly rational, Alston needs to show
(a) that CMP is a genuine doxastic practice; and
(b) that CMP is socially and psychologically established.
In order to show that CMP is moderately rational as well, Alston needs to show, further,
that
(c) that CMP is internally consistent; and
(d) that CMP is consistent with more well-established practices.
In order to show that an agent is strongly rational in regarding CMP as reliable, Alston
needs to show as well
(e) that CMP enjoys significant self-support.
In (2.1), I present Alston's argument in support of the claim that CMP is a species of a
perceptual doxastic practice, and in (2.2), Alston's response to objections to the claim that
CMP is a genuine socially established practice (a and b). If he succeeds in so arguing,
Alston will have established the weak rationality of believing that CMP is reliable. In
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(2.3), I present Alston’s response to various arguments to the conclusion that CMP is
internally inconsistent, inconsistent with more well-established practices, or unreliable in
some other respect (c and d). It successful, Alston will have gone a long way toward
establishing the moderate rationality of believing that CMP is reliable. In (2.4), I explain
the respect in which CMP enjoys significant self-support (e), and thus enjoys strong
rationality.
2.1 Vindication of the Weak Rationality of the Christian Mystical Practice
Given Alston's account of DPs (1.2), the case for the rationalityw of believing
CMP to be reliable must consist of showing that CMP is constituted by a family of bfds
and an overrider system, and that CMP is socially established, autonomous,
interdependent, etc. 1 Alston will conclude as follows. First, there are some human
beings who appear to themselves to perceive God; it is possible that God presents himself
to human consciousness; and it is possible that God is causally related to human
consciousness in the manner appropriate to perceived objects (2.1.1). Second, agents
who form beliefs about God employ an overrider system to evaluate those beliefs (2.1.2).
Third, CMP enjoys the various other features of a genuine DP (2.1.3). There is
apparently a practice of forming beliefs about God which meets the criteria for counting
as a genuine DP — where genuine does not entail reliable.
'. This should make it clear that Alston's argument is not an argument from analogy, viz., to the
conclusion that engaging in CMP is rational,, because engagement in CMP is analogous to
engaging in SP, and engaging in SP is rational,. Although Alston often compares (favorably)
CMP and SP, his claim that it is rational, to engage in CMP is grounded in the theory of doxastic
practices. See Perceiving God, p. 223.
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2.1.1 The Christian Mystical Practice
Alston argues that CMP is a species of perceptual practice. That is, the bfds
constitutive of CMP, like those constitutive of SP, realize a function which takes an agent
from 'seems to be X' to 'is X.' In so doing he pursues the following strategy: he analyzes
the paradigmatic instance of perceptual practice, viz., SP, identifies those features of SP
which make it a perceptual practice and then determines whether or not CMP possesses
those features. Analysis of SP indicates that the family of bfds constitutive of the first tier
of any prospective perceptual practice must satisfy two sets of requirements. First,
members of a perceptual practice must form beliefs on the basis of experiences with a
given phenomenological character, a mode of consciousness I discuss in (2. 1.1.1).
Second, for members of a perceptual DP to perceive, they must not just be in that state of
consciousness, but they must also be rightly related to that which is perceived. I discuss
these external, non-phenomenological, requirements of perception in (2.1 .1 .2).
2. 1.1.1 The Phenomenology of Perception
What kind of character does an agent's consciousness have when forming
perceptual beliefs? What does an agent appear to herself to undergo when perceiving?
According to Alston, the paradigm of perceptual consciousness is that an agent appears to
herself to be directly presented with an object. 2
2
. Faced with the objection that this account of perceptual consciousness is too broad, in that it
does not rule out especially vivid memories as apparent perceptions, Alston further develops his
analysis. The object with which an agent is apparently presented also appears to be external to the
perceiver, thus ruling out introspective states as objects of perceptions, as well as presently
existing memories. See George Pappas, "Perception and Mystical Experience," and William
Alston, "Reply to Commentators," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54/4
(December, 1994): p. 881 and 896 respectively.
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First, presentation. Essential to perception, according to Alston, is the
phenomenon of presentation to consciousness. An agent perceives an object only if she is
aware of that object, if it is given for, or presented to, her consciousness. When I sit in
front of my computer, my eyes open and mind alert, I perceive that computer in front of
me. The computer assumes a place in my visual field. If I turn my head, I no longer see
my computer; it no longer occupies a place in my visual field. I may recall that computer,
or imagine it, but it is no longer present to me. If I turn my head to its former position, I
once again become aware of the computer, and I am aware of it in a different manner than
merely remembering or imagining it. It is again present to my consciousness.
Presentation to consciousness distinguishes perception from mere conception, fantasizing,
judging, believing, hoping, wishing, etc.' Presentation to consciousness is distinct from,
and cannot be reduced to, structures ofjudgements, ways of conceiving, or the like. “And
so even if all perceptual awareness of facts involves judgement, it by no means follows
that all we are aware ofin such perception is a judgement .”4
3
. Perceiving God, p. 5, 14-5, 27, 36-38, 55, 186; "Externalist Theories of Perception," in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (September, 1990): 96; "Precis of Perceiving
God," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54/4 (December, 1994): 863; "The
Perception of God," in Philosophical Topics 16 (Fall, 1988): 28f.; “Literal and Nonliteral Reports
of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and Language, Stephen Katz, ed., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), pp. 84-5. What about the all-important problem of hallucinations? What
does an agent perceive when hallucinating? Visual images, of the sort many have regarded as the
only objects of which an agent is directly aware. "As 1 construe the theory [of Appearing], it takes
a mental image to be what is directly presented to consciousness only in those cases in which no
external physical object or state of affairs is available for this role." Perceiving God, p. 56.
4
. A Realist Conception of Truth, p. 94. Presentation is distinct from conceptualization and
judgement even if the former is causally related to the latter in such a way that being presented
with some object unavoidably involves conceptualizing it in some way or other. See Rene
Woudenberg, “Book Review: Perceiving God,” in International Journal for the Philosophy of
Religion, 3
1
(October, 1994): 1 17-24; and Paul Moser, Knowledge and Evidence, p. 87.
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Adequately to appreciate this feature ot perceptual consciousness requires that we
distinguish between an object’s appearing as such and such and an agent's taking that
object to be such and such. An object may look a certain way to an agent without her
conceiving that object as being that way: an agent may be aware of a tree with the
property of greenness without having at her disposal the concept of green and thus
without conceiving of that tree as green. This is the case even though, as Alston notes,
something's looking green typically evokes in an agent attributions of greenness - which
attributions do require conceptualization
.
6
Alston writes.
Normal perceptual experience is shot through with 'interpretation.'
Nevertheless, what makes this a matter of perceiving the house, rather than
just thinking about it or remembering it, is the fact of presentation,
givenness, the fact that something is presented to consciousness, is something
of which I am directly aware. And this is something that is distinguishable
from any elements of conceptualization, judgment, belief, or other forms of
'interpretation,' however, rarely the former may be found without the latter in
adult experience . 7
Alston mentions several reasons for denying that presentation is identical to
conception, judgement, etc. and thus that perceiving an object necessitates
5
. Perceiving God, p. 36-9; "Externalist Theories of Perception," pp. 79-80, 82. "It is possible, in
principle, for this book to visually present itself to me as blue even if I do not take it to be blue,
think of it as blue, conceptualize it as blue, judge it to be blue, or anything else of the sort."
William Alston, "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model," quoted in Mark McLeod, Rationality
and Theistic Belief, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 18. See Fred Dretske,
Seeing and Knowing, (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 4-18. For the
contrary, see Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California
Press, 1985), pp. 41-74; and Joseph Runzo, “The Propositional Structure of Perception,” and “The
Radical Conceptualization of Experience,” in Worldviews and Perceiving God, (Oxford: St.
Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 3-22 and 23-44 respectively.
6
.
Perceiving God, p. 37. See John Searle, The Rediscovery of Mind, pp. 133-37.
7
. Perceiving God, p. 27.
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conceptualization. The most simple is that presentation is a non-intensional
phenomenon, whereas conception is not. IfX (say, a Bible) presents itself to an agent and
X is identical to Y (God's definitive revelation to humanity), then it follows that Y
presents itself to that agent. If, however, an agent conceives of an object O as X (as a
Bible), and X is identical to Y, it does not follow that she conceives of O as Y (as God’s
definitive revelation to humanity).
Second, direct presentation. According to Alston, presentation of objects to
consciousness may be either direct or indirect. An agent directly perceives some
(external) object X iffX differs from the conscious state of perceiving X and she does not
perceive X in virtue of perceiving any other object . 8 An agent indirectly perceives some
(external) object X iffX differs from the state of consciousness of perceiving X and if she
perceives x in virtue of perceiving some other (external) object. When she perceives a
tree by looking into a mirror, an agent perceives that tree in virtue of perceiving some
object distinct from the tree, viz., the mirror. If an agent perceives an object (e.g., her
face) in virtue of perceiving some other object (a mirror), she perceives the latter directly
and the former indirectly . 9
Getting clear on what Alston means by direct presentation requires that we
distinguish that concept from others in the neighborhood. Both direct and indirect
perception differ from what Alston calls ‘indirect perceptual recognition.' An agent
indirectly recognizes a given object when she perceives some object which functions as a
8
. Perceiving God, p. 35.
9
.
Perceiving God, p. 21
.
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sign or indication of another such that she has to infer the presence of the signified from
her perception ot the signifier. 10 Thus, an agent may directly perceive a vapor trail in the
sky, and infer from her perception of the trail that a plane has recently passed by. The
plane is never perceived, but its existence has been inferred from that which has been
seen.
Direct presentation is also distinct from what Alston calls ‘absolute immediacy.’
An agent's awareness of her conscious states is unmediated (or what Alston terms
absolutely immediate'); that is, there is no distinction between an agent's being aware that
she is in a given conscious state and the conscious state of which she is aware. 11 The two
states are identical. Thus, for example, when an agent is aware of feeling glum, she is not
aware of an object distinguishable from her feeling glum. This immediacy does not
obtain between objects directly perceived and the state of perceiving it. When an agent
directly perceives a tree, she perceives it through a conscious state, a state readily
distinguishable from the perceived tree. Only if the object perceived is thus distinct from
the state of perceiving that object may an agent be said directly to perceive that object. 12
(Of course, that an agent directly perceives an object does not preclude causal
intermediaries between perceiver and object: whenever an agent sees a tree, light waves
are reflected from the tree to her retina; nevertheless, she does not perceive the light
waves.)
I0
. Perceiving God, p. 21
.
". Perceiving God, p. 21; “The Perception of God,” p. 30.
' 2
.
Perceiving God, p. 22; "The Perception of God," p. 30.
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Alston announces that he will focus primarily of putatively direct rather than
indirect perceptions of God because direct perceptions are simpler and more
fundamental. Indirect perceptual recognition and absolute immediacy, not being species
of perception at all, play no role in his argument.
Is there a mode of consciousness in which an agent appears to herself to be
directly presented with God? Yes. Alston argues as follows. Various agents report of
having directly perceived God. Their reports relate various experiences which range from
the proverbial mystical merging of individual identities to the divine to a dim tacit
awareness of God as sustaining an agent's very being. Sometimes those experiences are
sensorily mediated, as when an agent is aware of God by gazing at the heavens on a starry
night, but they typically lack sensory mediation. Sometimes they are spontaneous and
ecstatic, but may be the consequence of discipline and planning . 14 Those with which
Alston is concerned are not ineffable . 15
Here are some samples of the kind of phenomenon on the basis of which,
according to Alston, agents form beliefs about God.
I was in perfect health: we were on our sixth day of tramping, and in good
training. We had come the day before from Sixt to Trient by Buet. I felt
neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and my state of mind was equally healthy.
I was subject to no anxiety, either near or remote, fore we had a good guide,
and there was not a shadow of uncertainty about the road we should follow. I
can best describe the condition in which I was by calling it a state of
equilibrium. When all at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above
13
.
Perceiving God. p. 28.
14
. Perceiving God, pp. 32-3; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 2-3.
15
.
“Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,” p. 83. On the claim that religious
experience is, or even must be, ineffable, see Keith Yandell, The Epistemology of Religious
Experience, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 61-1 15.
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myself, I felt the presence of God— 1 tell of the thing just as I was conscious
°f it— as if his goodness and power were penetrating me altogether.
...The
state of ecstasy may have lasted four or five minutes, although it seemed at
the time to last much longer. ...The impression had been so profound that in
slowly climbing the slope I asked myself if it were possible that Moses on
Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God. 1 think it
well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor, nor
taste, moreover, that the feeling ot his presence was accompanied with no
determinate localization. It was rather as if my personality had been
transformed by the presence of a spiritual spirit. But the more I seek words to
express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of
describing the thing by any of our usual images. At bottom the expression
most apt to render what I felt was this: God was present, though invisible; he
fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him. 16
Then, in a very gentle and gradual way, not with a shock at all, it began to
dawn on me that I was not alone in the room. Someone else was there,
located fairly precisely about two yards to my right front. Yet there was no
sort of sensory hallucination. I neither saw him, nor heard him in any sense
of the word ‘see’ and ‘hear,’ but there he was; I had no doubt about it. He
seemed to be very good and very wise, full of sympathetic understanding, and
most kindly disposed toward me. 17
One day when I was at prayer ... I saw Christ at my side— or, to put it better,
I was aware of Him, for I saw nothing with the eyes of the body or the eyes of
the soul [the imagination]. He seemed quite close to me and I saw that it was
He. As I thought, He was speaking to me. Being completely ignorant that
such visions were possible, I was very much afraid at first, and could do
nothing but weep, though as soon as He spoke His first word of assurance to
me. I regained my usual calm, and became cheerful and free from fear. All
the time Jesus Christ seemed to be at my side, but as this was not an
imaginary vision I could not see in what form. But I most clearly felt that He
was all the time on my right, and was a witness of everything I was doing....
If I say I do not see Him with the eyes of the body or the eyes of the soul,
because this is no imaginary vision, how then can I know and affirm that he is
beside me with greater certainty than if I saw Him? If one says that one is
like a person in the dark who cannot see someone though he is beside him, or
that one is like somebody who is blind, it is not right. There is some
similarity here, but not much, because a person in the dark can perceive with
16
.
Anonymous, quoted in William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York,
NY.: Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 68-69.
17
.
Anonymous, quoted in Perceiving God, p. 17.
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the other senses, or hear his neighbor speak or move, or can touch him. Here
this is not so, nor is there any feeling of darkness. On the contrary. He
appears to the soul by a knowledge brighter than the sun. 1 do not mean that
the sun is seen, or any brightness, but there is a light which, though unseen,
illumines the understanding. 18
Normally, an agent is the best judge ot her own states of consciousness. 14 Hence,
if an agent describes her mode of consciousness as having a certain phenomenological
character, if she describes what she appears to herself to experience, we ought (in the
absence of powerful reasons to the contrary) to regard as accurate her description of those
appearances. Of course, that an agent accurately renders her mode of consciousness does
not entail that she accurately depicts that of which she is aware; although she may appear
to herself directly to perceive God, she may not in fact be doing so. Nevertheless, it
would be foolish to deny the accuracy of her description of what appears to her, and thus,
that some human beings appear to themselves to be directly aware of God.
Moreover, agents appear to themselves to form beliefs about God as a
consequence of God's putative presentation to their consciousness; indeed, they habitually
do so. Hence, some human beings have acquired bfds which realize functions taking
them from a putative direct awareness of God to a belief about God. Alston dubs beliefs
formed on the basis of apparent direct presentations of God, Manifestation beliefs or M-
beliefs, and the practice of forming such beliefs, Mystical Perception (MP). :o
18
. St. Theresa, quoted in Perceiving God, p. 13.
19
.
Perceiving God, p. 40. “Each person is in a uniquely favorable position to acquire knowledge
of his own current conscious states.” “Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access, in
Epistemic Justification, p. 286.
20
.
Perceiving God, p. 1 ; “Perceiving God," p. 655.
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Note that Alston stipulates that perception of God is perception of a being
understood roughly as the three central monotheistic religions have understood that being,
viz., as omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent, etc. 21 Because Alston builds into the concept
ot mystical perception a direct awareness of an object with specific theistic properties,
beliefs formed as a consequence of an apparent direct awareness of a non-theistic ultimate
reality do not count as M-beliefs. 22 So stipulating does not, of course, entail that
members of non-theistic religions can not form justified beliefs by perceiving the object
they venerate. It just means that they have to call those beliefs something other than M-
beliefs — at least, if they want to use Alston's terminology.
Two brief digressions. First, as mentioned above, Alston primarily concerns
himself with showing that it is rationalm and s for agents to regard CMP as reliable. CMP is
obviously a different practice than MP; in fact it is a species of the latter. On what basis
does Alston distinguish between MP and CMP? Different religions provide adherents
with different creeds and thus with differing grounds for evaluating M-beliefs. Just
because any incompatibility between an M-belief and a component of a given doctrinal
system may serve to rebut that M-belief, and because different doctrinal systems provide
different grounds for rebuttal to their adherents, there are as many different overrider
systems as there are different religions. 23 And because a difference in overrider system
suffices to distinguish one DP from another, there are as many different practices of
21
.
Perceiving God, p. 2, 29; "The Perception of God," p. 25.
22
. This move has no substantive implications, since putative experiences of a different kind of
object can serve as the basis for the prima facie justification of beliefs about that different object in
just the same way as M-beliefs do for beliefs about the theistic God.
23
.
Perceiving God, p. 7, 30, 191, 262.
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forming beliefs about God on the basis of our perceptual experience as there are different
religions. MP is actually composed of various distinct DPs . 24
For reasons of brevity, his own familiarity, and no doubt his convictions, Alston
restricts his attention to one such practice, viz., the Christian Mystical Practice. Keep in
mind, however, that the same arguments in support of the rationality of engaging in CMP
will be available to Islamic and Jewish variations of MP, not to mention Buddhist, Flindu,
animist, etc., versions of something like MP . 25
Second, Alston's argument differs from the kind of case more commonly made by
appealing to putative perceptions of God . 26 Arguments to the conclusion that God exists
from the premise that some agents experience God typically rest on the claim that the
existence or activity of God provides the best explanation of peculiar religious
experiences like an agent's (apparently) losing herself in the divine, an undifferentiated
and ineffable union with God, etc. According to this alternative formulation of the
argument from religious experience, the explanandum (mystical union with God in the
proverbial sense) is a subjective experience to which an agent adds a supematuralistic
explanans . 27 The bone of contention is, therefore, whether or not supematuralistic
24
.
Perceiving God, p. 256; “Reply to Critics,’ in Religious Studies, p. 177; “Religious Diversity
and Perceptual Knowledge of God,” p. 438.
25
. Perceiving God, p. 276. 'Something like,' of course, because Alston builds into the concept of
MP an awareness of God understood theistically.
26
.
Perceiving God, p. 3; 66.
21
. Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience, p. 108.
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explanations are the best available explanations of mystical union
.
28
Alston, let it be
noted, is neutral with respect to the soundness of such arguments.
His project is very different
.
29 He is a direct realist about perception of God (as he
is about the perception of objects in the natural environment): perception of God is the
presentation of an object to consciousness without necessary mediation by inference,
explanation or interpretation. Beliefs formed on the basis of direct awareness of God
enjoy justification, it they do, because, and only because, the way God appears reliably
indicates the way God is, not because appeal to God constitutes the best explanation of a
subjective experience. That is, the way in which M-beliefs incur justification is precisely
parallel to the way in which beliefs about the natural world are justified, i.e., via direct
awareness of objects . 30
Back to the main topic. CMP appears, initially, to satisfy the internal
(phenomenological) requirement for counting as a genuine perceptual DP. In fact,
however, the troubles have just begun, troubles resulting from a respect in which CMP
differs from SP. If those who engage in CMP share with members of SP a disposition to
base beliefs on a putative direct awareness of an object, in what respect(s) does CMP
differ with SP? In part perception in CMP is (typically) non-sensory/ 1 whereas that in SP
28
. "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 106.
29
.
Perceiving God, p. 25, 286-87; "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107.
30
. For an analysis of the apologetic prospects of both explanatory and perceptual models of
religious experience, see William Hasker, “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience:
Perceptual and Explanatory Models,” in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith:
Essays in Honor of William Alston, Thomas Senor, ed., (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press,
1995), pp. 150-69.
31
. The reason for the ‘typically’ qualifier is that Alston admits that it is possible indirectly to
perceive God, say via an awareness of a majestic waterfall, just as it is possible to perceive a
94
is always sensorily mediated. ’ 2 Why does this difference cause problems for CMP? It
seems incredible that the awareness of agents who suppose themselves to be aware of
God in generically the same way that they are aware of objects in the environment is
neither mediated by sensory impressions, nor caused by the stimulation of any physical
sense organ. Didn't Kant and Hume elevate to philosophical orthodoxy the maxim that
there is no perception without sensation? Clearly, Alston is claiming that there are some
ideas which cannot be traced back to any complex of sensory impressions; should we not
therefore consign his work to the fire?
According to Alston, orthodoxy in this case, is wrong. To suppose that
presentation, as a mode of consciousness which contrasts with reflection, introspecting,
recalling, can occur only via sensation, "simply evinces a lack of speculative
imagination." 3 ’ Just as it is possible that there are modes of presentation which operate
via the stimulation of senses different from the five which human beings happen to have,
it is also possible that there are modes of presentation which fail to operate through
physical stimulation of the senses altogether. We ought not translate lack of imagination
into a priori constraints on what human beings can know. We can only know on the basis
waterfall via a mirror. Alston denies Gale’s claim that, invariably, “people in our human epistemic
circumstance who say that they perceive a sunset as an expression of God s love, unlike those who
say that they simply feel God’s presence or God’s comforting them, are making inferences to the
existence of God.” Richard Gale, “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” in Reason and the
Christian Religion, p. 43. That is, Alston resists assimilating indirect perception to indirect
perceptual recognition, however frequently the two are confused. Perceiving God, p. 28. But
because he believes that indirect perception of God is either atypical or typically confused with the
indirect perceptual recognition of God, Alston pays it little attention.
32
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 3.
33
.
Perceiving God, p. 1 7.
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of experience whether or not God can appear non-sensorily and directly to our
consciousness, just as we can know only on the basis of experience that muons and
leptons can t, yet mountains and planets can, present themselves to us. 34
More serious is the difficulty of identifying the phenomenal content of mystical
perception. Agents form perceptual beliefs by attributing to external objects properties
correlative to (typically) very complex sensory arrays. Which belief an agent forms is a
function of the complex of sensory qualia an object (apparently) presents to her. For
example, an agent will be disposed to form the belief that there is a basketball in front of
her rather than that there is a Porsche if she experiences the familiar orange, black-
striped, round sensations. Why? Because she has learned that that kind of sensory array
reliably indicates basketballs and not Porsches. The functions realized by the bfds
constitutive of SP take an agent from the way an object appears to the way that object is.
An agent learns from experience what those functions are and thereafter adopts what
Alston calls adequacy assumptions, viz., assumptions that a given sensory array reliably
indicates a given object with given properties. 35
According to Alston, the generic notion of perception, of which sense-perception
is the paradigmatic but not sole instance, is not "conceptually tied to any particular
selection of phenomenal qualities." 36 (That is, it is possible that an agent perceive an
object without sensing that object.) Essential to the generic concept of perception is not
34
.
Perceiving God, p. 59, 64, 95.
35
.
Perceiving God, p. 48, 84, 178.
36
. Perceiving God, p. 43.
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sensation but presentation, givenness, awareness. Nevertheless, every instance of
perception must involve objects of perception being phenomenally qualified in some
respect or other, perceived objects always present themselves as something: good, green,
round, etc. If no such respects are available, there can be no determinate relation between
ground and belief-- God's appearing in such and such a way and the belief that God is
such and such. Were putative perceptions of God to lack distinctive phenomenal
characteristics, that would surely count against MP's standing as a genuine instance of
perceptual DP. In what respect(s) is awareness of God phenomenally qualified in CMP?
In the reports cited by Alston, and in those replete (in my experience) in religious
discourse, putative perceptions of God present God as possessing various properties: God
is perceived as loving, good, fatherly, wise, forgiving, condemning, etc. But none of
these properties characterize God as giving rise to phenomenal qualities on the order of
those proper to sense perception (colors, shapes, feels, etc.). God does not present
Himself as forgiving in the same sense as a tree presents itself as green. Being forgiving
is, if anything, a disposition to act in certain ways in certain situations, and therefore
cannot be read from a phenomenal array in anything like the same way as can greenness. 17
Or can it? According to Alston, we must distinguish between the way an object
visually appears from the properties of that object which give rise to those appearances,
and thus between concepts of phenomenal qualia and concepts of the objective properties
which tend to give rise to phenomenal qualia. 8 When we use 'green' in its phenomenal
37
.
“Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,” p. 90.
38
.
Perceiving God, p. 44-45; “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,” p. 90.
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sense to describe some object, we isolate its distinctive visual appearance. But when we
use 'green' in its objective sense, we pick out the physical properties of that object in
virtue of which it will give rise to certain phenomenal qualities under certain conditions:
given the property of absorbing all spectra of light save green, an object will appear to
competent observers in normal conditions to be green . 39 If, when we say 'This tree looks
green,' we mean something like, 'This tree looks to me as a green tree would be expected
[in virtue of its having such and such objective properties] to look under normal
conditions,' we are employing an objective concept of greenness to describe our
experience.
Alston argues that when an agent reports of experiencing God as forgiving,
loving, wise, etc., she is using objective concepts to describe what she experiences . 40 In
claiming that she is aware of God as forgiving, an agent means something like T was
aware of God as presenting the kind of appearance a forgiving being would be expected
to present in such and such circumstances.’ And in employing objective concepts to
describe her experience, she is at one with her ordinary practice of describing objects
sensorily perceived. For, although there is in principle no barrier to constructing a very
39
. “A phenomenal concept is a concept of the intrinsic qualitative distinctiveness of a way of
appearing (looking, smelling...). When I use the word Ted’ in a phenomenal sense, in saying that
something looks red, I am simply recording the qualitative distinctiveness of the way it visually
appears to me and that it all. I am saying nothing about its continuing powers and proclivities, its
entanglements with other things, its intrinsic nature, or anything else that goes beyond the visually
sensible character of its look. When, on the other hand, I am saying something about the
disposition of the object to look one way or another under one or another set of circumstances,
and/or its physical structure powers, or capacities.” “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical
Experience,” p. 90.
40
.
Perceiving God, p. 46; “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports ot Mystical Experience, p. 92.
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complex phenomenal concept capturing just the way, say, a football stadium appears to
an agent under various conditions, the magnitude of that task is far beyond our cognitive
capacities. Given the complexity ot the ways in which most objects may appear, the
limited number of basic phenomenal concepts, and the familiar human cognitive
limitations, we cannot but employ objective concepts in describing what we perceive.
"Being in no position to classify complex appearances according to their intrinsic
features, we are driven to classify them in terms of what objective sorts typically appear
in that way." 4 ' Similarly for perception of God.
How does an agent know what it would look like for God to appear as forgiving,
loving, etc.? By her experience with forgiving, loving, etc., human beings. Any (healthy)
human being regularly interacts with those to whom she commits wrongs, whose
forgiveness she requires, and (one hopes) whose forgiveness she receives. Those
"humble exemplifications" provide her with a model for grasping how a forgiving person
normally acts in various kinds of circumstance, a model she cannot but employ when
perceiving God . 42
There is a final problem. Our objective concept of greenness is parasitic on a
phenomenal concept . 43 How a green tree looks under certain conditions must be cashed
out by a phenomenal concept of greenness; when we employ an objective concept ot
greenness we presuppose that there is some qualitative distinctness of the appearance
41
.
Perceiving God, p. 47;
42
.
Perceiving God, p. 48.
43
.
Perceiving God, pp. 45-47; “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience," p. 93.
99
captured in a phenomenal concept regardless of whether we are explicitly using that
phenomenal concept.
As noted, such concepts are often much too complex to formulate explicitly.
Nevertheless, we can identify the basic kinds of phenomenal qualities of which such
concepts are composed: shapes, colors, etc. What kinds of basic phenomenal kinds are
intrinsic to CMP?
Though he does not deny that there are such basic kinds of distinctive appearances
for CMP, Alston denies that we are capable of delineating them (as we are with respect to
the appearances of objects in SP). But this need not worry us. We are able to identify
and categorize the phenomenal appearances accompanying our different sensory
capacities because those capacities and the objects we perceive by employing them are to
a significant degree under our control. 44 By varying the conditions in which we employ
them, we can determine the physiological and psychological conditions in which they
may be stimulated — “Placing a basketball in front of competent observers in normal
conditions causes them to have round, orange, qualia.” We may therefore predict when
we will have certain phenomenal appearances — “Whenever we place a basketball in front
of a competent agent in normal circumstances, she will experience round, orange qualia."
On the basis of this control and prediction of sensory appearances (which control extends
far into the past), we have been able to construct a shared language about those
appearances — “‘Roundness’ is the word we use to describe the shape a competent agent
perceives when a basketball is placed in front of her.”
44
.
Perceiving God, p. 49; “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,
v
p. 94.
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We are not similarly in control of the object about which one who engages in
CMP forms beliefs. Because God s intentions and purposes determine when and under
what conditions God will be present to an agent's consciousness, an agent who engages in
CMP is incapable of determining under what conditions God tends to be perceived and
therefore of predicting when she will perceive God. We therefore lack the means
whereby to identify the phenomenal features of mystical experience, categorize divine
appearances, construct an intersubjectively shared language for speaking of them, and
dimensionalize them. 47 This does not count against the genuineness of CMP, however.
Why? Because we can explain why it is unreasonable to expect that we should be able to
identify the qualia distinctive to CMP. 46 Given the possibility that this explanation is
true, indeed, given that it is what we should expect given God’s nature, our inability to
isolate divine appearances provides us with no reason to doubt that there are such
appearances and thus that it is possible that CMP has all of the properties possessed by a
genuine perceptual practice. 47
45
. Perceiving God, p. 49, 5 1
.
46
. We may also explain why mystical experience is so often regarded as ineffable. “Perhaps it is
this inability to specify phenomenal qualities in a more direct way that is chiefly responsible for
the frequency of complaints of ‘inexpressability.’” “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical
Experience,” p. 95.
47
. I should point out, though I don’t have time to go into the matter in any detail, that Alston
spends a considerable amount of effort attempting to identify the role(s) an agent's prior beliefs
play in the formation of a given perceptual belief. See Perceiving God, pp. 77-101 and “Literal
and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,” pp. 94-102. Of central importance is his claim
that we typically employ the beliefs to which we adhere prior to a given perceptual experience to
establish the identity of the object presented in that experience. Thus, “in supposing that I have
been directly aware of God communicating a certain message to me, I suppose that it is the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, creator of heaven and earth, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is
communicating that message to me. I do not learn from that experience that the source of the
message is the creator of heaven and earth. Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc., but it is part of
what I take to be true in forming the M-belief.” “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge
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2. 1.1.2 External Requirements of Perception.
In addition apparently to being directly aware of God, an agent engaging in CMP
must also satisfy the external requirements of a genuine perceptual practice
.
48 An agent
succeeds in perceiving some object, not only it she finds herself apparently presented
with an external entity, but if that entity actually exists, and if she is related to it in the
right way. How do we determine what those external requirements are? Sense
perception is our paradigm of a perceptual doxastic practice; we begin, therefore, by
identifying what those external requirements are in sense-perception. But because sense-
perception is merely a species of perceptual practice, we need to abstract from a
requirement of sensory qualia, the stimulation of sensory faculties, and other
characteristics distinctive to sense perception. Only then should we attempt to determine
“whether it is possible that those requirements should be satisfied by a non-sensory
experiential awareness of God .”49
of God,“ p. 439. Why is that important? Because “the complete M-belief cannot be prima facie
justified for me, unless I am prima facie justified in the identification of the communicator.”
“Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,” p, 439. That is, I can't be fully justified
in forming a given M-belief unless I am also justified in adhering to those beliefs by which I
identify the object of perception. And why is that important? Because it shows that Alston's
defense of the rationality ofCMP depends upon the completion of the larger and even more
problematic project of defending the rationality the Christian scheme of things. Alston's defense
of CMP, even if entirely successful as far as he attempts to take it, still depends for its success on a
more general vindication of the Christian scheme of things. Moreover, his account of the function
of beliefs in the identification of objects perceived is essential to defusing objections to the
conclusion that members ofCMP have no way of insuring that they perceive the same object. See,
for example, William Forgie, “Mystical Experience and the Argument from Agreement,” in
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 1 7/3 ( 1 985): 97- 1 07.
48
. Perceiving God, p. 36, 54; "The Perception of God," p. 32.
49
.
Perceiving God, p. 55. See Richard Gale, “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” p. 57.;
“Why Alston’s Mystical Doxastic Practice is Subjective,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 54/4 (December, 1994): 871.
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Resolving that issue is complicated by the contentious nature of the philosophy of
perception. Widely divergent accounts of the concept of perception cohabitate without
any signs of peaceful consensus in the offing. In this essay, 1 will briefly articulate two
accounts of the concept of perception, Alston's Theory of Appearing (TA) and a causal
version of the Sense Datum Theory (SD).
Alston's account is very simple. According to TA, an agent perceives X iffX
appears as so-and-so to that agent/ 0 TA endorses our common sense understanding of
what it is to perceive (an understanding Alston articulates in his phenomenological
account of perception), that is, as the direct presentation of an object. Perception is what
it appears to perceivers to be: a relation between an independently existing object and a
cognitive agent. What conditions must be added to direct awareness of an object in order
for that awareness to count as a perception of that object? Nothing, so long as the object
actually presents itself to the perceiver. 51 Note that, although TA does not analyze
perception into a certain kind of consciousness and some other factor (like causal
contributions of the proper sort), it does presuppose that an agent who perceives must be
causally related to the object of perception/ 2
50
. Perceiving God, p. 55; "Externalist Theories of Perception, p. 74.
51
.
Perceiving God, p. 56.
52
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 1 2. "If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to
one in a certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it would appear that
we can enunciate no further conceptually necessary conditions for perception. But that does not
follow. In declaring that the concept of appearance (presentation) is unanalyzable I was merely
denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent formulation in other terms. I was not denying
that conceptually necessary conditions can be formulated in other terms." "Experience of God: A
Perceptual Model," quoted in Mark McLeod, Rationality and Theistic Belief, p. 19.
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According to SD, an agent's perception of an object may be analyzed into two
components. First, an agent who perceives is directly aware of an object - not an object
in the external world, but ’images in the mind,' sense data. Second, an object in her
environment gives rise to those sense data. Perception may be analyzed into a certain
kind of consciousness and some further condition . 53 What further condition must be met
by the genuine perception? Obviously, there are causal relations between perceiver and
perceived; perhaps the further condition is that the two must be causally related.
Unfortunately, there are a variety of causal relations between perceiver and perceived,
e.g., neurophysiological processes are clearly necessary for perception of any object to
occur .
54 However, even though neurophysiological processes play a causal role in the
process, they are not perceived. Hence, playing a crucial causal role in the process of
perception is not a sufficient condition of an object's being perceived. Clearly, the object
perceived must play a causal role of the proper sort . 55
We may identify for each sensory modality what that role is: reception of light in
the retina, transmission of sound waves to the ear drum, etc. Unfortunately, no-one has as
yet identified a causal condition for the generic concept, that is, any modality, of
perception. We therefore lack sufficient conditions for when an object playing a crucial
causal role in the process of perception is in fact perceived: we do not know what makes
for the proper sort of causal role in perception. Hence, "about all we can say here is that,
53
.
Perceiving God, p. 56-7.
54
.
"Externalist Theories of Perception," p. 76.
55
.
Perceiving God, p. 57.
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on externalist theories [those which require for perception more than a direct presentation
of an object], in order that S perceive X by virtue of undergoing sensory experience, E,
there must be some ’suitable' way in which X figures in the causation of E." 56
Do agents perceive God according to the conditions for genuine perceptions laid
out in TA and SD? Alston’s strategy for defending the rationality of engaging in CMP
precludes him from a frontal assault on this question; that is, it precludes him from
showing that agents actually perceive God.' 7 Why? We are currently attempting to
establish that CMP is a genuine perceptual practice, in order to use that proposition as a
premise in an argument to the conclusion that it is rational for an agent to believe that
CMP is reliable and thus that she perceives God. Ordinarily, to perceive is to be correctly
related to an object; 'perceive' is a success term. If Alston is to use the premise that CMP
is a genuine perceptual DP in an argument the conclusion of which is that she perceives
God, he must denude the employment of the concept of perception in his first premise of
the connotation of success it enjoys in ordinary parlance. Therefore, Alston attempts only
to determine whether or not, if God exists, (1) it is possible for God to appear to an agent,
as TA requires, and (2) it is possible for God to play an appropriate causal role in the
process of perception, as SD requires.
Ad (1): Which entities can appear to our consciousness is an empirical matter; no
amount of a priori speculation can determine whether quarks and leptons but not rabbits
and mountains can present themselves to human beings. Such a matter must therefore be
56
.
Perceiving God, p. 57.
57
. Perceiving God, p. 36, 54.
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answered inductively. Because there are many who claim that God directly presents
Himself to their consciousness, and because there are no (good) empirical arguments
against that possibility
,
58
it is prima facie reasonable to suppose that it is possible that
God can non-sensorily appear to human agents. What considerations might rebut this
prima facie case?
Two objections are pertinent. First, because we lack any conception of the
mechanisms by which mystical perception occurs, because we can't imagine any way of
perceiving an object save by sensory stimulation, we can discount the possibility of
perceiving God . 59 This objection is arbitrary, however, because no-one would deny that
those who engaged in SP when we knew little or nothing about the mechanisms by which
light reflects off of objects in the environment, strikes the retina, etc., were incapable of
perceiving objects in their environment. Understanding the way a cognitive process
works is not a necessary condition of that process' being reliable and certainly not of its
possibly being reliable . 60
Second, there is no way in which an infinitely powerful, omniscient, unchanging
being could appear to a human agent . 61 God is too 'big.' Thus, Alasdair MacIntyre, "If
God is infinite, how can he be manifest in any particular object or experience? The
definition of God as infinite is intended precisely to distinguish between God and
58
. As Alston notes, our best account of the nature of sensory perception provides us with good
reason to suppose that God cannot present Himself to sensory experience. But that provides us
with no good reason for denying that God directly presents Himself to non-sensory experience.
59
.
Perceiving God, p. 59.
60
.
Perceiving God, p. 60.
6I
.
Perceiving God, p. 60.
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everything finite, but to take the divine out of the finite is to remove it from the entire
world of human experience." 62 Dispelling this objection requires that we exorcize
obfuscatory pictorial images of perception. Perceived objects need not fit into an agent's
head in order for that agent to perceive that object. More seriously, according to TA,
perception is a relational concept; in order for an agent to perceive an object, she needs to
be presented with that object, and properties like aseity, infinity, immateriality, etc. do not
preclude the possibility of such a relation obtaining. 63
Ad (2): As mentioned above, there is no general criterion which isolates that
causal condition which must be met by any object of perception, no matter the modality.
The causal relation between a seen object and the agent seeing it differs from the relation
between a heard object and the agent hearing it. 64 We are not sure what those two kinds
of causal relations have in common, and even less sure what causal relation a mode of
perception differing from the familiar five sensory modes would have to be like. Lacking
such knowledge we have to decide the issue by the seat of our pants, in an ad hoc manner.
The general contours of our search are clear, however: first, we have to determine what
an agent has actually perceived, accumulate a significant number of veridical perceptions,
etc.; second, only then can we identify the causal process mediating the object perceived
and the perceiving subject. Identifying the causal relation proper to a given mode of
62
.
"Visions," in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York: The MacMillan Co.,
1995), p. 256.
63
.
Perceiving God, p. 60.
64
.
Perceiving God, p. 69.
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perception requires that we acquire a quite substantial amount of knowledge before we
begin the process of isolating the causal relations giving rise to that knowledge
.
65
Similarly for CMP. In order to isolate the causal relation God must meet in order
that an agent perceive God, we have to acquire a substantial amount of knowledge about
God. That is, we have to engage in CMP to determine the appropriate causal relation
between God and the perceiving agent .66 However, our lack of control over the boundary
conditions of perception of God renders us incapable of identifying the appropriate such
causal condition. If God appears to us, God does so at God’s will and timing. Because
we cannot place God in front of us and manipulate our sensory apparatuses so as to
delimit the various and sundry conditions in which we can and can't perceive God, we
cannot identify the conditions God meets when an agent perceives God. However,
because we can explain this deficiency in our knowledge of the inner workings ofCMP
as a consequence of the nature of the subject matter, we are warranted in believing that it
is possible to perceive God without being able to isolate the causal conditions of such
perception . 67 CMP may be highly reliable, and thus epistemically under par, even if its
members are incapable of identifying the causal relations God satisfies when they
perceive Him.
65
.
Perceiving God, p. 65.
66
.
Perceiving God, p. 65.
67
. Alston mentions several possible such causal conditions (though not the mechanism by which
that condition is met), viz., when God intentionally presents Himself to an agent's awareness or
when God keeps a given experience in existence. In the latter case one would have to explain the
fact that agents often fail to perceive God. One might so explain by identifying various barriers
human beings erect between God and themselves which render them incapable of perceiving God
(as when a tree reflects light in my direction, but I move behind an opaque wall, or my synapses
misfire, or I am focusing on something other than the tree).
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2.1.2 CMP’s Overrider System
Does the family of bfds by means of which agents form M-beliefs have an
overrider system? Clearly, an agent who forms beliefs about God on the basis of her
putative direct awareness of God often evaluates those beliefs in light of other beliefs.
Most members of main-stream Christian communities would discount the truth of beliefs
grounded on putative experiences of God if those beliefs were incompatible with central
tenets of their creed. 68 Thus, for example, putative perceptions of God as spiteful, or of
God telling me to "kill all of the phenomenologists I can find," 69 are defeated because
they conflict with central moral teachings of the Christian tradition. That is, participants
in CMP would reject any M-belief not "in consonance with the picture of the nature,
purposes and doings of God that has been built up in that community." 70 Whether formed
by engaging in CMP, by interpretations of sacred texts, or by natural theology, well-
established religious traditions provide their adherents with a rich, complex, and varied
doxastic and procedural grid by means of which those adherents may evaluate M-
beliefs.
71
Is it permissible that beliefs formed otherwise than by perceiving God constitute
CMP's overrider system? Does the influx of beliefs formed by natural theology,
interpretation of sacred texts, or church tradition compromise the autonomy ofCMP?
No. As mentioned in (1.2.3), the overrider systems of memory, introspection and SP
68
.
Perceiving God: 188-91.
69
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 8.
70
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 8.
71
.
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 113.
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employ beliefs formed by other practices . 72 As Coady has argued, the vast majority of
sense-perceptual beliefs cannot be either corroborated or discontinued without
uneliminable dependance on testimony
.
73 MP's overrider system as well will employ
beliefs formed in other practices: memory, SP, as well as from sacred writings and natural
theology
.
74
The necessity of providing checks and investigative procedures for evaluating M-
beliefs was not, and still is not, merely an academic question . 75 That this is the case is
indicated by the (in)famous confrontation between Thomas Muntzer and Martin Luther.
Let me digress a bit to discuss that revealing case in point.
At his first pastorate (Zwickau), Thomas Muntzer fell under the influence of
Nicholas Storch and learned from Storch the stock in trade doctrines of medieval
millenarianism. Storch revived the old Taborite doctrine that the Last Days were at hand,
that the Anti-Christ must rule over the world, and that the Elect would rise up and
exterminate the ungodly, so that the Second Coming could take place and the Millenium
begin. Not surprisingly, the ungodly were identified with the privileged classes . 76
72
. Perceiving God, p. 159-61.
73
. Testimony, pp. 133-51.
74
. "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," p. 447.
75
. For ancient history, as well as present concerns, about the problems the Christian Church has
faced with the anarchistic tendencies of mystical experience, see Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm,
(London: Collins, 1950).
76
. Storch held that "those in authority live only in lust, consume the sweat and blood of their
subjects, eat and drink night and day, hunt, run, and kill Everyone should therefore arm
himself and attack the priests in their fat nests, beating, killing, and strangling them, because once
the bellwethers are removed, the sheep are easier to handle. Afterward the land-grabbers and
nobleman should be attacked, their property confiscated, and their castles destroyed." Quoted in
Niklas Hausman, "A Report concerning the Zwickau Prophets," in Christianity and Revolution:
Radical Christian Testimony, Lowell H. Zuck, ed., (Philadelphia, PA.: Temple University Press,
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As with every doctrine of election, Muntzer and Storch had to find some criterion
by appeal to which the Elect could be distinguished from the reprobate. They claimed
that the Elect were those who received immediate revelations from God. Immediate
revelations are instances of communication in which God conveys determinate
information without relying any of the five senses to convey that information; they lack
mediation because God does not reveal Himself by stimulating physical sense organs.
Immediate revelations are roughly what Alston refers to by the term mystical experience,
save that the former tend to convey much more specific information than Alston believes
is typically contained in M-beliefs. LInfortunately, because immediate revelations are
necessarily unidentifiable by publicly accessible means, reception of immediate
revelations is not a helpful criterion for identifying the Elect.
Relying on another tradition, this time a mystical one, Muntzer and Storch
claimed that only those who have been through great tribulation are capable of immediate
communication with God . 77 According to this tradition, only the "pure in heart will see
God" and suffering purges and purifies an individual of her sin. Muntzer and Storch
integrated this notion of immediate revelation with their militant eschatology — the Elect
were those willing to take up arms against the ungodly and were willing to suffer the
persecution this entails. Since the ungodly were identified with the privileged classes.
1975), p. 30.
11
. "But God does disclose himself in the inner word in the abyss of the soul. The man who has
not received the living witness of God knows really nothing about God, though he may have
swallowed 100,000 Bibles. God comes in dreams to his beloved as he did to the patriarchs,
prophets and apostles. He comes especially in affliction." Quoted in Roland Bainton, Here I
Stand: A Life of Martin Luther, (New York, NY.: New American Library, 1950), p. 204.
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Muntzer and Storch advocated revolution — the peasants were to take up arms,
exterminate their rulers, and thereby initiate the Second Coming.
Muntzer's combination of millenarianism and mysticism exacerbated the social
unrest of the peasantry and helped to spark the German Peasant's War. In 1523. Muntzer
took up a pastorate in Allstadt and formed the League of the Elect, which boasted 30 units
prepared to slaughter the ungodly. 78 Although the only rebellious activity actually to
emerge from the League was a desecration of a statue to Mary, tensions ran high, and
continued to escalate. In order to extinguish this volatile situation, Martin Luther
addressed a Letter to the Princes of Saxony, in which he urged the Elector Frederick
and his brother Duke John to banish Muntzer. 74 In the Letter, Luther attacked Muntzer's
revolutionary millenarianism on both political and theological grounds.
On a political level, he argued that rebellion leads to social chaos, since it
obliterates the distinction between the legitimate, socially sanctioned, use of force, and
the illegitimate, socially dysfunctional use of force, as in banditry, extortion, and piracy. 80
78
. "The basic principle of [Muntzer's] league was that all things are common to all men; that its
aim was a state of affairs in which all would be equal and each would receive according to his
need; and that it was prepared to execute any prince or lord who stood in the way of its plans."
Norman Cohn, In Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical
Anarchists of the Middle Ages, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 241
.
79
. "Letter to the Princes of Saxony Concerning the Rebellious Spirit," in Luther's Works, vol.
40, (Philadelphia: Augsburg Press, 1958).
80
. Luther writes, "Can you not imagine it, or figure it out, dear friends? If your enterprise were
right, then any man might become judge over another, and there would remain in the world neither
authority, nor government, nor order, nor land, but there would be only murder and bloodshed; for
as soon as anyone saw that someone was wronging him, he would turn to and judge and punish
him. Now if that is unjust and intolerable when done by an individual, neither can it be endured
when done by a band or crowd. ...How, then, do you expect to stand with God and the world,
when you do your own judging and avenging upon those who have injured you, nay upon your
rulers, whom God has ordained." WL, 4:228.
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[Luther believes he has justified the legitimacy of any established social order with
various proof-texts from the Bible. 81
] Since social chaos is never in the interest of any
populace- even the most repressive tyranny is better than no government at all, and since
the Elector is duty bound to satisfy the needs of his subjects, the Elector’s duty is to crush
any rebellion.
On a theological level, Luther attacked Muntzer's reliance on immediate
revelations. Luther, as is well known, had a deep appreciation for the way in which moral
depravity permeates an agent s every activity. Hence, he could not help but wonder
whether the enthusiasts' policy of legitimating some course of action by appealing to an
essentially private revelation is not an attempt, however innocent, to legitimate personal
pride and political aspiration. In order to guard against the danger of misconstruing his
own subjective desires as a divine visitation, Luther requires of the enthusiast some
intersubjectively accessible means of distinguishing genuine from spurious revelations.
Because Luther believes that Muntzer has no such criterion, and because he believes that
the Scriptures are the only reliable source of true beliefs about God's will, he implores
Muntzer to defer to the canon when his putative revelations conflict with the claims
expressed in the Bible, specifically, with those which prohibit insurrection.
This is just the position Luther takes in his Letter. He writes, "If they attempt to
justify themselves (as they usually do with big words) by saying that the spirit impels
them to achieve their goal by resorting to force, I would reply: ...their boasting about the
Spirit means nothing, for we have the word of St. John that we should 'test the spirits to
8I
. WL, 3:233.
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see whether they are of God .'" 82 An agent ’tests the spirits' by submitting to an
'examination,' in which she compares the claims she attempts to justify by appeal to
dreams and visions with the written record of God's will in the Bible. But the Bible
forbids insurrection. 8 -' Hence, Muntzer's construal of immediate revelations as
communications from God can only be a human, sinful pretension.
Notice that, for Luther, an examination before one's peers on theological matters
is possible only if those participating in the examination assent to the claims espoused in
the Bible, which they show by textual analysis, careful exegesis, and dialectical probing.
Intersubjective evaluation of disputed claims in theology is possible only under the
assumption that the canon is the authoritative arbiter in theological disputes. It was this
assumption about which Luther debated Eck at Leipzig, Cajetan at Augsburg, and before
the Imperial Diet at Worms. Because he shared this assumption with his opponents,
Luther could refrain from relying on what he regarded as merely subjective urgings,
urgings which he claimed do not afford those privy to them reliable access to the divine
will.
What is the moral of this story? That members of the Church have historically
placed strict limitations on which perceptions of God count as veridical, restrictions
Alston would clearly regard as constituents of an overrider system. More importantly,
82
. "Letter to the Princes of Saxony," p. 52.
83
. "Therefore, dear lords, here is a place where you can release, rescue, help. Have mercy on
these poor people. Let whoever can, stab, smite and slay. If you die in doing it, good for you! A
more blessed death can never be yours, for you die while obeying the divine word and
commandment in Romans 13, and in loving service of your neighbor, whom you are rescuing from
the bonds of hell and of the devil." "Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes or Peasants," in
Luther's Works, Vol. 46, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 54-55.
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members of the Church have recognized the morally and politically problematic character
of mystical perception, in that the difficulty of distinguishing genuine from spurious
perceptions of God risks apotheosizing merely human pretensions
.
84
There is good
theological reason to worry over the trustworthiness of CMP. Although Alston evinces
little recognition of the morally and socially dysfunctional tendencies ofCMP - he
adduces the social entrenchment of that practice in support of the rationality of engaging
in it! - he notes that moral constraints are among the more important elements of CMP's
overrider system.
2.1.3 Other Features of CMP
Given that there is a practice of forming beliefs about God on the basis of putative
direct presentations of God, and that agents who form those beliefs evaluate them in light
of a nexus of beliefs and procedures, does that practice share the other defining features
ot genuine DPs? Clearly it does. Agents who engage in CMP typically are socialized
into the Church before the age of reflection; the beliefs formed by engaging in CMP are
essential to such agents' identity; the overrider system of CMP has clearly changed over
time, as, say, a result of the rise of modem science; CMP is not reducible to some other
practice; etc. Hence, CMP is a socially established DP.
84
. As Alston notes, that "the great mystics of the Middle Ages and Counter-Reformation almost
weary one with their incessant talk of the difficulties of distinguishing genuine from counterfeit
perception of God" puts paid to the claim that 'religious experience' is self-authenticating, i.e., not
subject to checks and procedures by which prima facie may be distinguished from ultima facie
justified beliefs. Perceiving God, p. 210. See George Mavrodes, "Real vs. Deceptive Mystical
Experiences," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Steven Katz (ed.), (New York, NY.:
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 235-58; Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm, passim; Christopher Hill,
Change and Continuity in 17 th Century England, (New Haven, CN.: Yale University Press,
1991), pp. 103-23; Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During
the English Revolution, (New York, NY.: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 87-98.
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2.2 Response to Objections to the Weak Rationality ofCMP
Alston attempts to respond to the following objections to his claim that CMP is a
genuine DP: that CMP is not universally engaged in (2.2.1); that CMP is not a genuine
source ot new information (2.2.2); that CMP lacks an adequate overrider system (2.2.3).
2.2.1 The Partial Distribution of CMP
As noted in the first chapter, SP is a universal, whereas CMP is a particular, DP.
Every normal human being is disposed to engage in SP; human beings engage in CMP as
a consequence of socialization or decision. Somehow or other (Alston can not think of a
reason why), its partial distribution discredits CMP. 85 But this 'prejudice against
particularity' is unfounded: "there is no reason to suppose that a practice engaged in by
some proper part of the population is less likely to be a source of truth than one we all
engage in." 86 We cannot decide which DPs are genuine just by "counting noses.”87
Indeed, there are various particular DPs we prize as being highly reliable, viz., theoretical
physics, higher math, and wine tasting. Moreover, claims Alston, there may be good
reasons why only only some human agents engage in CMP, viz, because God has
determined that only those agents may perceive God who satisfy certain (moral)
conditions: pride, envy, and hatred preclude agents from perceiving God, whereas love,
compassion, and humility enable perception of God. 88 If that is the case, if we can
85
. Perceiving God, p. 169, 197-99; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 14; "Christian
Experience and Christian Belief," p. 120; "Is Religious Belief Rational?," p. 9-10; "Perceiving
God," p. 659.
86
. Perceiving God, p. 198.
87
. "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 120.
88
. Perceiving God, pp. 198-99, 268; "The Christian Language Game," in The Autonomy of
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explain the partial distribution of CMP in a way compatible with the reliability of CMP,
then its partial distribution fails to indicate CMP’s reliability.
Pretty clearly, Alston addresses this objection not for substantive but for
illustrative purposes: it exemplifies two defects which recur throughout the literature on
the epistemic standing of CMP: epistemic imperialism and the imposition of double
standards. Objections afflicted with epistemic imperialism impose criteria appropriate
for certain practices on practices for which those criteria are inappropriate
.
90
Thus, it
would be imperialist, and hence inappropriate, to require of introspective beliefs that they
be empirically testable. With respect to the objection just mentioned, the requirement
that a practice be universal is inappropriately imposed on CMP. Why? Because, if God
exists and has decreed as stipulated, CMP may be highly reliable — and thus epistemically
up to snuff — and yet enjoy only partial distribution . 91 That objection also runs afoul of a
double standard, i.e., improperly imposing on one practice a criterion one refuses to
impose on others. 9- How so? Particular DPs like theoretical physics are not discredited
because of their partial distribution, whereas CMP is discredited.
Religious Belief, Frederick Crosson, ed„ (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981), p. 156. That there are such subjective conditions of apprehending reality is crucial to
MacIntyre’s rejection of the ‘Encyclopaedic’ understanding of rationality. See, for example.
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1990), pp. 17f„ 60, 97, 133,225.
89
. Perceiving God, pp. 248-50; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 14.
90
. Perceiving God, pp. 199,211,216.
91
. "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 122-23.
92
. Perceiving God, p. 1 99, 211,216.
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Alston’s defense of CMP's presumptive innocence, the innocence it enjoys as a
consequence of its being socially entrenched, consists in large part of accusing his critics
of cooking the game against CMP by imposing on its members epistemic norms which
are guilty of epistemic imperialism or of imposing a double standard and thus which are
inappropriate tor that practice. Just what Alston means by ‘inappropriate,’ and how he
justifies judgements of impropriety, is the subject of the next chapter.
2.2.2 CMP not a Source of Genuine Information
SP is a source of new information. When an agent forms beliefs based on
perceptual experience, the beliefs she forms afford her new insight; she learns something
she did not know before, she modifies dearly held prejudices, etc. Thus, when an agent
turns a corner and bumps into Mrs. Simpson, whom she thought was in France, she forms
the new and unexpected belief that Mrs. Simpson is in fact in Toledo. When Galileo
looks into his telescope, whatever confidence he has left in Ptolemaic astronomy shatters.
That agents who engage in SP form new beliefs on the basis of direct presentations of
objects is essential to SP's standing as a perceptual DP, and therefore to the standing of
any putative perceptual DP.
An agent who engages in CMP, on the other hand, "just read[s] back to [herself]
the beliefs [she] brings to the experience ." 93 She is socialized into the Church, adopts the
categorial grid essential to becoming a functional member of that institution, is brought
up to expect to have certain experiences of God in certain conditions, and, hence,
acquires the tendency to form beliefs about God upon having experiences of the
93
.
Perceiving God, p. 206; "Is Religious Belief Rational?," pp. 11-12.
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appropriate sort. Those beliefs, therefore, can only reinforce the categorial scheme with
which she approaches her the world. Because nothing new is learned in CMP, it cannot
be a genuine perceptual practice.
Alston grants that an agent brings to a putative experience of God a categorial
scheme by means of which she organizes her experience, conceptualizes the object with
which she is presented, and, indeed, which crucially influences the beliefs she fonns.
Similarly, however, with SP. When an agent wanders into the local mall, she uses a
categorial scheme to conceptualize the objects with which she is presented. But to
approach objective reality with a categorial scheme does not inhibit an agent from
learning about that reality; else we would learn precious little about our natural and social
environments. Alston writes, "indefinitely many bits of information can be formulated by
the same conceptual scheme, and the fact that I antecedently possess the concept that I
use to articulate a given perception has no tendency to show that I already had the
information I claim to derive from that perception .”94 Those who engage in CMP are thus
wrongly charged with learning nothing new by engaging in that practice on grounds that
they employ a categorial scheme to interpret their experience which they acquired during
socialization.
4
' The objection under discussion imposes a double standard on CMP.
94
. Perceiving God, p. 206; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 4ff.
95
. See Caroline Franks Davis’ treatment of this objection in The Evidential Force of Religious
Experience, pp. 142-165.
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2.2.3 Inadequacy of CMP’s Overrider System
Now to a more serious objection: CMP's overrider system, that set of beliefs and
procedures which confer upon prima facie justified beliefs ultima facie justification, is
not an adequate means for evaluating M-beliefs
.
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Let's be clear about why this issue is
so crucial to Alston's defense of CMP. Alston resolutely denies that perception of God is
self-authenticating, incorrigible, indubitable, or any other property of that ilk. Any DP
worth its salt is one in which agents are capable of determining whether or not grounds
which ordinarily indicate the truth of some belief do, in this situation, so indicate; that is,
every legitimate DP allows for the distinction between prima facie and ultima facie
justification. In order for an agent so to distinguish, she needs to have at her disposal
tests whereby beliefs with initial credibility may be checked for justification all things
considered. That is, every DP must, on pain of epistemic illegitimacy, enjoy an adequate
overrider system.
Why might a critic claim of CMP that its overrider system is inadequate?
Consider SP's overrider system, as it relates to checking reports by other agents that they
have perceived some object. When an agent claims to have seen a snark in the woods, we
have means of checking her assertion: we follow her trail back to the place where she
%
. Perceiving God, pp. 209-222; “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,” p. 122. See C.B.
Martin in Religious Belief, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 64-94; Richard
Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 99 1 ),p.
285-343; “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” pp. 39-63; “Why Alston’s Mystical Practice is
Subjective,” pp. 869-75; Anthony O'Hear, Experience, Explanation and Faith: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1984), pp.
25-55; Michael Levine, “Mystical Experience and Non-Basically Justified Belief,” in Religious
Studies 25 (1989): 335-45; Mark McLoed, “Can Belief in God be Confirmed?,” in Religious
Studies 24 (1988): 31 1-23; Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm, pp. 576-77, 578-91.
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claimed to have seen the snark, search for evidence of snarks (footprints, stool, cigarette
butts, etc.), and make our determination on the basis of what any of us can discern. If her
story fails to check out after the appropriate kind of investigation, then we regard her
assertion as false, and the utterer of that assertion as deceptive, deluded, mistaken,
credulous, etc.
Our confidence in making that judgement is based on the fact that the objects of
SP are publicly available, i.e., that which one agent claims to have perceived is
perceivable (in principle) by any of us and by employing the same cognitive faculties she
would have had to employ were she to have perceived a snark .97 Because the objects of
SP are publically available, all who engage in SP can in principle agree upon the
conditions in which it is possible to apprehend putative objects of perception
.
48 And
because the conditions in which it is possible to perceive objects may be determined by
any practitioner of SP, claims about those objects are intersubjectively evaluable.
Anyone can evaluate sense-perceptual claims and can evaluate them by appeal to criteria
anyone can agree on. In short, because we can "specify conditions under which the
experience of one subject is relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of the
97
. None of this should be taken as an endorsement of the individualism implicit in claims like the
following: "Whereas the test for the veridicality of a sense experience are based solely on other
sense experiences, those for the veridicality of a religious experience are not based solely on other
religious experiences, since the latter are based on what we hear other members of the religious
community say about their religious experiences, what we see in certain 'holy' books, etc."
Richard Gale, The Nature and Existence of God, p. 410. As if the tests we employ for
evaluating the vast majority of our beliefs about the external world are not ineradicably dependant
on the testimony of others.
98
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 4-5, 15.
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perceptual report of another subject," we are able to engage "in the critical examination of
sense-perceptual reports ." 99
That sense-perceptual beliefs are intersubjectively evaluable grounds our
confidence in the reliability ol SP. Why? The heart of the answer is simple: human
beings are fallible; by having other agents check our assertions, agents who may lack our
particular epistemic vices, we raise the probability that a given perceptual belief is true . 100
The public availability of the objects of perception renders us able to assess publicly the
beliefs formed about those objects, and thus increases our confidence in the truth of
particular judgements. If, for this reason, we are rightly confident of most of the
judgements we make by engaging in SP, we are rightly confident of SP's reliability
.
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The point, of course, is not just that an SP type overrider system is a healthy check
on otherwise profligate cognizers; the intersubjective tests internal to SP are elevated to a
sine qua non of a perceptual practice - intersubjective tests of the SP type are not merely
desirable but de jure! [And sometimes not just for a perceptual practice. 102 ] As Alston
remarks, "the price ofjustification for an objective claim about the world is subjection to
"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 5.
I0
°. Given, of course, that SP as a whole is reliable. To appeal to the publicity of SP's overrider
system in an argument for the reliability of that doxastic practice would be epistemically circular.
I0
‘. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 6.
I02
. Interestingly enough, long before Alston turned his professional attention to the epistemic
status of religious experience, he addressed basically the same objection — the “consensual
corroboration objection” — to the cognitive status of “First Person Immediate Psychological State
Reports.” Because beliefs about our subjective beliefs and feelings are not publically checkable,
they are epistemically suspect, or at least, of no use for the genuine, behavioristic, science of
Psychology. Alston’s position on the matter is basically the same that he takes with respect to
religious experience some 20 years later — CMP’s (introspection’s) overrider system differs from
SP’s but the difference is a legitimate one, and therefore cannot count against the epistemic (or
cognitive) status of M-beliefs (FRIPSRs). See William Alston, “Can Psychology Do Without
Private Data?,” in Behaviorism 1 (1972): 71-102. See C. A. J. Coady, Testimony, pp. 66-75.
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appropriate objective scrutiny by other members of the community. Objective epistemic
worth requires intersubjective validation ." 103
Obviously, those who engage in CMP enjoy no such intersubjective evaluation of
M-beliefs
.
104
Although, as we saw briefly, Luther regarded with skepticism Munzer’s
claim to be privy to direct revelations, and suggested some tests in light of which to test
such claims, the tests he suggests are worlds apart from those de jure in sense perception.
[This is not to say that Luther distrusts CMP for different reasons than non-theologically
committed critics: distrust of CMP because of the inadequacy of its overrider system cuts
across the theism/non-theism divide.] And this counts against the epistemic standing of
CMP: the lack of adequate checks to belief formation renders the reliability ofCMP
suspect . 105
This objection, according to Alston, is a "glaring example of epistemic
imperialism ." 106 The objector proposes to impose on agents who engage in CMP
procedures for checking beliefs properly required only of SP. The crucial point is the
ICb
. Perceiving God, pp. 215-16, Alston's emphasis. Thus, according to C.B. Martin, a putative
perception of God can count as a genuine perception of an independently existing object only if it
is subject to "a society of tests and checking procedures." Religious Belief, p. 72. Otherwise, M-
beliefs are in fact disguised psychological claims. He writes, "The presence of blue paper is not to
be read off from my experience as a piece of blue paper. Other things are relevant: What would
photograph reveal? Can 1 touch it? What do others see? It is only when I admit the relevance of
such checking procedures that I can lay claim to apprehending the paper, and, indeed, the
admission of the relevance of such procedures is what gives meaning to the assertion that I am
apprehending the paper? What I apprehend is the sort of thing that can be photographed,
touched
,
and seen by others ." Religious Belief, p. 74. (Martin’s emphasis)
104
. William Forgie, “Mystical Experience and the Argument from Agreement,” pp. 107-1 10.
105
. “The Autonomy of Religious Experience,” p. 6; "Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"
p. 122.
106
. Perceiving God, p. 216. See “The Autonomy of Religious Experience,” p. 7; "Perceiving
God," pp. 661-662; “Reply to Commentators,” p. 873.
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following. We determine which tests are appropriate for SP’s overrider system by relying
on knowledge gotten by engaging in SP . 107 More generally, in order to determine which
procedures are appropriate for the overrider system of a given DP, one cannot but appeal
to the beliefs already formed via that practice. Why? There is no way to determine a
priori which procedures we ought properly to employ in order to evaluate a given type of
belief, in the case of SP, there is no way to determine a priori which procedures will
allow us to check beliefs formed about the natural environment without relying on our
prior knowledge ot what the natural world is like. As a consequence of engaging in SP.
we learn that the natural environment is composed of enduring physical objects which
casually interact with other physical objects in a law-like manner. Because we have
acquired knowledge about the regularities exhibited by objects in the natural
environment, we may therefore isolate the conditions in which it is possible for a given
agent to perceive a given object . 108 And having learned that, we justifiably judge that the
intersubjective evaluability of claims about the objects of sense perception is a sine qua
non of any genuine practice of forming beliefs about the natural world. In short, "it is on
the basis ot what SP has revealed to us about the nature of its subject matter that we take
its deliverances to be subject to assessment in terms of the perceptions of properly
qualified others ." 109
107
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 9-10.
108
. "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 122.
109
. Perceiving God, p. 2 1 8. See “Reply to Commentators,” p. 893.
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Just as with SP, those who engage in CMP may legitimately employ that practice
to construct an understanding of its subject matter in order to determine what may
appropriately be required of their practice's overrider system . 110 Determining what tests
are required in order to corroborate or to discredit M-beliefs is a circular process: agents
form an understanding of God's nature and purposes, as well as the way He interacts with
those who perceive Him, and on the basis of that understanding formulate procedures for
checking M-beliefs. These procedures are subsequently employed to evaluate the M-
beliefs those who engage in CMP form and, indeed, perhaps those very beliefs on the
basis of which a given procedure was deemed appropriate . 111
Of what relevance is this to the objection at hand? The understanding of God
internal to CMP is that of a sovereign, immaterial being who is present (for all we can
tell) non-sensorily and non-systematically to human beings. While the beliefs formed on
the basis ot those perceptions reveal that God possesses enduring virtues like compassion
and justice, they reveal no dependable regularities in the way God interacts with human
beings which render possible predictions of divine presentations . 112 Indeed, the
no
. Perceiving God, p. 217.
As Alston notes, this feature of the circularity of a given practice's overrider system — that the
tests for checking beliefs are parasitic on beliefs already formed — is slightly different, though
complementary, to the point made earlier that in checking a particular belief, an agent also cannot
but employ beliefs formed by that doxastic practice. Perceiving God, p. 217.
" 2
. Let me clarify a possible confusion. In order that those who engage in CMP employ an
overrider system to evaluate their beliefs, they rely on the picture of God's nature and intentions
they have built up over the years. That picture provides them with an account of the kinds of
actions God is likely to approve or disapprove the kinds of properties he is likely to display, etc.
That picture does not suffice to enable those who engage in CMP "to make predictions about His
behavior." Charles Daniels, "Experiencing God," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
49/3 (March, 1989): 491 . Knowing that an agent is compassionate or loving does not suffice to
enable me to predict when she will act compassionately; such properties lack predictive value
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understanding of God internal to CMP provides those who engage in that practice with
reason to believe that God's action exhibits no regularities of the proper sort and thus no
basis for predictions, viz., God is sovereign and transcendent." 3 Therefore, our being
unable to test M-beliefs in the manner appropriate to SP cannot count as a good reason to
regard it as unreliable ." 4 Rather, the understanding of God internal to CMP warrants us
in regarding this objection as imperialistic.
Alston concludes:
The upshot of all this is that while what we have learned about the physical
world from SP gives us the wherewithal to hold particular perceptual reports
subject to a decisive test in terms of what relevant others perceive, what we
have learned from God and His relations to His creation, from CMP and other
sources, gives us reason to suppose that no such tests are available here . 115
Therefore, they are not rightly imposed on CMP.
Alston's response has a further implication. Suppose that an agent who engages in
CMP acquires an understanding of God as sovereign and transcendent, and thus
legitimately expects to be unable to predict under which conditions she will perceive
God. If she subsequently begins to perceive God in regular and predictable ways, she
then has good reason to be suspicious of her perceptions. This is the analogue in CMP of
a situation in which an agent who believes reality to be constituted by enduring physical
objects begins to experience the physical world as chaotic, and thereby doubts that her
sufficient to underwrite the intersubjective tests proper to SP. See "Reply to Daniels," in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49/3 (March, 1989): 502.
" 3
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 1 1
.
1 14
. Perceiving God, p. 2 1 8; "Precis of Perceiving God," pp. 866-67.
" 5
. Perceiving God, p. 87.
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perceptions are veridical. In what respect are they analogous? In that legitimate
expectations about her experience, based on her understanding of the objects of her
experience, undermine her confidence in experiences which fail to meet those
expectations. This shows how misguided is O’Hear's argument:
I do not want to suggest that a religious explanation and interpretation of
religious experience is necessarily incorrect, or that there could not be
circumstances in which such an explanation was more probable than any
other. If people, after praying to a particular God or within a particular
religious tradition, often had fairly specific experiences, internal visions and
the like, of the divine beings of that religion, the probability that the
experiences emanated from those beings would be greater than if the
experiences were inconsistent and irregular. 116
Let us take stock of Alston's argument for a moment. In 2.1, 1 outlined Alston's
argument in support of the claim that there is a genuine practice of forming beliefs about
God. In this subsection, I have presented and responded to several arguments to the
conclusion that CMP is not a genuine DP. If the arguments of the first two subsections of
this chapter are sound, then, by (EP3), those who engage in CMP are rationalw in
regarding that practice as reliable. In the next subsection, I present Alston's arguments in
support of the conclusion that CMP is neither internally massively inconsistent nor
externally massively inconsistent with more well established DPs.
" 6
.
Experience, Explanation and Faith, pp. 47-8.
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2.3 Vindication of the Moderate Rationality ofCMP
Having thus defended the case for the claim that CMP is a socially established and
genuine DP, Alston responds to arguments which purport to show that CMP is unreliable.
Thus he responds to claims that CMP is unreliable because: putative perception of God
may be explained naturalistically (2.3.1); CMP gives rise to massively inconsistent beliefs
(2.3.2); CMP gives rise to beliefs which are inconsistent with natural science (2.3.3); or
of religious diversity (2.3.4). If his objections to those claims are cogent, Alston will
have vindicated the presumptive epistemic innocence CMP enjoys in virtue of being a
socially established DP.
2.3.1 Naturalistic Explanations of Mystical Experience
Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are famous for "explaining away’' religion. They
provide us with several proposals explaining why agents form beliefs about God,
including M-beliefs. 117 That agents adhere to religious beliefs, including those formed by
engaging in CMP, may be explained by the functionality of M-beliefs for the dominant
class, ressentiment, or regression to an infantile state. And that causes problems for the
claim that agents are perceptually aware of God. For if “God need never be mentioned in
order to mount an explanation, ... we are debarred from taking those experiences to be
experiences of God.'’ 1 18 But if agents are not causally related to God, then according to
“ 7
. Alston has discussed Freudian objections in some detail in "Psychological Explanations of
Religious Belief," in Faith and the Philosophers, John Hick, ed., (Oxford: St. Martin's Press,
1964), pp. 63-102.
" 8
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 13.
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both TA and SD, putative perceptions of God cannot provide us with justified beliefs
about God (whether or not God exists).
Alston is dubious as to the evidential support for such explanations of religious
belief
.
119
But we need not appeal to anything so controversial to explain religious belief.
For it is no doubt possible that neurophysiology will provide us with an adequate
naturalistic explanation ot why agents form M-beliefs. That is, scientists will eventually
be able to isolate those brain-states which induce in an agent an apparent presentation of
God. But does that show that CMP is unreliable? No. An explanation of the formation
of M-beliefs as a consequence of neurophysiological causes ought concern an agent who
engages in CMP no more and no less than that the formation of sense-perceptual beliefs
may be similarly explained . 1 J) What is wrong with this argument, then?
A neurophysiological explanation, as well as a Marxist or Freudian explanation,
would at best provide us with some of the proximate causes of M-belief formation. But
to provide an explanation of M-belief formation by reference to proximate causes fails to
show that God plays no causal role at all in the process of perception. Hence, "the mere
fact that mystical experience can be explained in terms of causally sufficient, proximate
natural factors has no tendency to show that it does not constitute veridical perception of
God ." 121 Why? In order that an agent perceive God, all God need do is play some
appropriate causal role in the production of belief — however remote. As we have already
" 9
. Perceiving God, p. 233.
120 Perceiving God, p. 231; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 13; "Perceiving God,"
pp. 658-59; “Reply to Daniels,” p. 506.
I21
. Perceiving God, p. 232.
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seen (2.1.1
.2), we know of the causal relations proper to each mode of sensory
perception, but not to perception itself, nor to CMP. Have agents who engage in CMP
any reason to believe that a true neurophysiological explanation of the formation of M-
beliefs renders impossible a causal contribution of God to the formation of M-beliefs?
Not unless critics show that God cannot causally interact with an agent whose M-beliefs
may be causally explained by "neurophysiological happenings in the brain." 122 And there
is no reason to think that this case can be made. It is possible that God plays some
suitable causal role more remote than that of synaptic firings, as well as regression,
ressentiment, or functionality.
Alternatively put, God may bring about the desired affects by employing causal
processes of the sort identified by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. An agent uses a crowbar
to move a boulder. What moved the boulder? Both the agent and the crowbar: each
“contributes part ot a sufficient condition.” Both the force exerted by the crowbar as well
as the intentional act by the worker, in those circumstances, suffice to being about the
desired effect. Similarly, God may bring about apprehension of the divine by initiating
the processes identified by the three masters of suspicion. “Indeed, this is part of the
standard Christian story about the work of the Holy Spirit, who is supposed to work
through the church and its activities, not independent of or alongside the church.” 123
122
. Perceiving God, p. 23 1
.
123
. William Alston, “The Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief,” in Faith in
Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Carol J.
White, eds., (Chicago, IL.: Open Court Press, 1993), p. 29.
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But does God play a suitable causal role? Those who engage in CMP believe that
God does and they think that their apparent apprehension of God provides reason to think
so: that is why they form beliefs about God. But isn't recourse to CMP to establish the
actuality of God’s playing a suitable causal role in the process of perception circular? Of
course. But it is circular in just the way that an agent who engages in SP believes that
objects more remote than synaptic firings play a suitable causal role in the formation of
their beliefs about those objects.
Isn't Alston's answer to Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud disingenuous? Isn't the point
ol their objections to religious belief that causal factors rendering unreliable other DPs are
operative in CMP and thus render it unreliable? Don't we distrust an agent's belief the
formation of which is infected by wish-fulfillment or ressentiment? Doesn't wish-
fulfillment and ressentiment render our critical capacities ineffectual, muddy up our
cognitive waters, in short, obscure the truth? Isn't the problem that causally sufficient
explanations ofa particular sort undermine our confidence in CMP?
I think that this is what the three great masters of suspicion intended to argue.
Moreover, I think that, if any of their explanations of religious belief enjoy sufficient
evidential support, they constitute good reason to regard CMP as unreliable. Alston,
however, is undaunted. Suppose, he says, it is the case that religious belief is caused by
regression to infantile stages of cognition. What of it? Can't God use such regressive
modes of cognition to present Himself to an agent's consciousness? "Why suppose that
this is not the mechanism God uses to reveal Himself to our experience?" 124 (I will
l24
. Perceiving God, p. 233.
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discuss Alston’s response to Marx, Freud and Nietzsche in 3.6, where I argue that it is
inadequate.)
2.3.2 Massive Internal Inconsistency of CMP
Clearly, every practice, including SP, memory, introspection and inference,
generates inconsistent beliefs. So a puritanical rigorism, like that displayed (selectively)
by Plato with regard to SP, is out of order. 125 A practice may yet be reliable which
produces inconsistent beliefs. Similarly, then, for CMP. To what degree are the outputs
ofCMP inconsistent? That depends in part on how one individuates that practice. Those
who claim to engage in CMP but form beliefs such as that God displays feminine
qualities may be regarded as engaging in a different practice than CMP, thus limiting the
number of inconsistent beliefs formed by engaging in CMP. (This is to assume that all
genuine participants in CMP believe that God displays no feminine qualities.) But to
individuate CMP in that way risks a proliferation of DPs. For in virtue of denying that
those agents engage in CMP who believe God to display feminine qualities, we stipulate
into existence an FMP — a feminist mystical practice. 126 And thus the problem of internal
inconsistency returns in the form of inconsistent beliefs between CMP and other practices
like FMP. As Alston notes, internal and external inconsistency vary inversely. 127
125
. Perceiving God, p. 234.
126
. ‘Stipulate’ is, 1 think, the correct word. According to Alston, a DP has only a notional reality.
It is a grouping of numerous bfds on the basis of some similarity shared by those bfds. And
although those bfds are real, the grouping is not. Hence, there is "no one uniquely right way to
group mechanisms into practices." How we do so is determined by the theoretical uses to which
we want to put those notions. Perceiving God, p. 165. See “Reply to Critics,” in Religious
Studies, p. 176.
127
. Perceiving God, p. 236.
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The tack Alston takes is to individuate CMP with reference to the authority
accorded to "the Bible, the ecumenical counsels of the undivided church, Christian
experience throughout the ages, Christian thought, and more generally the Christian
tradition 28 Of course, he admits that vagueness afflicts each of these criteria, but
notes that the nature of the subject matter militates against further "precising ." 129
Given this way of individuating CMP, Alston further notes that there is no
calculus for determining when some internal inconsistency becomes too much and thus
undermines the reliability of that practice. Such judgements are a seat of the pants affair,
lequiring an epistemic version of phronesis. He judges that CMP does not give rise to too
much such inconsistency although Alston concedes that the lesser degree of inconsistency
in SP, memory and other basic practices renders them more reliable than CMP. Hence, in
case of external inconsistency between either of them and CMP, the latter's epistemic
standing is canceled . 1
’ 0
2.3.3 Conflicts between Science and CMP
Alston's attempt to address conflicts between science and religion is agreeably
brief and mine will be briefer. He identifies three sources of possible conflict between
science and religion: between specific scientific results and specific doctrines, scientific
and religious methodology, and scientific assumptions and religious doctrines . 131
128
. Perceiving God, p. 193.
129
. Perceiving God, p. 193.
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Those conflicts which have been given the most press are the first: Wilberforce
vs. Huxley, Galileo vs. Cardinal Bellarmine, etc. However, such conflicts as exist do not
concern the central doctrinal positions of Christianity, and certainly not the beliefs formed
via CMP. Recognizably Christian theologies have been articulated long after the
admission that Huxley and Galileo had the better of their opponents. Of course, it is
possible that some central such conflict between science and religion will erupt. And in
so far as some of the human sciences, e.g., behavioristic psychology, deny human
responsibility and freedom, those sciences are incompatible with CMP. But, fortunately,
behaviorism and the like lack enough empirical support to threaten the reliability of CMP.
In order to allay tears that this lack of current conflicts between particular (well-
confirmed) scientific theories and religious doctrines might be just a contingent feature of
the current state of scientific (and religious) knowledge, Alston provides systematic
reason for regarding that lack as not merely contingent. Taking a familiar line of
argument, he argues that the function of science is to provide human agents with an
adequate account of the structure of the physical world, not to identify its origin or the
purpose of either the cosmos or of beings in it. Reflecting on the purpose of human
beings, of God's intention vis-a-vis God's creation, is the purview of religion. Such
conflicts as occasionally erupt between the two are therefore peripheral to the essential
function of religion and easily resolvable by the revision of religious claims . 132
As one might expect Alston to argue, there are no methodological conflicts
between CMP and science; there are only differences. Those differences may be
explained and justified by the difference between the nature of physical objects and God.
12 Perceiving God, p. 241
.
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There would only be conflict if someone suggested that one methodology should be used
for both domains; but, to no one's surprise, Alston argues that to do so would be
imperialistic.
Finally, the materialism presupposed by scientists would seem to conflict with,
say, the theistic belief that God presents Himself to consciousness. For that belief implies
that the natural laws which govern the natural world are sometimes abrogated. Alston
responds, however, by denying that materialism is one of the results of science; it is,
rather, a working assumption - methodological materialism to modify a phrase of
Berger's .
1 And methodological materialism requires a scientist to assume only for
purposes of empirical research that the events she investigates have fully naturalistic
explanations. It does not require that she assert that, in fact, all events have fully
naturalistic explanations
.
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2.3.4 Religious Diversity
The diversity of religious MPs generates the problem Alston regards as most
seriously endangering the moderate rationality of CMP. Intuitively, it seems
epistemically improper to regard CMP as reliable given that there are various socially
established MPs
133
. Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, (New
York. NY.: Doubleday Books, 1969), p. 180.
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. More precisely, Alston writes, the “only thing a scientist is committed to assuming, by virtue
of engaging in the scientific enterprise, is that there is a good chance that the phenomena he is
investigating depend on natural phenomena to a significant degree. These three qualifications
mark ways in which he need not be assuming strict naturalism. (1) He need only assume a
significant probability. (2) He need only make his assumption for the particular area of his
investigation. And (3) he need not assume even there that natural causes do the whole job in every
instance.” Quoted in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Reflections on the Claim that
God Speaks, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 124-25.
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the products of which are incompatible with the products of CMP but which, like CMP,
are not demonstrably unreliable. Alston sets up that problem in the following way.
First, there are genuine inconsistencies between different versions of MP . 135
Alston adheres to a realistic concept of truth — whether or not a proposition is true
depends upon what is the case, regardless "of anyone's actual or possible epistemic
position vis-a-vis the proposition ." 1 ’6 Hence, Alston cannot take the easy way out of
arguing that beliefs formed by engaging in CMP are 'true' in 'Christian cultures' and that
beliefs formed by engaging in a Buddhist MP are 'true' in 'Buddhist cultures .' 137
Second, the inconsistencies among the products of the various MPs are
sufficiently massive that any two such MPs cannot be conjointly reliable. "If one [species
of MP] is reliable, then most of the beliefs that issue from it are true; and, hence, because
of the incompatibility, a large proportion of the beliefs issuing from each of the others
will be false; and so none of these others is a reliable process ." 138
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. Perceiving God, pp. 256-66; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," pp.
433-34.
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. "A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 5. See A Realist Conception of the
Truth, passim; ""Divine Action, Human Freedom, and the Laws of Nature,” in Quantum
Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert J.
Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C.J. Isham, eds., (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory
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Third, Alston assumes a worst case scenario in which there are no
non-question-begging reasons in support of the relative epistemic superiority of any one
version ofMP over others. 139
Fourth, there are three bad arguments which employ the fact of religious diversity
to discredit CMP. (1) CMP is unreliable just because it lacks universal engagement.
Partial distribution provides no reason for doubting a practice's reliability. 140 (2) CMP is
unreliable because the best explanation of partial distribution entails its unreliability —
say, because engagement in the different variations of MP is best explained by
socialization, wish-fulfillment, auto-suggestion, etc. Alston argues that regarding such an
explanation as best presupposes the faulty assumption that "if any person or group enjoys
a certain kind ot cognitive contact with a sphere of reality, then any other person or group
that takes itself to cognize that reality in that way would come up with the same, or
similar, results." 141 Religious diversity is just as well explained by the hypothesis that the
various versions of MP put their members in contact with a transcendent reality, though
“they cannot all have it exactly straight," or at least straight to the same degree. 142 (3) If
CMP (or some other version of MP) were reliable, there would be some indication that it
is; some mark which distinguishes it from the rest. There is not; hence the best
explanation of the diversity of MPs is that all of them are unreliable, including, of course.
139
. “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,” p. 484; “Reply to Critics,” in
Religious Studies, p. 178.
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CMP. But even SP lacks a distinguishing mark; our only grounds for believing it to be
reliable are those we acquire by engaging in that very practice . 143 In general, there is no
reason to believe that reliable practices will provide those who do not engage in them
with any indication of their reliability. Of course, as with SP, by engaging in CMP, an
agent has access to abundant internal indications of reliability -- God is present on a
regular basis!
Well, what problem does religious diversity pose for CMP? The problem is one
of arbitrariness
,
not of unreliability. Mere disagreement, the mere diversity of doxastic
practices, is not a reason to regard a particular such practice as unreliable . 144 Rather, an
agent (a) who is aware of the diversity of versions ofMP and (b) who persists in
regarding her favored version as reliable, and thus others as unreliable, and (c) who is
fully apprized of the epistemic parity among the various versions, verges on a violation of
the principle of universalization.
What is the principle of universalization? Consider the following example. If
two students were to turn in papers, A and B, which by a massively improbable
coincidence, were word for word identical, then I would be irrational were I to fail to give
each of those papers the same grade. Barring extenuating circumstances, on what
legitimate basic could I possibly distinguish between them? Certainly, there may be
differences between the two papers over and above mere numerical difference: A might
M3 perCeiving God, p. 268; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," p. 441.
144
. A point made by Alasdair MacIntyre about the interminable conflicts afflicting “wholly
secular humanistic disciplines’ like psychology and literary criticism. Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry, p. 6-7.
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have been submitted inside a green folder and B inside a red. If I were to justify my
differential grading by appeal to that difference, I would be irrational and would be justly
called to account for my grading policies. Although there is a difference between those
papers -- and perhaps even a difference relevant in certain discourses, e.g., aesthetic —
that difference is not relevant to the grade they deserve.
At the heart of — though not exhaustive of - the concept of rationality is
consistency, where the 'other' of consistency is not mere logical contradiction but
arbitrariness. If you have a reason tor x, then you have, on pain of arbitrariness, good
reason for y lv .., yn , so long as they are similar in all the relevant respects to x. An agent is
arbitrary, not when she lacks reasons, but when she has reasons and fails to adhere to
them evenhandedly; not when she lacks rules by which to guide her behavior, but that
having rules, she makes unwarranted exceptions to those rules. An arbitrary agent is one
who grades differentially papers between which there is no important difference; who acts
differently in situations that lack important differences. Because she is arbitrary, she is
irrational.
As Alston formulates the problem, for all any agent knows, the various versions of
MP are identical in all epistemically relevant respects. That is, CMP is on equal par with
other MPs with respect to criteria like social establishment, internal consistency,
consistency with other well-established practices, and significant self-support. And,
given the worst case scenario he stipulates, no version ofMP enjoys any “external marks
which indicate that it is more reliable than other versions. Structurally identical
arguments, employing the very epistemic principles articulated in the previous chapter
139
[(EP9) and (EP10)], support the rationality, of regarding many other MPs as reliable.
Although a member of CMP may believe with confidence that her version ofMP puts her
in contact with God, she knows that members of other versions believe the same, and.
presumably, with the same degree of confidence.
What should she do in this situation? What course of action will enable her to
avoid the charge of arbitrariness meted out to those who violate the principle of
universalization? How can she treat all versions ofMP equally? She ought not regard all
MPs as reliable, for there are massive inconsistencies among those practices. She ought
not regard them all as unreliable, for mere disagreement does not warrant so strong a
conclusion. She ought not regard one MP as reliable, and others as unreliable, because all
practices are epistemically on the same par. She must, therefore, take the only other
option, viz., withhold judgement as to the reliability of each of the various practices. To
commit to one version of MP would be arbitrary.
Note that the conclusion of this argument, unlike that of the three arguments
briefly mentioned several paragraphs prior is that, even if CMP is very reliable, it is
irrational for an agent to regard it as reliable. "Even if some form of MP is reliable, we
have no non-question begging grounds for determining which one that is." 14
"
This is just the conclusion we would draw in more mundane instances of
irresolvable conflict. Suppose a witness' account of an accident is disputed by several
other witnesses, each ofwhom recall a different version of the events, but each of whom
had equally good access to the accident. What is the epistemically proper attitude for that
l45
.
Perceiving God, p. 270.
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agent to take with regard to her own rendering of the events? Clearly, it is, if not to
abandon her account, to reduce her confidence in her recollections. It is not to regard all
accounts as unreliable, or all as reliable, or one as reliable. 'I'm not sure' is the proper
attitude to adopt. Similarly for CMP. As confident as an agent may be of her awareness
ot God, given that it is disputed by others, that those others enjoy structurally identical
grounds for regarding themselves as having perceived God, and that there are no
epistemically relevant differences between the various versions of MP, she is irrational if
she fails to withhold assent to the claim that CMP is reliable.
What must Alston do to respond to the objection from religious diversity? He
must identify an some relevant difference between the Mystical Practice of choice and
alternative versions. Only if he can cite some important difference between CMP and
other versions of MP will he evade the charge of arbitrariness in persisting in the belief
that CMP is reliable and its alternatives are not.
Alston begins by identifying an important disanalogy between cases in which
various equally well placed witnesses to an accident articulate conflicting and mutually
incompatible reports and the situation in which members of a given MP find themselves.
There is a crucial difference between unresolved disputes over matters of particular
empirical fact and over whole DPs . 146 With respect to inconsistent reports about an
accident, agents know in principle how they could go about resolving that dispute. They
can employ the various procedures internal to SP, memory, and inference to determine
l46
. Perceiving God, pp. 272-74; “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," pp.
442-45.
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which observer is most competent, had the best vantage point, etc. Because the agents
involved lack that which they could in principle have, their lack of that means ought to
reduce their confidence in their beliefs. But just this shared means of resolving the issue
is missing in the dispute between rival MPs. We do not know how that dispute could in
principle be resolved. But to be unable to imagine how interlocutors might resolve a
dispute renders it unreasonable to discredit the position of any party to that dispute on
grounds that they cannot show that their position is the correct one. It is to ask the
impossible . 147
Alternatively put, those involved in an intrapractice dispute may have recourse to
a shared overrider system to resolve their difference; if the difference can’t be resolved by
employing the procedures constitutive of their overrider system, the most reasonable
course of action is to withhold assent until the dispute can be resolved . 148 It is just
because a resolution of the problem is a live possibility that we regard the most
reasonable course of action to be that of withholding assent. But those involved in
interpractice disputes can’t be assured that they have access to considerations which will
enable them to resolve their differences. They have no shared set of procedures in light
of which they can adjudicate between conflicting claims. And when there are no such
procedures, when there is no live possibility of resolving the dispute, the existence of
uneliminated alternatives does not have the deleterious consequences it has in
intrapractice cases. It is not irrational for an agent to persist in regarding her version of
1 47 Perceiving God, pp. 273-74; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," p. 443.
I48
. See J. L. Schellenberg, “Religious Experience and Religious Diversity,” in Religious Studies
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MP as reliable even though she is aware of a plethora of uneliminated and incompatible
alternatives.
Alston constructs a counter-analogy to make this point . 149 Imagine that there were
three very different sense perceptual practices, a Whiteheadian, a Cartesian, and an
Aristotelian. Suppose that each of these practices were equally as rich in informational
content, that each makes possible a highly developed science, that each enjoys an
adequate overrider system, etc. Suppose further that the outputs of the three versions of
SP were massively inconsistent. Suppose, finally, that there were no shared means for
determining which versions of SP were more reliable. If these alternatives were actual,
agents would be in precisely the same situation with respect to SP as they currently are
with respect to MP. What would a rational agent do if she found herself so beset?
According to Alston, “in the absence of an external reason for supposing that one of the
competing practices is more accurate than my own, the only rational course for me is to
sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding
my activity in the world.” 150 And because members of a given version ofMP are in a
structurally identical situation in the actual world that members of the Aristotelian version
of SP find themselves in the possible world Alston describes, the only rational course to
take with respect to that version is to ‘sit tight.'
Suppose that the distinction between intra- and interpractice conflicts is a happy
one. And thus, suppose that Alston has identified an epistemically relevant difference
149
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between situations in which an agent is faced with uneliminated and incompatible reports
about an accident and those in which she is faced with uneliminated and incompatible
versions of MP. That only means that Alston has identified a relevant difference between
a scenario in which our 'gut reaction’ is to deny rational status to a given belief and the
predicament in which members ofCMP find themselves. But the difference Alston cites
only requires us to be suspicious of our gut reaction in this case, to refrain blindly from
following our epistemic 'intuitions.’ What headway has he made on the issue of
principle, viz., that there seems to be no relevant difference between various versions of
MP and thus that an agent is arbitrary if she commits herself to one such version?
Any participant in CMP, or any other version of MP, forms beliefs on the basis of
putative presentations of the divine. As a consequence of her engagement in CMP, she
has plenty of internal justification for believing that CMP is reliable. And she will lack
just such internal justification for other versions of MP. Now this appeal to
considerations made available by engaging in a given DP was neutralized by the fact that
other agents have access to the same type of consideration. But if Alston’s argument is
correct, it is neutralized only on the assumption that there is a way of adjudicating
between the conflicting claims of the various versions of MP. Only if it is reasonable to
suppose that the dispute between the disparate MPs can be resolved is it reasonable to
abstain from engaging in those practices. But now that we realize that we lack the
resources for such interpractice adjudication, the most reasonable course of action to to sit
tight. That is, for any agent who engages in a given version of MP, and thus who is
thereby putatively put into contact with the divine, the most reasonable course of action is
144
to continue to engage in that practice. The relevant difference between her version of MP
and alternative versions is that by engaging in her own she has apparently been presented
with God; she should therefore persist in engaging in that practice even in the face of
uneliminated alternatives. And because we regard this as the most rational policy for
members of all versions of MP, we cannot be faulted on grounds of arbitrariness. 151
2.4 Vindication of the Strong Rationality of CMP
As we noted in section 1
.6, Alston claims that there is a way of strengthening the
epistemic standing of moderately rational doxastic practices, viz., by appeal to significant
self-support. I will briefly attempt to indicate the kind of self-support Alston believes that
CMP exhibits. Internal to the Christian tradition are various claims about the character of
those who engage in CMP; by engaging in CMP, an agent learns that she will, if a
genuine participant, undergo changes in moral character — she will be transformed into a
more virtuous person. She will be less prideful, more tranquil in times of danger, more
151
. It should be clear by this point how wrongheaded are accusations that Alston's strategy for
defending the rationality ofCMP is merely protective and insular (as alleged, e.g., by Matthew
Bagger in "The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism: Religious Experience and Justified Belief,"
p. 302, 303; and Dirk-Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of
Foundationalism,” in Religious Studies 31 (1995): 37, 41. Alston defends the autonomy and
uniqueness ofCMP in order to insure that it gets a fair hearing; in order to insure that M-beliefs
are evaluated in light of appropriate and non-question-begging criteria. But the autonomy ofCMP
does not entail that it is immune to criticism from its "more mundane counterparts" (Bagger, p.
302) Alston takes pains to argue that CMP must be consistent with the traditional package of SP,
memory, introspection and inference if it is to be reliable. Amazingly, Bagger and Martin ignore
that. As I will argue in the last chapter, Alston’s advocacy of autonomy does undermine the
mechanical application of substantive epistemic norms to any practice whatever. But that is a very
different proposition than the claim that no criticism ofCMP is possible or that Alston intends to
insulate CMP from such criticism.
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gracious to her enemies, and the like. That is, internal to CMP are a set of loose
hypothetical
specifying that under such and such conditions, God is likely to bring about such and such
changes in character
.
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Thus, Jonathan Edwards:
In forming a judgement of ourselves now... we should certainly adopt that
evidence which our supreme Judge will chiefly make use of when we come to
stand before him at the last day... There is not one grace of the Spirit of God,
of the existence of which, in any professor of religion, Christian practice is not
the most decisive evidence.... The degree in which our experience is
production of practice shows the degree in which our experience is spiritual
and divine. 15 ’
Saint Theresa concurs:
Like imperfect sleep which, instead of giving more strength to the head, doth
but leave it the more exhausted, the result of mere operations of the
imagination is but to weaken the soul. Instead of nourishment and energy she
reaps only lassitude and disgust: whereas a genuine heavenly vision yields to
her a harvest of ineffable spiritual riches, and an admirable renewal of bodily
strength. I alleged these reasons to those who so often accused my visions of
being the work of the enemy of mankind and the sport of my imagination. I
showed them the jewels which the divine hand had left with me: - they were
my actual dispositions. All those who knew me saw that I was changed; my
confessor bore witness to this fact; this improvement, palpable in all respects,
for from being hidden, was brilliantly evident to all men . 154
If those predictions are accurate, and not just in an agent’s own life but
throughout the membership of CMP, then we have reason to believe that CMP provides
its members with an accurate rendering of God’s intentions and nature, of an agent’s
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relation to God, and the like. The beliefs formed by CMP cohere in a way that
recommends it and in ways that do not thereby recommend any other practice whatever.
Why does this appeal to moral transformation count as a species of self-support?
Because we can determine that the predicted character changes have come about only as a
consequence of having developed ‘perceptual skills,’ and because we can acquire those
perceptual skills only by engaging in CMP, any appeal moral transformation to support
the positive epistemic status of CMP will be infected with epistemic circularity. 155 That
is, only ifCMP is reliable are the relevant beliefs about changes in character reliably
formed and thus any argument in support of CMP’s reliability by appeal to those
predicted changes presupposes the issue at hand. Why is this type of self-support
significant? Because, if engagement in CMP correlates positively with moral
transformation, we have in hand an argument (once again, a circular one) in support of
CMP’s reliability which is not necessarily available to other practices. Because CMP
supports itself in ways it need not have supported itself, it is thereby better off
epistemically than it would have been were it not to enjoy that support.
This argument in support of CMP is structurally similar to arguments in support
of SP's reliability which appeal to its predictive success. Note that any appeal to the fact
that SP enables us successfully to predict events in the natural world will invariably be
infected by epistemic circularity — how else can we determine whether or not out
predictions actually come about than by engaging in SP and thereby by tacitly
presupposing its reliability? Nevertheless, although worthless as a direct proof of the
l55
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reliability of SP, appeal to the predictive success of SP counts as significant self-support.
Not just any old practice puts us in the position to make accurate predictions about the
natural world; presumably astrology and the reading of crystal balls do not. Because it
supports itselt in ways that it might not have supported itself, and in ways that other
practices apparently do not, SP s predictive success does supplement the epistemic status
SP enjoys in virtue of being a socially established practice which is free of massive
internal and external inconsistency.
Not to state the obvious, but CMP does not enjoy the same kind of epistemic
self-support proper to SP. CMP furnishes accurate predictions, if it does, about our moral
character; SP affords accurate predictions, if it does, about the natural world. But that is
hardly reason to deny the epistemic importance of CMP’s version of self-support. The
kind of self-support we should expect differs from practice to practice; that enjoyed by
deduction differs from induction, introspection, and, of course, SP and CMP. According
to Alston, the kind of self-support we should expect from a given practice is determined
by the aim orfunction of that practice; the aim ofCMP differs from that of SP, and that
difference accounts for the differences in what they are successful in doing .
156 The
function ofCMP is, generally put, to provide us with a map or the divine territory — to
enable us to understand God’s nature and will. Such understanding has moral conditions
— “only the true in heart will see God.” 157 Hence, we have to master those moral
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components if we are to be successful practitioners in CMP. The aim of SP is very
different; it is to enable us to make our way around the natural environment; hence, it will
have to provide us with an accurate map of that environment if it is to be successful in
that aim. The difference, in short, between the kind of significant self-support CMP
provides its practitioners with is legitimately different from that provided by SP to its
practitioners.
2.5 Summary of Alston’s Argument
In the first chapter, I attempted to reconstruct Alston’s general epistemic position
without employing that position to determine whether or not religious belief enjoys
positive epistemic status. I noted that, in virtue of the ubiquity of epistemic circularity,
Alston despairs of the attempt to show that any of our most basic doxastic practices are
reliable. We have, therefore, to make do with second best. We should sit tight with those
practices in which we happen to engage unless we have good reason to regard those
practices as unreliable, viz., they are massively inconsistent, whether internally or
externally. We should also attempt to identify epistemically desirable characteristics
which selected practices enjoy even if we can't appeal to those characteristics in order
directly and non-circularly to show that practices which enjoy those characteristics are
reliable. And of course, in order for an agent to act in an epistemically appropriate
manner, she must show that non-socially entrenched practices are reliable by employing
premises formed solely within well-established practices.
NY.: Orbis Books, 1988), p. xxxiii-xxxiv.
149
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconstruct Alston’s claim that there is a
religious practice of forming beliefs about God and that that practice satisfies the
normative criteria constitutive of Alston's general epistemic position. There is a socially
established practice of forming and evaluating beliefs about God on the basis of putative
presentations of the divine. And so long as we consider the epistemic status ofCMP
fairly, that is, so long as we impose no double standards, and engage in no epistemic
imperialism, CMP is afflicted with no demerits sufficient to render those who engage in it
epistemically unjustified in so doing.
Before I turn to the task of evaluating Alston's position, I will make three
comments about his argument.
First, not all religious beliefs are formed by engaging in CMP; others are formed
by the reading of sacred texts, by appeal to communally recognized authorities, and some
are formed as a consequence of reflection on natural phenomena, that is, by engaging in
‘natural theology.’ Clearly, these other ways of forming beliefs may not rest for their
laurels on the arguments Alston marshals in support of CMP. And Alston does not
assume that they may; he denies that by vindicating the epistemic standing of M-beliefs
he has thereby vindicated the epistemic standing of religious beliefs in general. 1
'’ 8
Nevertheless, Alston articulates, or at least, he pursues, a strategy when defending CMP
that may fruitfully be employed in the defense of other ways of forming religious beliefs.
I will articulate in some detail what I take that strategy to be in the next chapter.
os perce iv jng God, p. 4, 286.
150
Second, Alston intends to provide an external justification of the epistemic
standing of CMP, not just the internal defense favored by other Refonned
Epistemologists like Plantinga and Wolterstorff. That is, he articulates a general
epistemic position by which to determine whether or not an agent’ s engagement in some
doxastic practice passes epistemic muster and which he commends independently of its
application to CMP. And according to that position, those who engage in CMP are
strongly rational in so engaging. More importantly, that those who engage in CMP are
strongly rational is discemable by those who do not engage in CMP. Alston’s claim is
not just that Christians have available to them grounds sufficient to show that they are
strongly rational in regarding CMP as reliable, but that those who have no theological
predilections whatsoever have access to sufficient grounds as well. Anyone can
determine whether or not CMP is socially established, internally consistent and consistent
with more well-established practices. 159
Note, however, that Alston has not provided sufficient grounds for believing that
those who engage in CMP are epistemicallyjustified in so doing. To show that, he would
have to show that CMP is reliable, a task he assumes will meet with failure. Rather, his
argument is that it is strongly rational to believe that CMP is reliable, a very different
proposition. (Rationality is not truth-conducive, justification is.)
I59
. “I believe that my arguments in this book provide anyone, participant in CMP or not, with
sufficient reasons for taking CMP to be rationally engaged in.” Perceiving God, p. 283.
There is a problem, however, with strong rationality. Alston claims that an agent learns to
discern the kind of character growth predicted by CMP only by engaging in CMP. But if this is
true, how are those who do not engage in CMP to determine whether or not that practice enjoys
significant self-support? And if they cannot determine whether or not CMP enjoys significant self-
support, they cannot determine whether or not CMP enjoys strong rationality.
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Third, although in earlier essays on the topic Alston argued that CMP enjoys the
same epistemic status we accord to SP
,
160 he no longer adheres to that claim. As a
consequence of SP’s superior overrider system
,
161
of the more numerous inconsistencies
generated by CMP
,
and of the fact that CMP is faced with numerous incompatible yet
undefeated alternatives
,
163 CMP enjoys an inferior epistemic status than SP. (Of course,
inferior does not entail negligible; Alston rejects the claim that CMP lacks positive
epistemic status altogether.) As a consequence of its lower status, if particular religious
claims conflict with the dictates of SP (taking modem science, more particularly, to be a
constituent of SP), then the religious claims must be rejected or modified accordingly
.
164
16
°. “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,” p. 120.
161 Perceiving God, p. 220.
,62
.
Perceiving God, p. 238.
163
.
Perceiving God, p. 277.
164
.
Perceiving God, pp. 172-73.
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CHAPTER 3
THE AUTONOMY OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL PRACTICE
At the heart of the Reformed approach are the following four claims. (1) Every
cognitive agent cannot but rely on a set of belief-forming practices, e.g., sense-perception,
introspection, memory and testimony, for which she can provide no non-circular
discursive justification. 1 (2) The most powerful and venerable set of restrictions
demarcating the belief-forming practices which require discursive redemption from those
which do not, viz., classical foundationalism, is self- referentially incoherent, unduly
restrictive, or arbitrary.
2
(3) Once the vicissitudes of classical foundationalism are
exposed, there is no reason why a religious way of forming beliefs ought not count as one
of those practices in which an agent may engage without providing discursive
justification for so doing. Religious practices of forming beliefs enjoy a presumptive
innocence. (4) That a belief-forming practice enjoys a presumptive innocence does not
insure those who engage in that practice of ‘diplomatic immunity’ from critical
reflection; rather, critical reflection assumes the burden of a proof of guilt. Religious
practices of forming beliefs are innocent until proven guilty.
'. I am formulating the Reformed approach in Alston’s preferred terminology, not Plantinga or
Wolterstorff s. At least in their early work, Plantinga and Wolterstorff frame their position in
terms of ‘basic beliefs;’ they argue that rational agents cannot but rely on a set of basic beliefs for
which they can provide no discursive justification and seem unconcerned with the practices b\
engaging in which those beliefs are formed and evaluated.
2
.
Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,’’ in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstoitf,
eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame
Press, 1983), pp. 59-63; Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2
nd
ed.,
(Grand Rapids, MI.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993), pp. 28-55.
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(1) is a claim about pluralism: there are numerous distinct practices of forming
beliefs and there is no reason to assume, much less require, that beliefs formed by
engaging in some subset of those practices provide us with good reason to believe that
practices not in that subset are reliable. There is no reason to believe, and in light of
persistent failure, every reason to deny, that one practice is likely to be reliable on the
evidence furnished by the others; that SP, for example, is likely to be reliable given the
evidence generated by introspection, deduction and memory (Descartes).
This pluralism claim must be distinguished from Alston’s claim that distinct
doxastic practices are autonomous. Most generally, the claim that a given doxastic
practice is autonomous is the claim that internal to that practice are standards of
evaluation, types of input and output, procedures for evaluating prima facie justified
beliefs, that differ from those proper to other practices. 3 The plurality claim is that there
are distinct DPs which are not necessarily probable on the evidence afforded by others;
the autonomy claim is that the differences between distinct practices are legitimate. The
plurality claim entails that we ought not require of a given practice that it be shown to be
reliable by premises formed only in other practices; the autonomy claim entails that the
activities, concepts, standards of evaluation, etc., internal to one practice need not be de
jure in others. The plurality claim supports the denial that CMP needs to be shown to be
reliable by promises formed in SP memory, introspection etc.; the autonomy claim
supports the denial that the bases on which M-beliefs are formed must enjoy all the
\ Perceiving God, p. 162; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 4.
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characteristics enjoyed by the bases on which sense-perceptual beliefs are formed or be
checked in the way sense-perceptual beliefs are checked, etc.
What is the relation between the plurality and the autonomy claims? Just because
there are various practices with distinctive types of inputs, outputs, checking procedures,
conceptual schemes, etc. does it make sense to claim of one practice, e.g., SP, that it be
shown to be reliable by premises generated by other practices, e.g., introspection, memory
and rational intuition. That is, just because there are distinct practices is it possible to
require of one practice that it be probable on the evidence furnished by others. The
pluralism claim presupposes the autonomy claim.
I believe that Alston’s defense of the autonomy of distinct DPs, and in particular
of CMP, constitutes one of his most interesting and important insights. Alston concurs;
he claims that, by advocating the autonomy of distinct DPs, he is carrying out, or at least
contributing to, a "paradigm shift" in the field of epistemology. 4 Surprisingly given its
importance to his project, Alston fails to provide a rationale justifying his claim that
distinct DPs are autonomous, and, perhaps more importantly, criteria in light of which we
may distinguish between genuine and spurious autonomy claims. Moreover, Alston fails
to address a tension between the autonomy claim and (4) above. That is, Alston’s claim
that religious DPs like CMP are autonomous seems to render them immune to external
critique, thus undermining the Reformed claim that religious DPs should be amenable of
criticism; that, although presumptively innocent, we should always open ourselves to the
live possibility that they are guilty.
4
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 1 1.
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I will attempt to remedy that, at least in part, in this chapter. I begin, in section
3.1, with an analysis of the kind of problem to which the autonomy claim is supposed to
provide an answer. In 3.2, 1 provide a rationale for the autonomy claim; that is, I provide
some criteria by which we may determine whether or not a given practice is autonomous
and some reason why it is reasonable to believe that CMP is autonomous. In 3.3,
1
indicate the way in which the autonomy of religious DPs makes possible a promising
strategy for defending religious belief. In 3.4, 1 indicate why Alston's advocacy of
autonomy is so objectionable to critics: it seems to render CMP immune to external
criticism. I then argue that this objection imposes a double standard on CMP. In 3.5,
1
attempt further to allay concern that Alston's strategy for defending religious belief
renders such practices immune from external criticism by contrasting my rationale with
that articulated by another defender of the autonomy of distinct DPs, viz., Peter Winch in
his account of the rationality of non-Westem practices of forming beliefs. I argue that
Alston's metaphysical realism, unlike Winch's anti-realism, underwrites a fallibilism
about religious doxastic practices which, because it opens their participants to the
possibility that they may be systematically deceived in believing as they do, invites
external critique. In a final section, I provide some indication of the limitations of the
appeal to autonomy as a strategy for defending the rationality of religious belief.
3.1 Comparison Criticism
Alston identifies two ways in which the weak rationality of engaging in a socially
and psychologically established practice may be overridden, viz., either by massive
156
internal inconsistency among the outputs of a given practice or by massive inconsistency
with the outputs of a more well-established practice. But his attempt to respond to
various criticisms ot CMP indicates that there is another potential overrider in the
neighborhood, one which Alston takes at least as seriously as the other two. Analysis of
an exchange between Alston and one of his most persistent critics will help us pinpoint
just what that overrider is.
Richard Gale lists in some detail the various tests which a given sense-perceptual
belief must pass if an agent is to be ultima facie justified in adhering to it . 5 M-beliefs fail
those tests, or lack analogous tests, and thus lack cognitive status. (I discussed this
objection in the previous chapter.) Alston responds as expected: the nature of God, God’s
transcendence and sovereignty, inhibits us from identifying circumstances in which God
will be perceived by competent agents; according to Alston, this is good news and bad
news. It is bad because, were reality suited to our epistemic tastes, we would be able to
test all of our beliefs in the way we test sense-perceptual beliefs ;
6
reality (in this case,
God) is not so suited; hence we cannot test M-beliefs as we would like. It is good news
because we understand that our inability so to test our beliefs is a consequence of the
constraints imposed on us by the object about which we form beliefs. Because we may
yet be forming our beliefs about that object reliably, CMP's impoverished checking
procedures fail to denude CMP of positive epistemic status.
5
. On the Nature and Existence of God, p. 302.
6
.
Actually, SP isn’t as ideal as we might like it. Don’t most of us wish to have insight into the
physical world like that which we have of the laws of logic?
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Gale has little patience with this maneuver. Alston's response is like "the doctor
saying, 'I've got good news and bad news; the bad news is that you will die of an
untreatable cancer within six months and the good news is that we know the reason why
you have cancer ."’ 7 He even coins a new fallacy, the "Alston fallacy:" "we find Alston
committing the fallacy of thinking that if he can give a categorially based explanation for
a disanalogy between the religious and sense-experience doxastic practices, it renders the
analogy harmless ." 8 Again, “explaining why M-experiences flunk a requirement does
nothing toward helping them to satisfy it.”9 On the contrary. Gale argues, because SP and
CMP are disanalogous in crucial respects, viz., the checking procedures constitutive of
their overrider system, Alston's attempt to show that CMP is epistemically respectable
fails .
10
What is the nature of the dispute between Gale and Alston? Both concur in the
claim that CMP differs from SP in important ways; that CMP lacks something,
intersubjective tests for M-beliefs, which SP enjoys. Both agree that, were CMP
constructed to our epistemic tastes, M-beliefs would be amenable of intersubjective
checking. But neither claims that CMP’s lacking those tests itself generates massive
inconsistencies among M-beliefs. And neither claims that CMP’s lacking intersubjective
tests generates beliefs which are massively inconsistent with more well-established
1
. On the Nature and Existence of God, p. 319.
8
. On the Nature and Existence of God, p. 322.
9
.
“Why Alston’s Mystical Doxastic Practice is Subjective,” p. 875.
10
. Note again that Alston's argument is not an argument from analogy; his argument hinges on the
doxastic practice approach I articulated in the first chapter. Hence, showing that SP and CMP are
disanalogous in various respects does not entail anything about the epistemic standing of either.
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practices, e.g., SP. Rather, the problem is that CMP lacks a feature we prize very much,
and that counts against CMP’s epistemic standing. Gale claims that any respectable
perceptual practice has that feature so that, because CMP lacks it, CMP is not a
respectable doxastic practice. Alston admits that CMP would be better off epistemically
it it had that feature, but that it does not require it in order to enjoy positive epistemic
status. Having an SP-type overrider system is desirable but not required of respectable
doxastic practices. Gale s objection is an example of what I shall call comparison
criticism
; the dispute is over whether or not a feature of one practice - SP - which we
believe puts us in effective contact with reality, and is therefore epistemically desirable,
ought also be required of another - CMP.
The structure of comparison criticism is as follows. Suppose that we are
confident of Beta's trustworthiness, that it gives rise to a sufficiently high proportion of
true to false beliefs. We have identified various epistemic excellences which Beta
possesses and are justly confident that its possession of those excellences accounts for
Beta's providing us with access to reality. Alpha, however, lacks one of those
excellences, E, or any functionally equivalent excellence for E. If both Alpha and Beta
ought to have some such excellence, we infer (ceteris paribus) that the epistemic status
Alpha enjoys is lower than that enjoyed by Beta; and if E is a particularly important
property, we may conclude that Alpha enjoys no positive epistemic status whatsoever. In
short, by comparing what we know about the kinds of activities that put one in touch with
the truth with what we know about the way in which practitioners of Alpha form beliefs,
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we attempt to determine whether or not forming beliefs in the Alpha-type way is a good
thing from the epistemic point of view.
Comparison criticism is an important species of argumentation," particularly if
the Reformed strategy (or some relevantly similar strategy) is ultimately defensible.
Why? Comparison criticism enables us to engage in critical reflection in a principled
manner even given the limitations imposed on us by our inability to attain a God's-eye
view of our epistemic situation. One who levels such a critique is free to admit what
Reformed epistemologists have been urging, viz., that there is no reason to believe that
one doxastic practice can be shown to be reliable on evidence from some select set of
practices, and what many proponents of 'naturalistic epistemology' have been urging, viz.,
that none of us has any idea of the features of a practice that facilitate reliable belief
formation other than by engaging in actual ways of forming beliefs. By engaging in ways
of forming beliefs to which we cannot but impute a presumptive innocence, we are able
to acquire some understanding of how we can come into contact with reality. We may
subsequently employ that understanding to criticize other ways of forming beliefs.
". Thus, it seems to me that the most interesting of the supposed conflicts between ‘religion and
science’ hinge on some supposed difference between the way in which scientists form their
beliefs and the way religious believers form their beliefs; the conflicts that get the most press,
like the creation-evolution debate, hinge on a putative incompatibility between religious
doctrines and the ‘assured results of modern science,' but are of comparative unimportance
because the religious tradition party to the incompatibility can revise their theological truth-
claims. It is only when that kind of revision seems impossible that the conflict between science
and religion can seem intractable. And the putative intractability of religious belief, when
contrasted to the malleability of scientific truth claims, is grounds for a comparison criticism of
religious belief which is more serious, I believe, than the various conflicts between particular
doctrines and theories that receive so much attention. On that putative contrast, see Basil Mitchell,
Faith and Criticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
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Unfortunately, comparison criticism harbors potential for the uncritical rejection
of legitimate practices of forming beliefs. The crucial problem for any such criticism is
to show of an excellence E internal to one practice that another practice which in fact
lacks E ought to have E. Although E may be crucial to one practice’s capacity to put an
agent in touch with reality, the very same excellence may be superfluous or even
counterproductive for a different practice. To reject the latter practice because it lacks E
would be a travesty.
According to Alston, Gale commits just such a travesty: why should we assume
that our inability to evaluate M-beliefs as we do sense-perceptual beliefs is epistemically
cancerous rather than merely a cold or mild headache? Granted that we don’t want a cold
or headache; we certainly won't die if we do. Granted that we prefer a better overrider
system than CMP in fact has, why should we regard CMP as altogether lacking epistemic
standing because it doesn’t?
So Alston and Gale differ on their diagnosis of CMP. How do we adjudicate
between their diagnoses? Alston argues that CMP is an autonomous practice of forming
beliefs which thereby enjoys its own, distinct criteria for validating beliefs; CMP is a
"sovereign sphere of cognition. Let’s call this Alston’s Autonomy Thesis. Among
those criteria is not the requirement that M-beliefs be intersubjectively evaluated. The
obvious question is, then, how do we determine whether or not a given feature should be
regarded as de jure for a given (autonomous) practice?
I2
.
Perceiving God, p. 221
.
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3.2 The Ontological Principle
A resolution of the dispute between Alston and Gale depends on answering the
question, “how do we determine whether or not a given feature is de jure for a given
(autonomous) practice? 1 ' Faced with a comparison criticism, we must determine whether
or not some excellence E enjoyed by one practice, which we believe puts us in effective
touch with reality, is reasonably to be expected of another practices. Alston's answer is
straightforward: the nature, "kind," etc. of that about which an agent forms beliefs
imposes limitations on the way in which an agent reliably can form beliefs about object.
He adopts what I call the Ontological Principle, viz., that the nature of an object ought to
determine the way in which we form beliefs about it . 13 His texts are replete with the
claim that the "nature ," 14 "kind of reality ," 15 "realm of reality ," 16 "subject matter" 17 about
13
. Alston is distinctive, but not unique, in according the Ontological Principle systematic
significance. Thomas Torrance writes, "it is always the nature of things that must prescribe for us
the specific mode of rationality that we must adopt toward them, and prescribe also the form of
verification apposite to them, and therefore it is a major part of scientific activity to reach clear
convictions as to the distinctive nature of what we are seeking to know in order that we may
develop and operate with the distinctive categories demanded of us." Theological Science,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. viii. See pp. 168-69; God and Rationality, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 33; Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 67f.; The Ground and Grammar of Theology,
(Charlottesville, VA.: University of Virginia Press, 1980), pp. 8f.; Reality and Scientific
Theology, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985), pp. 1-3; Transformation and
Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge, (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984), pp. 42,
73-6, 265, 293; Theology in Reconstruction, (Grand Rapids, Ml.: Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1965), p. 15.
14
.
Perceiving God, p. 254.
15
.
Perceiving God, p. 249.
16
.
Perceiving God, p. 229.
17
.
Perceiving God, p. 242.
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which those who engage in CMP form beliefs circumscribes the ways in which members
can
reliably form and check beliefs about God. Canonically put, the Ontological Principle is
the claim that,
(OP): the characteristics of an object ought to constrain the norms an agent
employs to evaluate the beliefs she forms about that object.
Several notes by way of exposition. First, the Ontological Principle, as
formulated, is completely general. It applies to beliefs about objects of any sort, not just
to beliefs formed about God. So, although religious apologists may, and do, employ it to
happy effect, those concerned with the epistemic imperialism visited upon non-religious
ways of forming beliefs are free to do the same. (I believe that an fuller appreciation of
the Ontological Principle would render disputes central to the philosophy of social
science and of mind more fruitful.)
Second, by ‘object,’ I do not just mean an independently existing, discrete entity,
of the sort paradigmatically exemplified by the typical chair, banana, etc. Mental states
are 'objects' about which agents form beliefs, as are social institutions, none of which
exist independently of human cognizers, and yet their distinctive ontological makeup
imposes constraints on the way a rational agent forms beliefs about them. By object,
then, I mean the ‘subject matter’ about which an agent forms beliefs, or even more
prosaically, ‘whatever it is’ about which an agent forms beliefs.
Third, ‘characteristics’ should be understood broadly, to include not just the
ontological makeup of an object of belief, the stuff of which it is composed, but also the
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form that stuff takes. 18 Birds and plants may be composed of the same stuff, but, because
that stuff is organized very differently in plants than in animals, the way in which a
rational agent forms and evaluates beliefs about them differs significantly. This becomes
particularly important when we concern ourselves with the way we ought to form beliefs
about God. The characteristics of God which impose constraints on us are not just,
though they certainly include, God's incorporeal nature and God's transcendence; they
also include the ways in which God has decided to communicate information unknowable
to us. That is, they include the intentions and purposes God, as a free agent, pursues.
Fourth, the characteristics of an object constrain the norms an agent ought to
employ to evaluate her beliefs, but they do not determine exactly what those norms are.
Only some of the norms which are improperly employed to evaluate the epistemic status
of a given type of belief are rendered improper by the object's nature and characteristics.
Some are improper because, for example, an agent does not have access to the doxastic
practices which are a condition of forming beliefs in the way required by a given norm.
(In the terminology developed later, both practice- and object-imposed constraints place
limitations on the epistemic norms it is reasonable to impose on cognitive agents.)
Fifth, to affirm of a norm that it is improperly employed to evaluate beliefs of a
certain sort is not to claim that beliefs of that sort are subject to entirely different norms
than those proper to other practices. It is to claim that there are some legitimate
18
. Torrance and Alston both claim that an object's nature does the constraining. But unless
God's intentions, and more specifically, God's chosen mode of communication, are part of God s
nature, then both Alston and Torrance assume that it is more than just God's nature that
constrains the way we ought to form beliefs about God. More accurate, though less stylish, is
characteristic. Whenever I use 'nature,' I intend to be understood as meaning characteristic.
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differences between one practice and others, not that the former is absolutely different
from the latter. All practices, for example, are no doubt subject to the laws of logic;
every practice which gives rise to massive amounts of self-contradictory beliefs cannot be
reliable and thus is epistemically out of bounds. Amongst the norms internal to the
overrider systems of distinct doxastic practices, then, there will be similarity and
difference, unity and plurality. (As I will argue in chapter four, formal norms, like the
Law of Non-Contradiction, are universally applicable, that is, de jure for any doxastic
practice whatever, but substantive norms, like the claim that beliefs should admit of
public evaluation, are appropriately imposed on some practices but not on others.)
I believe that an adequate defense of the Ontological Principle provides us with
what we need for an adequate defense of the Autonomy Thesis, as well as criteria for
distinguishing between genuine and spurious autonomy claims. That is, if we can provide
an adequate rationale for the Ontological Principle, we will have in hand as well an
adequate rationale for the Autonomy Thesis and thus the means necessary to resolving
disputes like that between Gale and Alston. Alston fails to provide that rationale; he
relies heavily on its intuitive appeal, without attempting to provide any discursive
justification. I will attempt to do so now.
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3.2.1 Examples of the Ontological Principle
Before articulating a rationale for OP, I will present several examples I hope will
render plausible the claim that some such principle is true (whether or not I have
successfully identified what that is).
Suppose that I saw a Venus Flytrap in the forest and I tell you about it, but you
don't believe me. I can verify my belief if I retrace my steps until we return to the
location at which I claim to have seen the Flytrap. If we cannot find the plant, witness no
signs of its removal, and are not delusional or otherwise incapacitated, my claim to have
seen the plant will have been compromised. If, however, I claim to have seen a rare
species of bird, you don't believe that I have, you insist on returning to the location at
which I claim to have seen the bird, you direct your attention to the very branch on which
the bird was resting when I saw it, refuse to grant that my belief is true, and cite as
grounds that the bird is not where I said it was, you are simply being unreasonable. Why?
Plants are stationary; birds move. You insist on employing procedures to substantiate
bird-beliefs that are proper to plant-beliefs and the like. We reasonably investigate claims
about the latter in ways it would be irrational to investigate the former just because the
first kind of object interacts with our cognitive faculties in a different way than does the
second.
Consider another example. If there is a God, God is not a physical object. If there
is a planet orbiting Alpha Centauri, it is a physical object. In virtue of God's essentially
incorporeal nature, God can not reflect light. In virtue of its corporeal nature, the planet
orbiting Alpha Centauri can. If we want to determine whether or not there is a planet
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orbiting Alpha Centauri, we hire an astronomer with an unbelievably powerful telescope;
if the telescope is powerful enough, the astronomer skilled enough, and there actually is a
planet there, she will detect it. If she doesn't, we conclude that Alpha Centauri is
planetless. But no matter how powerful the telescope, no matter how assiduously the
astronomer scours the heavens, she cannot expect to detect God amongst the celestial
beings she perceives. If she does not detect God, and thus concludes on that basis that the
universe is godless, she is irrational.
Of course, not every example is as clear cut as are those mentioned in the previous
paragraphs. For another example, and a more controversial one, consider the
longstanding debate between those who believe that human actions are events of a sort
different than human behaviors and that the properties making for that difference impose
constraints on the way that we form beliefs about actions, constraints from which we are
free when forming beliefs about bodily movements. I can determine without having any
knowledge of an agent's intentions or beliefs whether or not water is poured from her
hand on to her child's head; I cannot determine without access to her beliefs and
intentions whether or not she is baptizing her baby. Because an agent's beliefs determine
in part which action she performs, those who form beliefs about another agent's actions
must have access to the latter's beliefs. The observer needs to find some way to
determine what the actor’s beliefs are and that cannot be accomplished merely by
observing the relevant agent's physical movements. Thus, in order reliably to form
beliefs about an agent's actions, we need to interpret (understand, empathize with, etc.)
what that agent does, where interpretation (understanding, empathizing, etc.) is a very
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different kind of cognitive activity than that in which we must engage in order reliably to
form beliefs about an agent's physical movements. Once again, because of a relevant
difference between two objects of belief (in this case, two events), the epistemic
desiderata proper to beliefs formed about one object properly differ from those formed
about the other.
It seems to me that Charles Taylor, in his many writings on the philosophy of
social science, theory of interpretation, etc. employs - without explicitly articulating, so
far as I can tell — the Ontological Principle in defending the legitimacy of a
non-scientistic approach to the way in which we form beliefs about human action.
According to Taylor, human beings are very different kinds of entities than are, say,
lemmings. Human beings are self-interpreting animals, because our beliefs about
ourselves determine in part who we are and what we are; that is, they determine our self-
identity . 19 Lemmings lack beliefs, and hence Lemming-characteristics depend on
Lemming-beliefs. This difference has great importance, according to Taylor, for the kind
of checks and constraints we employ to evaluate theories about human agents and those
we employ to evaluate theories about lemmings . 20 Because human beings are
19
. "A fully competent human being not only has some understanding (which may be also more
of less misunderstanding) of himself, but is partly constituted by this understanding. ...Our self-
understanding essentially incorporates our seeing ourselves against a background of what I have
called 'strong evaluation,"’ that is, a set of "distinctions between things which are recognized as
of categoric or unconditioned or higher importance or worth, and things which lack this or are or
lesser value." Charles Taylor, "Introduction," in Human Agency and Language, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 19. Taylor explains what he means by strong evaluation
in Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 3-52, especially pp.
19f. and 30f.; and what he means by the self-constitutive nature of human personhood in "Self-
Interpreting Animals," in Human Agency and Language, pp. 45- 76.
20
.
Naturalistic science, according to Taylor, aspires to explain human action absolutely, that
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self-interpreting animals, the theories that a scientist forms about a human being can
change the way a human being thinks of herself, thus altering the object of study in a way
that the scientist doesn t alter the lemming when she studies it. As a consequence, the
kind of exact prediction proper to theories in the hard sciences is not properly expected of
beliefs in the social sciences.- 1 Hence, it would be unreasonable to reject a theory formed
about persons because it does not admit of disconfirmation through failed prediction.
Rather, disconfirmation of social scientific theories ought to be evaluated in light of
criteria internal to hermeneutics. 22 To require of theories about self-interpreting animals
that they be subject to the kinds of checks properly imposed on the natural scientific
theories would be imperialistic. 23
is, without taking into account properties which exist only in the experience of human beings
(e.g., secondary qualities, self-conceptions). Continuing the train of thought quoted in the
previous footnote, Taylor writes, "A being who exists only in self-interpretation cannot be
understood absolutely; and one who can only be understood against the background of
distinctions of worth [strong evaluations] cannot be captured by a scientific language which
essentially aspires to neutrality. Our personhood cannot be treated scientifically in exactly the
same way we approach our organic being. What it is to possess a liver or heart is something 1
can define quite independently of the space of questions in which I exist for myself, but not what
it is to have a self or be a person." "Introduction," pp. 3-4.
21
. See "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 55f; and "Social Theory as Practice," in
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 91-101.
22
. "Social Theory as Practice," p. Ill; "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," p. 53.
23
. To multiply examples further would be tedious, but not impossible. John Searle, it seems to
me, uses the Ontological Principle to defend his account of the nature of the human mind. "In
spite of our modern arrogance about how much we know, in spite of the assurance and
universality of our science, where the mind is concerned we are characteristically confused and
in disagreement. We let our research methods dictate the subject matter, rather than the
converse. Like the drunk who loses his car keys in the dark bushes but looks for them under the
streetlight, 'because the light is better there,' we try to find out how humans might resemble out
computational models rather than trying to figure out how the conscious human mind actually
works." The Rediscovery of the Mind, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 247. Again,
"the epistemology of studying the mental no more determines its ontology than does the
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3.2.2 Practice and Object Imposed Constraints
Each of the preceding scenarios exemplifies the Ontological Principle in action.
Epistemic desiderata proper to one doxastic practice are rejected as imperialistic
impositions on another, and at the heart of the rationale for such rejection is a recognition
of epistemically relevant differences between the objects of belief. Illustrations are
helpful, but are there principled considerations supporting the Ontological Principle? I
think that there are.
If we are to form our beliefs in such a way as to achieve our central epistemic aim,
viz., to achieve a high a ratio of true to false beliefs, we must acquire information about
the objects of our belief. The beliefs we form about an object must be generated from
information about that object if our believing truly is not to be a lucky accident and thus a
failure to discharge our central epistemic aim. We engage in various practices by which
we gather information and thereby form beliefs: sense-perception, testimony,
introspection, memory. Constructed as she is, the typical human being is capable of
acquiring information about objects in her vicinity via the stimulation of her visual
receptors by light generated or reflected by those objects, of her auditory receptors by
sound waves reflected by those objects, of her olfactory receptors by odoriferous particles
emitted by those objects, etc. Our five senses are not our only sources of information.
We acquire information about our feelings, beliefs, desires, and the like not by sensory
stimulation but by introspecting. And although memory and testimony are parasitic on
epistemology of any other discipline determine its ontology. On the contrary, in the study of the
mind as elsewhere, the whole point of the epistemology is to get at the pre-existing ontology."
Ibid., p. 23. The parallel with the religious question is obvious.
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other belief-forming practices for their inputs, and thus are not basic sources of beliefs,
they are basic sources of epistemic justification. 24 That is, memory and testimony are
sources of information inaccessible to an agent unless she engages in those practices.
To be sure, if there are some objects discoverable by a sixth sense forever
unattainable by those endowed with a constitution like ours, then it is impossible for us
reliably to form beliefs about those objects. If some kinds of emotion are detectable only
by the empathetic powers enjoyed by (so far as we know) science fictional characters,
then agents (like us) who lack those powers are unable to acquire trustworthy information
about those kinds of emotion. Although by rank speculation we may happen upon some
truth or two, the means at our disposal are not conducive to our discharging our central
epistemic obligation with respect to those emotions.
That we are capable of engaging in certain practices but not others, then, imposes
constraints on the way in which we from beliefs. As finite epistemic agents, we can
engage only in certain practices and thus may reliably form beliefs about only certain
kinds of things. A bit of terminological legerdemain: I shall call any such constraint a
practice-imposed constraint. A practice-imposed constraint is any limitation on the way
in which an agent can acquire information to which she is subject in virtue of the
belief-forming practices available (or unavailable) to her.
There are various sources of practice-imposed constraints. The most important
source is an agent's constitution. Those outfitted with a well-functioning visual apparatus
24
.
Robert Audi, Belief, Justification and Knowledge, (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing
Co., 1983), p. 38; Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 87f.
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but not the means to form beliefs via sonar cannot form beliefs in the way that bats form
beliefs. Human beings form beliefs about other people's beliefs principally by relying on
testimony; those with the capacity to read minds are not so limited. Of course, an agent's
constitution may be both extended and altered. An agent may employ her visual
apparatus to form beliefs about subatomic particles by employing an electron microscope,
a possibility foreclosed to those without the requisite technology. Those who enjoy the
fruits of such technological sophistication have open to them possibilities inaccessible to
the less fortunate. And it is but a short step from extending an agent's physical
constitution to altering it. Perhaps future scientists, via genetic engineering, will be able
to equip human beings with the ability to generate beliefs via sonar in addition to their
normal visual capacities. Those altered human beings would then be subject to different
practice-imposed constraints than those to which we are subject. The moral of the story
is simply that every cognitive agent (save perhaps God) is subject to practice-imposed
constraints but that we ought not be too confident about what those limitations are. : ~
For certain of our core doxastic practices, the transmission of the information
from that about which we form beliefs to our capacities requires that we be causally
related to those objects. In order to acquire the information required to form our beliefs
25
. Thus, William James writes, “One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my
impression of its truth has ever remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness,
rational consciousness as we call it, is bit one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it,
parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely
different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite
stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which
probably somewhere have their field of application. No account of the universe in its totality can
be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is
the question....” The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 298; see also pp. 327-28.
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reliably, we must enter into causal relations of some sort with that about which we form
beliefs .- 6 Our intuitions about particular doxastic practices bears this out. The clearest
example is sense-perception, that an agent is causally related to the object putatively
perceived is a necessary condition of any genuine perception of that object. An agent
who forms a true belief about an object O on the basis of sensory impressions which
accurately represent O does not succeed in perceiving O, and thus in reliably forming a
perceptual belief about O, ifO does not play a suitable causal role in the generation of her
belief. Thus, suppose that I am seated in front of a large black-bellied stove, that I am
having a visual experience as of such a stove, an experience generated by the stimulation
of my visual receptors by light reflected from that stove, and that I thereby form the belief
that there is in fact a large stove in front of me. So long as nothing bizarre occurs in the
transpiring of those events, I no doubt form my belief reliably; so long as I have no reason
to believe that anything fishy is going on, and so long as nothing fishy in fact occurs, I
can hardly be anything but justified in forming beliefs as I do. But if someone,
unbeknownst to me, slips an incredibly lifelike painting of the stove in between myself
and the stove, so that my visual perception of the painting gives rise to a visual
26
. The locution “causal relations of some sort” is intentionally vague; I claim only that reliable
belief-formation requires causal connection between knower and known without committing
myself to any particular analysis of causation, nor to an account of the different kinds of causation
apposite to different kinds of belief-formation. I have no idea what difference there is between the
kind of causal connection properly obtaining between an event that occurs in the past and an agent
who recalls that event, and the kind of causal relation properly obtaining between a crater in the
moon and an agent who sees that crater. I suppose that identifying those differences falls to
physiologists, psychologists and to other types of scientist. My point is simply that an agent who is
causally connected to a given object in no way, shape, or form cannot form beliefs about that
object in a reliable, responsible manner.
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experience phenomenologically indistinguishable from the visual experience I would
have had when actually perceiving the stove, then I can hardly be said to be perceiving
the stove and certainly not forming my beliefs reliably. The break in the causal chain
originating with the stove and terminating in the stimulation of my sensory faculties
precludes my having the kind ot purchase on an object requisite for information gathering
and thus reliable belief formation.
Similarly with other DPs. Suppose that ego stoked the fire in the potbellied stove,
that alter saw him stoke the stove, that as a consequence alter believed that he stoked the
stove, and that alter continues to believe the same because she remembers that ego stoked
the stove. Once again, barring bizarre circumstances, alter no doubt forms her beliefs
reliably and justifiably. If, however, alter's memory of the event was wiped out as a
consequence of severe brain damage suffered in a car accident, a further consequence of
which is that she seems to recall vividly many events which never in fact occurred, and if
alter recalls vividly that ego in fact stoked the stove, but does so as a consequence of her
abnormal neurophysiological condition, then she has not in fact formed her beliefs about
that event reliably. The requisite causal connection between past events and present
recollection has been severed, rendering unreliable what would normally have been a
reliable indication of the truth.
Or suppose that ego stoked the stove and mentioned that fact to several other folks
who related the story to alter, who thereby formed the belief that ego stoked the lire. So
long as the transmission chain linking alter to ego wends its way through the requisite
competent authorities, alter's belief most likely enjoys justification. Suppose, however.
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that during the transmission ot testimonial authority, an English speaker fully in mastery
of her native language, utters to a French speaker that "Ego stoked the stove." If the latter
lacks the capacity to understand any language other than her own, she cannot testify
authoritatively to the claim that ego stoked the stove. Suppose that the French speaker
enjoys the way "Ego stoked the stove" sounds, and persists in repeating it whenever she is
addressed by English speakers. If alter happens to see her, and believes that she knows
something about the event in question, and thus asks her if Ego stoked the stove (in
English), and if our French speaker responds by uttering the sounds "Ego stoked the
stove," the belief that alter forms thereby does not count as epistemically justified.
Although there is a connection of some sort between ego's stoking the fire and alter's
believing that ego stoked the fire, the connection is not of the appropriate sort; it is not the
sort of causal connection between the object of belief and the believer which undergirds
our testimonial DP. (Again, I have no positive account of what that connection is. 27 )
So, then, if an agent is to form beliefs reliably, she must be capable of acquiring
information about the object of her beliefs. The ways she has of requiring information are
constrained by the DPs available to her. In order for the DPs available to her to enable
her to acquire information, she must be causally related in an appropriate way to the
object of her belief. No causal relation results in no information, and thus arbitrary belief.
27
. I should note, however, that the causal chain can't include the requirement that every link in
the testimonial chain needs to understand the utterance by which she conveys the relevant
information, as my example might seem to imply. After all, two agents, secret agents , may by
previous agreement communicate via a medium who fails to understand the coded messages she
utters at the appointed meeting times, at the agreed upon cue, etc.
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It the ways in which we can reliably form beliefs are constrained by the kinds of
causal underpinnings internal to the DPs available to us, they are further constrained by
the kinds of causal relationships into which different objects of belief can enter. Given
that human beings have the capacity visually to perceive physical objects, the
characteristics ot different physical objects constrain the ways in which human beings can
reliably form beliefs about those objects. Birds move around a lot; plants are stationary.
In virtue of that difference, beliefs formed about birds must be checked very differently
than those about plants. It isn't possible for an actual human being reliably to form beliefs
about both birds and plants if she insists on checking both kinds of beliefs by employing
the same set of procedures. Reliable belief formation is constrained by the characteristics
of the object of belief.
Consider another example. Suppose that there exists a very strange artifact, the
Holy Grail, which has the property that any cognitive agent who perceives that object is
afflicted with permanent amnesia about its existence and location upon forming any
belief about it. In virtue of its having that property, the Grail would be unable to enter
into those causal relations partly constitutive of both our mnemonic and testimonial DPs.
Clearly, any objects about which we have amnesia are those about which we can form no
reliable memory beliefs. And any object which no-one can remember is one to which
no-one can testify. No doubt the Grail remains 'undiscovered' because it has some such
property.
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Detenders of CMP, like Alston, will be quick to point out that God, if God exists,
cannot reflect light, emit odors, resist the touch of a hand, reflect sound waves; hence
God cannot be tasted, seen, smelled, heard or touched.
Some more terminological legerdemain. An object-imposed constraint is a
limitation on the way in which cognitive agents of a certain sort can reliably form beliefs
about a certain kind of object, a limitation which obtains because of the kind of causal
interactions into which that object's characteristics enable (or do not enable) that object to
enter.
What are the relations between agent and object-imposed constraints?
Agent-imposed constraints set broad limitations on that about which an agent can reliably
form beliefs. Object-imposed constraints restrict reliable access to information even
further. What we can reliably form beliefs about is demarcated in the first place by the
kind of cognitive faculties we enjoy and in the second place by the characteristics of
objects about which we form beliefs.
An object-imposed constraint is of no epistemic relevance if agent-imposed
constraints render an agent incapable of coming into effective cognitive contact with a
given kind of object in the first place. For a society of congenitally blind people, that
God does not reflect light might be an interesting consequence of the divine nature but
not one which affects the epistemic standing of their beliefs about God. Because they
lack functioning visual apparatuses, and thus cannot perceive objects via the reflection of
light, that an object cannot reflect light affects the epistemic standing of their beliefs
about God not a whit. It would be as relevant to the epistemic standing of their beliefs
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about God as the properties of emotions which enable empaths (if any there are) to detect
another agent s emotional state are to ordinary human beings, viz., not at all.
Why is it important to get straight this relation between agent- and object-imposed
constraints? Because it indicates that object-imposed constraints are not epistemically
relevant tout court, but only for agents with a certain set of cognitive abilities. Claims
about the epistemic relevance of object-imposed constraints must always be indexed to
particular kinds of agents. God could have created us with intuitive access to the divine
mind in much the same way God has provided us with intuitive access to our own. If
God had, then the constraints placed on us by our inability to control the manner of God's
appearing to us would be moot. But because God did not so hardwire us, because we are
in fact constrained to form beliefs in the way Alston lays out, God’s transcendence and
sovereignty do in fact place constraints on reliable belief-formation. Because we are
subject to such and such agent-imposed constraints, and only then because we wish to
form beliefs about a given subject matter, we are thereby also subject to such and such
object-imposed constraints.
3.2.3 Rationale for the Ontological Principle
How is the discussion of object- and agent-imposed constraints relevant to the
truth of the Ontological Principle, viz., the claim that the nature of an object constrains
the norms rational agents impose on beliefs about that object? So long as it is possible
for an agent to form beliefs about an object reliably (e.g., agent-imposed constraints do
not render that object inaccessible), then any epistemic norm which requires of an agent
that she enter into causal relations with that object into which she cannot enter (e.g..
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because ot object-imposed constraints) (1) violates the ‘ought implies can' dictum and (2)
does not enable her to achieve her central epistemic aim, and thus is epistemically
indefensible.
First, to require of an agent that she forms beliefs about an object in a reliable
manner whilst evaluating her actions in light of epistemic norms which presuppose that
she can enter into causal relations with that object into which she cannot enter is to
require the impossible. But ought implies can; it is irrational to require of an agent that
she perform an action she cannot perform. Hence, any norm which presupposes of an
agent that she can enter into causal relations into which she cannot enter is irrational.
Rather, an epistemic norm is rationally defensible only if it requires of an agent that she
perform actions it is possible for her to perform. And, of course, what is possible by way
of reliable belief-formation is determined in part by the nature of the object of belief.
To require of an agent that she evaluate bird-beliefs in light of the checking
procedures apposite to the checking of plant-beliefs presupposes that she can enter into
the kind of causal relationship to birds which is a condition of the possibility of reliably
forming beliefs about plants. But because birds move around a lot, no actual human
being can relate to birds like she can relate to plants. (Unless, of course, the birds about
which she forms beliefs are deceased.) Similarly, to require of beliefs about God that
they be based upon grounds of the sort on which we ought to base our beliefs about
planetary objects would be to require of an agent that she enter into causal relations with
God she cannot, quite literally, in the nature of the case enter. God, not being a physical
object, cannot reflect light and thus cannot stimulate our visual apparatus in the manner
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appropriate to planets and stars. Failure to adhere to the Ontological Principle in these
cases, e.g., requiring of bird-beliefs that they be checked as we would validate
plant-beliefs, and requiring ot M-beliefs that they be based upon grounds generated by the
stimulation of our sense-perceptual faculties, is to fault agents for failing to do that which
they cannot in the nature of the case do.
But doesn't this play into Gale’s hands? If we support the autonomy of CMP by
appeal to the Ontological Principle, and we support the Ontological Principle by appeal to
the 'ought implies can' dictum, haven’t we done just what he accuses Alston of doing,
viz., of providing an explanation of why CMP doesn’t function as it should - it doesn’t
function as it should because it can't! I do not think so. An objection to the epistemic
standing of some practice because that practice lacks some epistemically desirable feature
it could have but doesn't seems to me to be entirely reasonable; and it is no response to
such an objection to provide an explanation of why a practice which could have that
feature doesn’t have it. If that was the nature of Alston’s response. Gale’s critique would
be appropriate. But to object to a practice that may in fact be reliable because it lacks
some feature it cannot possess, to impose on agents who engage in some practice norms
which presuppose they can enter into causal relations they cannot enter, is unreasonable.
Second, recall that our central epistemic aim is to believe the true and not the
false. Any epistemological censure of a procedure or practice must be justified on the
grounds that adopting that procedure or engaging in that practice inhibits us from
reaching our central epistemic aim. We pass positive judgement on a given practice iff it
enables those who engage in it to form beliefs reliably, and we pass negative judgement
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on a given practice iff it inhibits an agent from forming her beliefs reliably. A judgement
which cannot be so substantiated has no place in epistemic discourse.
It is unreasonable to require of agents who engage in a DP that they adhere to
norms in light of which the beliefs so formed cannot but be judged as epistemically
unjustified, even if those beliefs have been highly reliably formed. The norms in light of
which we evaluate our beliefs must be sufficiently sensitive to enable us to detect whether
those beliefs have been reliably formed or not - what other epistemologically sound
justification could we produce for such a norm? Evaluating beliefs formed in a DP in
light of norms they cannot but fail even if that DP is reliable is hardly an adequate way of
discriminating between reliably and unreliably formed beliefs! But this is precisely what
the critic does when she does not allow 'the characteristics of the object to constrain how
cognitive agents form beliefs about that object.' Even if an agent is forming beliefs about
an object in the appropriate manner, and thus is causally related to the object of belief in
the manner apposite to objects and agents of that kind, the critic requires of her that she
adhere to norms which would unavoidably rule reliably formed beliefs out of epistemic
bounds.
Failing to adhere to the Ontological Principle, in short, would result in our failing
to do what we can to achieve our central epistemic aim; hence, adhering to the
Ontological Principle is a good thing to do from ‘the epistemic point of view.'
We made a correlative point when assessing the value of epistemically circular
arguments. That is, if epistemically circular arguments were acceptable, every practice
would come off as highly reliable so long as the 'test
1
we employed to evaluate that
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practice was whether or not the beliefs formed in a given DP supported the beliefs formed
in that DP. It I form the belief that there are little green men who inhabit the planet Pluto
by looking into my crystal ball, and then evaluate that belief by looking into my crystal
ball, I will no doubt be highly confirmed in that belief. If I apply this 'test' enough times,
and it I am not very confused, I will surely conclude that my crystal ball is nearly
infallible. And because any practice, no matter how disreputable, can be supported by
this kind of argument, epistemically circular arguments are insufficiently discriminating;
they lack standing just because they do not enable us to distinguish between reliable and
unreliable practice and thus to achieve our central epistemic aim.
In short, to rig the game so that a practice which does not enable us to achieve our
central epistemic aim cannot but be judged to be reliable is fatuous; to rig the game so
that it is impossible for beliefs formed in a DP - even if reliable - to pass evaluative
muster lacks any epistemic merit. Epistemically circular arguments are objectionable
because they invariably ‘pass’ both reliable and unreliable practices; norms which violate
the Ontological Principle are objectionable because they inevitably fail both reliable and
unreliable practices. In both cases, the problem is an insufficient sensitivity of a given
criterion to the truth.
How is this relevant to the status of the Ontological Principle? If certain norms
lack epistemic merit because they require of an agent that she perform the impossible, and
if what is impossible by way of reliable belief formation is determined in part by an
object's characteristics (capacity to fly, incorporeality, essential subjectivity, etc), then the
fact that certain norms lack epistemic merit is a consequence, in part, of an object's
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characteristics. But that is just a long-winded way of claiming that the Ontological
Principle is true: the way a rational agent forms beliefs about some subject matter is
constrained by the nature of that subject matter.
Let me sum up by laying out in its essentials the argument in support of the
Ontological Principle.
( 1 ) In order reliably to torm beliefs about a given object, an agent must acquire
information about that object.
(2) In order to acquire information about a given object, an agent must be causally
connected to that object.
(3) Hence, in order reliably to form beliefs about a given object, an agent must be
causally connected to that object.
(4) In order for an agent to be causally related to a given object, that object must have
the requisite causal properties and she must have access to the requisite doxastic
practices.
(5) Hence, in order for an agent reliably to form beliefs about a given object, that
about which she forms beliefs must have the requisite causal properties and she
must have access to the requisite doxastic practices. (Reliable belief-formation
requires causal connection between objects and agents.)
(6) If reliable belief-formation requires causal connection between objects and agents,
then any epistemic norm which requires of an agent that she enter into causal
relations into which she cannot enter, whether because of practice or
object-imposed constraints, is epistemically indefensible.
(7) Hence, any epistemic norm which requires of an agent that she enter into causal
relations in which she cannot enter is epistemically indefensible.
(8) If the causal relations into which an agent can enter are determined in part by the
nature of a putative object of belief, whether or not an epistemic norm is
epistemically defensible depends in part upon the nature of that about which an
agent forms beliefs.
(9) Hence, whether or not an epistemic norm is defensible depends in part upon the
nature of that about which an agent forms beliefs.
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3.2.4 Relation between the Ontological Principle and the Autonomy Thesis
The Ontological Principle, then, is true. What is the relation between that
principle and Alston s Autonomy Thesis? The Ontological Principle provides criteria for
determining in what respects a given doxastic practice differs legitimately from other
practices. Violation of the Ontological Principle is sufficient for a violation of a given
practice s autonomy. It the subject matter of a given practice constrains an agent s
belief-torming activity in such a way that it is not reasonable to require of her that she
form and evaluate those beliefs as she forms and evaluates beliefs in another practice,
then the evaluative criteria internal to those practices will differ. And because they differ
legitimately, the practices of which they are partly constitutive are autonomous; those
practices enjoy their own distinctive criteria for evaluating belief-formation.
Let me introduce one final term of art. When is it unreasonable to impose a given
set of norms which are proper to one practice on beliefs formed in another? When beliefs
formed in those practices are constraint-incompatible
.
Two kinds of belief, A and B, are
constraint-incompatible iff
(a) some norm N which is properly imposed on agents who form A-beliefs cannot but
defeat the justification enjoyed by B-beliefs;
(b) the justification of B-beliefs would be defeated by N even if B-beliefs were
reliably formed; and
(c) the uniform overriding of the justification of B-beliefs could not but occur in
virtue of B-beliefs' possession of some object-imposed constraints.
If the way an agent should form beliefs about a given subject matter is constrained by the
nature of that subject matter, and different doxastic practices are individuated in virtue, in
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part, of the different subject matters about which members of the practice form beliefs,
and it beliefs formed about those subject matters are constraint-incompatible, then the
ways in which an agent forms and evaluates beliefs will legitimately differ. And because
it is plausible to suppose that the subject matters internal to introspection, SP and CMP
differ in just the right way, it is reasonable to suppose that internal to those practices are
legitimately different ways of forming and evaluating beliefs.
Return briefly to the topic with which we began this essay. Comparison criticism
of religious belief proceeds by way of (1) identifying those practices at the core of our
cognitive life, (2) isolating those features of our core practices which account for their
reliability, and (3) determining whether or not other practices which ought to have those
features have at least their functional equivalents. The danger with this kind of argument
is that we risk imposing on one practice the expectations legitimately required only of
other practices; the drawback with comparison criticism is that we have a very difficult
time determining whether or not a feature indicating reliability for one practice indicates
unreliability for those which lack that feature. That is, it is very difficult to determine
whether or not a given practice is genuinely autonomous in a given respect. 28
The Ontological Principle provides us with some principled guidance for
resolving disputes over that matter. Reliable belief-formation requires causal connection
between knower and known. Because different kinds of object enter into different kinds
of causal relation, the kind of relationship between knower and known required for
28
. In the terminology I adopt next chapter, because we have access to no substantive epistemic
norms which are applicable to any and every doxastic practice, our employment of comparison
criticism cannot but be an ad hoc affair.
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reliable belief-formation varies from one practice to another. We may determine whether
or not a given epistemic norm is properly imposed on a given practice by asking (1) is it
possible for an agent who forms beliefs about an object to enter into a causal relationship
with that object of the sort presupposed by the norm in question?; and (2) would an agent
who adhered to that norm be forced to conclude that she was forming beliefs
inappropriately whether or not she was in fact forming her beliefs reliably? If ‘no' in the
first case and ‘yes’ in the second, then the norm in question lacks epistemic merit.
A violation of the Ontological Principle, then, is sufficient for a violation of a
practice s autonomy. But what about necessity? Can we violate the autonomy of a
practice without violating the Ontological Principle? Yes. The rationale for the
Ontological Principle I have provided presupposes that some causal relation must obtain
between a believer and the object of belief. And I think that this presupposition holds
true of many, if not most, doxastic practices. But it is doubtful that it applies to all.
Consider the way we form moral beliefs, e.g., the belief that we ought not inflict pain on
innocent children without powerful reasons for doing so. That conviction does not rely
for its veridicality on any causal relation between object and believer— the belief
expresses a conviction about what ought to be the case and not about what is in fact the
case. And between what ought to be the case and a believer causal relations need not
obtain— for the simple reason that, alas, what ought to be the case in not invariably the
case and what is not the case cannot enter into any causal relations at all.
Though too brief, I think that this indicates that the rationale I provided for the
Ontological Principle is of little use in vindicating the autonomy of moral belief-
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formation. Not that I believe that moral doxastic practices cannot be the object of
epistemic imperialism. As I note at the end of the next chapter, requiring of moral beliefs
that they be evaluated in light of the same epistemic norms we employ to evaluate
scientific beliefs is no less objectionable than laying down the same requirement for M-
beliefs. But just because the autonomy of moral practices may be violated without a
violation of the Ontological Principle, and because my defense of the autonomy of
distinct doxastic practices like CMP relies entirely on an appeal to the Ontological
Principle, I regard my defense of autonomy as seriously incomplete. Work remains to be
done . 29
3.3 The Structure of Alston’s Strategy for Defending CMP
The Reformed approach to defending the rationality of religious belief is to argue
that there is no reason to deny religious beliefs in membership that select category of
beliefs which we cannot but assume to be true and on the basis of which we determine
whether or not beliefs not in that select category are true. Alston’s modification of the
Reformed Approach is to replace beliefs with practices: there is no reason to deny that
religious practices fall into that select category of practices which we cannot but assume
to be reliable and by engaging in which we form beliefs in light of which to determine
whether or not practices not in that select category are reliable. Once he vindicates
CMP’s status in that select group, Alston plays ’king of the hill’: CMP is dislodged from
29
. Habermas has, I think, attempted to vindicate the rationality and the autonomy of the way we
form moral beliefs. But that is another story for another day.
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its place at the top ot the epistemic hill only if we can show that it is unreliable. And
Alston self-consciously pursues a strategy form insuring that CMP will not be so
dislodged.
Once Alston lays out the contours of the Christian Mystical Practice, he argues
that the various criticisms directed at that DP either impose a double standard or are
imperialistic. A critic who imposes a double standard on CMP objects to that practice on
grounds which should also undermine the epistemic standing of a DP the critic persists in
regarding as reliable. A critic whose objection to CMP is afflicted by epistemic
imperialism employs criteria proper to another practice (SP, for example) which are
inappropriate to CMP. Alston's strategy is to divide and conquer: arguments against
CMP either impose a double standard, in which case two practices are inappropriately
evaluated in light of different standards of evaluation, or are imperialistic, in which case
the standards of evaluation proper to one practice are inappropriately imposed on
another. 30 In both kinds of objection, all the work is done by the term inappropriately.
We can now identify more precisely the grounds on which Alston's accusations of
impropriety rest. My claim is that this strategy for defending CMP is parasitic on his
claim that CMP is autonomous.
Arguments afflicted by a double standard impute a specious autonomy to a given
DP — CMP for our purposes. An argument which employs a double standard to the
detriment ofCMP is one in which the critic evaluates CMP and another DP in light of
different criteria even though there are no relevant differences between those practices
30
.
Perceiving God, p. 248f.
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which would warrant this differential treatment. A critic operating with a
double-standard argues that CMP lacks justification even though the grounds on which
she makes that judgement, were they employed evenhandedly, would undermine the
positive epistemic status of DPs she regards as justified . 31
I have articulated or alluded to several arguments which exhibit that flaw. CMP
lacks epistemic justification because we cannot non-circularly show that it is reliable,
even though we cannot non-circularly show that SP is reliable. CMP lacks epistemic
justification because we use M-beliefs to evaluate the prima facie justification of
M-beliefs, even though we do the same with SP and introspection. CMP is unreliable
because mystical experience reinforces an agent’s conceptual scheme, just as SP does.
CMP is unreliable because it yields inconsistent beliefs, just like SP and introspection.
CMP is not a reliable perceptual practice because we have no idea which causal
mechanisms underlie perception of God, even though we would refuse to junk SP were
we to lack an account of the mechanisms by which we form sense-perceptual beliefs.
M-beliefs cannot be formed reliably because we can provide an adequate causal
explanation of those beliefs, as we can with sense-perceptual beliefs. In each case, the
critic attempts to undermine the epistemic status of CMP by arguments which, applied
consistently, would also undermine the epistemic status of sense-perceptual,
introspective, memory, etc. beliefs.
Arguments afflicted by imperialism offend against the legitimate autonomy of
distinct DPs - CMP in particular. An argument vitiated by epistemic imperialism is one
3I
.
Perceiving God, p. 199.
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in which M-beliefs are evaluated in light of procedures properly employed to evaluate
sense-perceptual beliefs but which are inappropriately imposed on M-beliefs because
sense-perceptual beliefs and M-beliefs are constraint-incompatible. Whether or not a
standard of evaluation is appropriate depends in crucial part upon whether or not the
beliefs formed about a given subject matter can pass those tests if they are reliable. That
is, a necessary condition of a standard of evaluation's being appropriate is that it not
violate the autonomy of a given DP.
We have articulated or alluded to several such arguments in the second chapter.
The shared language for describing phenomenal appearances may be required of SP, but
not ofCMP because we can manipulate the conditions in which we perceive physical
objects but not God. That we must be able to specify the causal contribution of objects
perceived by a given mode of perception is properly imposed on SP but not on CMP,
once again because God appears at His will, whereas physical objects appear to a
significant extent on our will. That God imposes moral restrictions on membership in
CMP, but not on SP, explains why CMP is a particular and SP a universal practice. We
have discussed several times Alston's response to the mileage critics like Gale attempt to
make out of CMP's peculiar overrider system. The claim that a reliable perceptual DP
ought to give rise to accurate predictions, but that CMP does not is no less imperialistic,
and for no different a reason, than the claim that M-beliefs ought to be intersubjectively
evaluated.
The divide and conquer strategy Alston has developed to defend the presumptive
innocence ofCMP seems to me to be very promising. It is, however, easily and often
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misunderstood. Although it rests on an entirely defensible rejection of inappropriate
impositions on CMP, critics of Alston's strategy accuse him of attempting to remove
religious belief from the arena of critical analysis altogether. Alston’s advocacy of
autonomy, so his critics claim, is merely a protective strategy which is inappropriate for
those engaged in the disinterested pursuit of the truth. I will spend the next three
subsections of this chapter and much of the next chapter, attempting to allay those
concerns.
3.4 Does Alston’s Strategy Invite Suspicion?
If I have articulated myself clearly enough, the reader will already have noted a
feature of Alston's strategy which is, if anything, even more disconcerting than his
defense of the autonomy of CMP. Consider the procedures constitutive of CMP’s
overrider system. According to Alston, members of different practices evaluate the prima
facie justification of beliefs in light of different procedures and those procedures depend
for their intelligibility on substantive renderings of the nature of the object about which
those members form beliefs. But this raises the question: how do we identify those
substantive renderings? Given that the propriety of the procedures internal to a DP's
overrider system depends on the nature of the object about which members of that DP
form beliefs, how do we determine the nature of the object of our beliefs?
Clearly, we do not have any a priori insight into these matters. We learn by
experience that plants are stationary and squirrels are not; that mountains are observable
but that muons are not. Of course, we might have had such insight; surely God could
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have created us with innate knowledge of answers to questions such as these. But God
did not; hence we must learn by experience the characteristics of the objects about which
we form beliefs.
This is problematic. We determine whether or not a prima facie justified belief is
ultima facie justified if it passes the tests constitutive of a DP's overrider system, but we
determine whether or not the tests constitutive of a DP's overrider system are appropriate
if they accord with the nature of that about which we form beliefs. And on what basis
could we possibly be warranted in forming an understanding of the nature of that about
which we form beliefs than our ultima facie justified beliefs about that object? We have
no testing procedures without ultima facie justified beliefs and no ultima facie justified
beliefs without testing procedures. We make use of what we learn in a given practice to
construct procedures for testing that which we have already learned. Once again, an
unavoidable circularity seems to invade our epistemic activity.
Actually, the circular way we acquire the tests by which we evaluate prima facie
justified M-beliefs does more than raise a question; it invites suspicion. Alston's
protestations at epistemic imperialism are predicated on the distinctive nature of the
subject matter of CMP; but those who have a vested interest in regarding CMP as reliable
determine what that distinctive nature is. What's to stop them from constructing and
reconstructing an understanding of God's nature so as to insure that any objection
whatsoever to the reliability of CMP counts as imperialistic? Does CMP not enable
members to make accurate predictions? Claim that God is transcendent and objections
based upon that failure count as imperialistic. Does CMP contradict itself massively?
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Claim that God is inscrutable, or not bound by the laws of logic, and thus that objections
based upon that flaw are imperialistic. To gloss MacIntyre, “it is yet another mark of a
degenerate [doxastic practice] that it has contrived a set of epistemological defenses
which enable it to avoid being put in question, or at least to avoid recognizing that it is
being put in question, by rival [doxastic practices].”32
This suspicion can only be exacerbated by Alston's claim that CMP is a basic
practice. IfCMP is basic, then those who do not engage in CMP lack reliable access to
that about which members of CMP form beliefs. And who can possibly gainsay their
rendering of the nature of that about which they form beliefs? Simply put, no-one else
but those agents aware of a given kind of object are in a position to judge what properties
a given object possesses or doesn't possess. Surely those who don't engage in a given
basic practice, and thus who lack access to the subject matter engaging in that practice
affords its participants, are in no position to make judgements about the characteristics,
properties, predilections, nature, etc. of the subject matter of that practice. In short, not
only does the nature of the object of belief constrain the checking procedures which can
reasonably be imposed on those beliefs, but only those already privy to reliably formed
beliefs about a given kind of object are in a position reasonably to judge what the nature
of an object is. Hence, those who engage in CMP determine what restrictions may
reasonably be employed in their epistemic activity. CMP does not just grade its own
examinations; it provides the criteria by which those exams are graded !
33 Thus, Preus
32
.
“Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” in The Monist
60(1977): 461.
33
. "Is Religious Belief Rational?," p. 10.
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expostulates, “clearly, the plea for autonomy in fact can be reduced to one thing:
religion's refusal to submit to any explanation other than its own, a claim as time-honored
as it is self-serving.”34
Before we let our suspicions run wild, it would be wise to apprize ourselves that
other universally respected DPs are in the same predicament that CMP is. We learn by
using our senses that physical objects don't flit in and out of existence, that they stand in
orderly causal relations with one another and hence that we can predict their activity
when we know enough about them, etc. On the basis of what we have learned we adopt a
series of tests by which to evaluate the initial credibility of sense-perceptual beliefs.
Beliefs which pass those tests count as ultima facie justified. We use those ultima facie
justified beliefs to build up an understanding of how the physical world operates, what it
is like, etc. In short, in SP, as in CMP, we don't just grade our own exams, but determine
the criteria appropriate to the grading. As with CMP, because SP is a basic practice,
those who don't engage in SP have no grounds on which to gainsay the understanding of
the nature of physical objects which we build up by engaging in SP — unless, of course,
they have a priori or direct intuitive insight into the nature of physical reality.
Of course, because SP is a universal practice, we are hardly likely to level this
objection at SP. What really concerns the critic, I surmise, is not just circularity, but
circularity in conjunction with particularity. But, while the conjunction at issue may
reasonably make us cautious, it provides no grounds for an objection to the epistemic
34
. J. Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud, (New
Haven, CO.: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 203.
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status of CMP. It is only on pain of imposing a double-standard that we suspect foul
epistemic play in the case ofCMP when we do not suspect the same of SP. In all of the
epistemically relevant respects, CMP and SP are similar: both are basic DPs and both
formulate the procedures proper to checking prima facie justified beliefs on the basic of
what they have already learned by engaging in CMP.
What is the moral of this story? That the limitations imposed on an epistemic
agent by her finitude underwrites autonomy as well as pluralism. As we saw in the first
chapter, we cannot extract our eyes in order to determine whether or not our vision is
veridical; we cannot but make use of the practices in which we always already engage to
determine whether or not that practice is reliable; we cannot provide non-circular
justification for our basic DPs. Similarly for the procedures by which we evaluate prima
facie justified beliefs. We can only use what we have already learned to formulate
checks, tests and procedures for evaluating what we have already learned. Just as we lack
a God's eye view by which to determine which DPs are reliable, so we also lack a
God's-eye view by which to determine how to test our beliefs. In both cases, we cannot
but rely on those procedures, beliefs and dispositions in which we have been socialized in
the effort responsibly to govern our beliefs.
3.5 Is Alston a Hermit?
Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology is not an attempt, thinly
veiled or not, hermetically to seal members off different communities into different
practices of forming beliefs, condemned to act in accord with communal standards,
195
immune from external criticism, and unable to communicate with those on the outside. 35
His defense of the autonomy ofCMP is worlds apart from a sprachspeilism which
vindicates the rationality of religious belief by denuding it of reference to reality or by
stipulating that reality in some sense or other depends on the language game one plays. In
order clearly to differentiate between autonomy and mere sprachspeilism, I will contrast
Alston's realist rationale for autonomy with Peter Winch's anti-realist rationale for a
similar thesis. In 3.5.1, 1 explicate Winch's 'version' of the autonomy thesis; in 3.5.2,
1
note the respects in which Alston rejects Winch's rationale; and in 3.5.3, 1 explain the
importance for Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology that he does reject
Winch's anti-realism.
3.5.1 Peter Winch on Autonomy
Winch argues that members of different societies (modem and primitive) engage
in different practices of forming beliefs (science and witchcraft) and that internal to those
practices are distinct criteria for forming and evaluating beliefs (roughly, experimentation
and poison oracle). 36 The Azande, a ‘primitive’ society to which Winch refers throughout
his treatment of the issue, explain sickness, injury, death, etc. as a consequence of the
activity of witches; they detect witches via a 'poison oracle': poison is administered to a
fowl and a question is asked which admits of a 'yes or no' answer; the answer is checked
35
. “The Autonomy of Religious Experience,” p. 17.
36
. "Understanding a Primitive Society, " in Understanding and Social Inquiry, Fred Dallmayr
and Thomas McCarthy, eds., (Notre Dame, IN.: Notre Dame University Press, 1977), p. 166. I
have no intention of misrepresenting (or even slandering!) Winch, but I am not altogether too
concerned to get his position exactly correct either. I am interested primarily in contrasting my
defense of autonomy with an alternative and fairly common defense.
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by asking the same question the other way around and administering the poison to another
fowl. They employ an overrider system to cull out false beliefs with initial credibility and
they enjoy a variety of auxiliary hypothesis to 'explain away' apparent contradictions, e.g..
the poison administered is defective, those administering the oracle were ritually unclean,
etc.
’ 7 The Azande practice of forming beliefs about witches is both rich, confirmed by
their experience and internally coherent. Moreover, "a Zande would be utterly lost an
bewildered without his oracle. The mainstay of his life would be lacking ." 38 In short, the
Azande engage in a distinctive practice of forming beliefs (a Witchcraft DP, or WDP) and
that practice is both socially and psychologically established. Given that, at least in the
Azande's culture, there are no more well-entrenched practices with which WDP is
massively incompatible, it would seem that that DP is moderately rational.
According to Winch, moreover, what we take to be real depends upon the
linguistic practices of the society in which we live; "reality is not what gives language
sense. What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has.
Further, both the distinction between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement
with reality belong to our language." ’ 9 This does not imply that there is not a reality
which exists independently of those who form beliefs about that reality, even though
Winch is often accused of assenting to this heresy. Charity seems to require that we don't
impute doctrines to those who explicitly deny those doctrines. And Winch explicitly
37
. "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 167-68. See also Keith Thomas, Religion and the
Decline of Magic, (New York, NY.: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), pp. 208, 614, 643.
38
. "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 166.
39
. "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 162.
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rejects the "protagorean relativism" into which a denial that "men's ideas and beliefs must
be checkable by reference to something independent - some reality..." plunges us
.
40
Nevertheless, he seems to have a very strange understanding of the independently
real, one which makes it seem that what is real depends on the linguistic habits of a given
community. I don't know of any other way, for example, of interpreting the following
passage, other than as an assertion that the reality of God depends - in some unspecified
sense - on the language we use to speak of God:"it is within the religious use of language
that the conception ot God has its place, though, I repeat, this does not mean that it is at
the mercy of what anyone cares to say; if this were so, God would have no reality ." 41
Now, if God's reality depends on whether or not the conception of God is not at the mercy
of what people care to say, then clearly. Winch's understanding of reality is very different
than the more common-sensical notion that whatever is real exists whatever our actual or
possible epistemic relation to the real. On a more common-sensical understanding, God,
it God exists, is real, regardless of whether or not the conception of God is at the mercy
of what people say; the malleability of a conception of an object is never a good reason to
deny that the object is real.
Winch's claim that the independently real is determined by the language game one
plays provides him with a rationale for claims which sound very much like the Autonomy
Thesis. Winch argues that it does not make sense for those of us in the modern west to
40
. "The most radical position on the cultural relativism of standards of rationality comes from
Peter Winch, who holds that belief-forming processes are no more than social practices for which
there is no overarching basis or justification. And the ultimate basis of Winch's position is his
denial that there is an objective world to which those belief systems may or may not correspond."
Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 21 1.
41
. "Understanding a Primitive Society," p. 162.
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Thesis. Winch argues that it does not make sense for those of us in the modern west to
deny that puts the Azande into effective cognitive contact with reality, but that
modern science does. More precisely, it is inappropriate for moderns to appeal to the
‘assured results of modern science' or to the standards of belief formation and evaluation
proper to modern science as grounds for denying that the Zande’s WDP is reliable, that it
puts members of that ‘primitive society’ in a ‘strong position’ to get at the truth. For that
judgement presupposes that we enjoy some concept of 'reality' which does not rest for its
validity on the linguistic/doxastic practices indigenous to our society. But we do not
have any such concept of reality. Because the independently real depends upon the
linguistic practices of a society, and different societies have different understandings of
what is real, there is no justification for denying that the practices of forming beliefs
indigenous to societies other than our own put their members into effective cognitive
contact with reality. We have no basis on which to deny that witches exist — though, of
course, this does not commit us to claiming that witches do exist either. Like Alston,
Winch rejects the persistent attempt to apotheosize modern science into the sole and final
arbiter of the true and the false. Different doxastic practices, different 'independent'
realities, no imperialism . 42
42
. For a version of Winch’s defense of the autonomy of religious belief, see D.Z. Phillips, Faith
After Foundationalism, (New York, NY.: Routledge, 1988). For Alston’s attempt to distance
himself from Phillips’ version of the Autonomy Thesis, see “Taking the Curse Off Language
Games,” pp. 16-48.
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3.5.2 Realism and Doxastic Practices
Unlike Winch, however, Alston does not justify the constraints he places on
science, and SP more generally, by appeal to alternative and incommensurable
conceptions of an independent reality. 43 His defense of the autonomy of distinct DPs
does not commit him to claiming that different DPs have their own concepts of truth,
justification, or reality. 44 Nor does it commit him to claiming that members of particular
DPs are hermetically sealed off from those who do not engage in that DP such that those
on the inside are immune from external criticism. Why?
Alston is a metaphysical realist. 45 There is a reality which exists independently of
human beings; what we believe, justifiably believe, know, how we conceptualize, the
language we use to describe, etc. does not affect, bring into being, make, determine, that
about which we form beliefs. Alston writes,
...My theory of doxastic practices differs radically from the various non-realist,
verificationist, and relativistic versions of Sprachspielism now current, represented
by writers like D. Z. Phillips and Richard Rorty, and by such rumblings as
deconstructionism that emanate from Europe. I am far from supposing, with many
of these writers, that each "language game", "conceptual scheme", "discourse", or
what have you, carries its own special concept of truth and reality, that each defines
a distinct "world", or that truth is to be construed as "What one's linguistic peers
will let one get away with" (Rorty). My theory of doxastic practices is firmly
realistic, recognizing a single reality that is what it is, regardless of how we think or
43
. Alston advocates autonomy, and does so by appeal to something like the Ontological Principle,
but does precious little (nothing at all, I should say) to defend it. Hence, I should own up to my
argument and claim that my defense of the autonomy thesis is realistic. I will, however, continue
to refer to Alston’s defense of autonomy.
44
. "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 1 7; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” pp.
36-7.
45
. "The Christian Language Game," p. 138, 148; Perceiving God, p. I 55; "Yes, Virginia, 1 here
is a Real World," passim.
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distinct doxastic practices, into cognitive contact with which those practices put their
participants. Alston's defense of the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices hinges on
his affirmation of the Ontological Principle, which presupposes that what exists does so
whatever we believe about it and in whatever practice we engage, and on his claim that
there are importantly different kinds of entities which constitute the one independently
existing world.
Alston’s realism grounds his claim that we should adopt a fallibilist attitude
toward the doxastic practices in which we engage and therefore that we should always be
open to critique leveled at us by others who, although they may not engage in the same
doxastic practices in which we engage, nevertheless ’live, move, and have their being’
within and therefore form beliefs about, the same reality about which we form beliefs. If
there is a reality which exists independently of our possible and actual epistemic relations
to it, and if our beliefs are true iff reality is as our beliefs depict it, then it is always
possible of any of belief that it is false. If there is a reality which exists independently of
our possible and actual epistemic relations to it, and if a DP is reliable iff it puts us into
effective cognitive contact with reality, then it is always possible of any DP that it is
unreliable. Alston writes, “In supposing that what we believe and assert is rendered true
or false by whether what a belief or assertion is about is as the belief or assertion would
have it to be, we are acknowledging a liability to falsity that is, in a fundamental way, out
of our control. We can, of course, take such precautions as are open to us to ensure that
this condition for truth is satisfied. But in the final analysis whether what we say is true is
determined not by anything we do or think, but by the way things are — the things we are
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talking about .”47 Because it is always possible for our beliefs to be false and our DPs to
be unreliable, we must never uncritically accept any DP or any belief. If we should never
accept uncritically a given practice, we should always be willing to listen to those who
regard us as failing to achieve our central epistemic aim. In short, Alston's metaphysical
realism renders unacceptable any dogmatism which would exempt any belief or any DP
from criticism. This applies, not least, to CMP and other religious doxastic practices
.
48
Alston is clear that, however significant doxastic practices are for epistemology,
they have no metaphysical implications; they are epistemically crucial but metaphysically
idle. In fact, the direction of influence heads in the other direction, from metaphysics to
epistemology. As a consequence of our experience of an object, we formulate a
vocabulary, conceptual structure, checking procedures, etc. by which we are enabled
reliably to form beliefs about that object. But the conceptual structure, and the
accompanying vocabulary, itself undergoes continuous modification as a consequence of
what we learn about the object of belief. Our conceptual structure does not determine
what is real; what is real should determine our conceptual structure. We risk imperialism
when we get the order reversed.
47
. A Realist Conception of Truth, p. 264.
48
. “Our realist position leaves us free to recognize the obvious fact that religious believers make
cognitive commitments that have implications for the way things are or will be in the world,
implications that are testable by a variety of non-religious procedures.” “Taking the Curse Off
Language Games,” p. 39.
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3.5.3 Realism and Fallibilism
Alston's metaphysical realism differentiates his defense of autonomy from
Winch's in two respects. First, the Ontological Principle makes no sense if the object
which imposes constraints on the norms by which agent's evaluate justified beliefs is real
only relative to the conceptual structure we employ to form beliefs about it. Alston
argues that the nature of that about which we form beliefs imposes limitations on the
kinds of norms in light of which it is reasonable to evaluate on those beliefs; if what we
believe about an object determines which characteristics that object has - whatever sense
we can make ot that — then its really the beliefs we hold about an object which impose
constraints on the norms properly employed to evaluate those beliefs.
Second, Alston's realism grounds a fallibilism which in turn opens him up to
criticism from external sources. Given that we are finite and fallible, we can never be
certain that the beliefs that we form about an object are true. It is always possible that
there is more we can learn about an object; all of our beliefs are open to correction by
considerations we have yet to take into account. And that our understanding of the nature
and characteristics of a given object is unavoidably open to correction provides critics a
toehold into even those DPs in which they do not engage. That the subject matter about
which members ofCMP and SP form beliefs exists independently of those practices
insures that the language game does not always have the last word on the subject.
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3.5.4 Immanent Criticism
Suppose that we grant that Alston's realism opens up the possibility that, for any
doxastic practice in which we engage, that practice might be unreliable, and thus that, for
any practice in which we engage, we should always admit the possibility that engaging in
it does not further our central epistemic aim. We may still harbor the suspicion that, in
spite ot his professed fallibilism, Alston fails to articulate criteria with enough ‘bite’ to
enable us to show that obviously problematic practices like witchcraft and astrology are
unreliable. To recapitulate, Alston argues that a socially established practice may be
shown to be reliable if either internally or externally inconsistent. I have noted a third
ground for critique, viz., comparison criticism. In the interests of indicating how those
suspicions might be further allayed — so far as is possible — I will mention briefly a
fourth.
Winch’s article on ‘primitive societies’ generated a considerable amount of
discussion on the possibility of providing non-question-begging reasons for regarding as
unreliable doxastic practices which are in fact almost universally rejected in modernity.
If Winch is correct in arguing the different societies enjoy distinct and conflicting
standards for evaluating beliefs, and if he is correct that there are no ‘neutral' criteria we
may non-circularly employ to rank alternatives with respect to their ability to put us in
contact with an independently existing reality, then so ranking doxastic practices like the
Zande's WDP and modem science lacks justification. This is just another formulation of
Winch's version of the Autonomy Thesis. The following objection to Winch's argument
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seems to me to be a cogent one and to indicate further grounds for disqualifying a given
DP from enjoying positive epistemic status.
Notice that a consequence ot Winch s claim that there are numerous distinct
societies, internal to which there are autonomous doxastic practices, and between which
there are no criteria in light of which we may justly judge one practice to be epistemically
superior to another, is that he must explain transitions in a given society from one practice
to another in some non-rational, perhaps purely causal way. As a matter of fact, members
of a society change membership in doxastic practices; they do so, sometimes in wholesale
manner, in great numbers. Doxastic practices which are widely regarded as reliable at
one stage in a society s history are rejected and replaced with what members of a society
regard as a superior practice. (They may, of course, replaced rejected practices with
nothing at all.) Just such a transition seems to have been effected in 17 th century England:
vast numbers of agents rejected witchcraft as a reliable doxastic practice and placed their
confidence in modem science. What are we to make of such transitions? How are we to
explain the actions of those who perpetrated the change from witchcraft to science? What
are we to make of the grounds on which those who changed allegiances made their
decision? Did they have any grounds or was that change just a surd fact in their personal
pilgrimage? And if they did have reasons for rejecting witchcraft, and if they conclude
after having placed confidence in ‘modern science’ that they have thereby improved their
access to the truth, and if we cannot fault them for making such judgements — even
Winch does not proscribe disputes internal to a given society, then it is legitimate for
those who do not participate in a given doxastic practice to make critical judgements
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about practices in which they do not engage. After all, who, when, or under what
circumstances an agent presents an argument is of no relevance at all to the issue of
whether or not that argument is sound.
What kind of arguments motivate the wholesale transitions from one doxastic
practice to another? Discussing this issue adequately would require resolving a whole
thicket of thorny problems, a task I will forgo for the moment. Hence, I will have to be
dogmatic and just assert what I take to be a plausible position, leaving an adequate
defense to another venue.
An autonomous doxastic practice may exhibit some epistemic defect or
incoherence as judged by standards internal to that practice. Just because a practice
enjoys distinctive evaluative norms does not entail that it invariably succeeds in satisfying
those norms. Indeed, it would be amazing if such were generally the case. The history of
CMP is fraught with conflict over the meaning, propriety, reliability, social functionality,
etc. of mystical experience. Similarly with any other doxastic practice which has a
history. It is, moreover, possible that a given practice’s failure to satisfy its own
standards may persist over time: members may come to regard that practice as afflicted
with an intractable incoherence. Such afflictions motivate members to cast about for
some alternative. If they discover some alternative which promises to resolve those
incoherences, they have reason to adopt that alternative. The fracture, dissent,
argumentation, debate made possible by the standards internal to a given doxastic practice
is not clearly distinct from the debate, dissent, argumentation and debate which leads an
agent out of some practice and into another.
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If there is some alternative practice A which holds out the promise of resolving
the incoherences which afflict some practice B, and if, moreover, A promises to provide
an account which explains why B is so afflicted and why its affliction is unavoidable so
long as members of B continue to form beliefs in accord with the standards internal to B.
then members of B have reason to change their allegiance to A. Having made the
transition, they may describe their decision as a learning process. “So long as I continued
on as before I couldn t solve problem x. But I learned about an alternative way of
tackling the problem and I found out after approaching the problem in that new way, that
I could resolve the problems with which I was earlier faced. I discovered, moreover, why
I would never have been able to resolve those problems had I continued on as before.”
Learning processes occur as a consequence of immanent criticism. Alasdair
MacIntyre has identified three criteria for a successful immanent criticism . 49 First, a
given practice, B, is intractably incoherent by its own standards. Second, if members of B
formed beliefs according to the standards internal to some other practice A, they would be
able to resolve those incoherences. Third, A provides an explanation as to why the
incoherences in B can’t be resolved given the resources A affords to its members. In
49
. “What is being looked for is some new mode of reasoning about the same subject matter which
has, if possible, three characteristics: it does not suffer from the same defects as its predecessor; it
enables those defects to be identified more precisely; and it explains what it was about the
standpoint from which and in terms of which that predecessor more of reasoning was formulated
which generated its inadequacies.” Alasdair MacIntyre, “Moral Rationality, Tradition, and
Aristotle: A Reply to Onora O’Neill, Raimond Gaita, and Stephen R. L. Clark,” in Inquiry 26/4
(1986): 451; See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed., (Notre
Dame, IN.:University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 268; Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry, p. 146; Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988), pp. 349-69, esp. Pp. 361-62; “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and
the Philosophy of Science,” pp. 453-71
.
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short, an immanent criticism is the claim that, by your own lights, your way of doing
things is problematic, my way of doing things resolves those problems, and I know why
your way of doing things will invariably be problematic. You therefore have good reason
to cease from engaging in B and commit to A.
Habermas has articulated an immanent criticism of mythical worldviews like the
Azande which is at least suggestive. Habermas distinguishes between three types of
worldviews by identifying different degrees to which they differentiate between distinct
validity claims. Mythical worldviews conflate factual, normative and expressive claims
to validity in a thoroughgoing manner; religious worldviews succeed in differentiating
between fact and value with respect to ‘this-worldly’ phenomena, but not otherworldly
phenomenon; and modem worldviews make the necessary distinctions in all aspects of
reality. The motor of socio-cultural evolution is the cognitive success engendered by an
ever more comprehensive application of the distinction between what is the case, what
ought to be the case and what I take to be what is and ought to be the case. The
inadequacy of ‘primitive' worldviews generates problems which can be identified but not
resolved by those who adhere to those worldviews. And, moreover, those who inhabit
modem worldviews have the conceptual resources to identify those problems, to explain
why the pre-modems cannot resolve them, and to explain how a transition to a modem
world view would enable a resolution of those problems. Lack of differentiation
generates problems which only a transition to more differentiated worldviews resolves / 0
50
. Habermas writes, “I shall attempt to make the development of religious worldviews
comprehensible from the aspect of a development of formal world-concepts. In doing so, I shall
be making tacit use of a concept of learning that Piaget expounded for the ontogenesis of
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I realize that my analysis of immanent criticism is extremely sketchy. It does,
however, have the advantage of indicating a respect in which Alston fails to employ
grounds for evaluating practices available to him. Alston’s account of doxastic practices,
unlike MacIntyre’s notion of tradition and tradition-constituted inquiry and Habermas’
employment of a developmental logic to rank worldviews, is severely a-historical. He
conceives ot doxastic practices as resources on which cognitive agents draw when
forming and evaluating beliefs but pays little attention to the history of those practices.
He therefore pays little attention to the ways in which the historically extended arguments
which lead up to a practice's current standards for evaluating beliefs may provide those
who engage in a given doxastic practice with greater confidence in the capacity of that
practice to put them in touch with the truth. And as MacIntyre argues, surely that is in
large part a source ot our confidence in the reliability of modem science: we understand
how the current theories we adopt are the product of a continuous pattern of formulation.
structures of consciousness. As is well known, Piaget distinguishes among stages of cognitive
development that are characterized not int terms of new contents but in terms of structurally
described levels of learning ability. It might be a matter of something similar in the case of the
emergence of new structures of worldviews. The caesurae between the mythical, religious-
philosophical, and modern modes of thought are characterized by changes in the system of basic
concepts. With the transition to a new stage the interpretations of the superceded stage are, not
matter what their content, categorially devalued. It is not this or that reason, but the kind of reason
which is no longer convincing. A devaluation of the explanatory and justificatory potentials of
entire traditions took place in the great civilizations with the dissolution of mythological-narrative
figures of thought, in the modem age with the dissolution of religious, cosmological, and
metaphysical figures of thought. These devaluative shifts appear to be connected with socio-
evolutionary transitions to new levels of learning, with which the conditions of possible learning
processes in the dimensions of objectivating thought, moral-practical insight, and aesthetic-
expressive capacity are altered.” The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, vol. 1, Thomas McCarthy, ed., (Boston, MA.: Beacon Press, pp. 67-8.
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objection, reformulation in light of objection, and so on. Could that not also be the case
for religious doxastic practices?
3.6 On the Use and Misuse of Autonomy
As I have mentioned, Alston's defense of the autonomy ofCMP from various
imperialisms is one of the most interesting features of his work. Yet when combined
with the innocent until proven guilty approach, advocacy of autonomy begs for some
account of the legitimate grounds for concluding that doxastic practices are unreliable. I
have attempted to supplement Alston’s rather weak attempt in that direction by
articulating the concept, and defending the legitimacy, of comparison critique and, more
briefly, of immanent criticism. My final attempt to allay fears on this front is to note
what I take to be an illegitimate employment of the Autonomy Thesis in Alston's defense
of CMP. After all, by noting illegitimate uses of the Autonomy Thesis, we foreclose to
some degree the epistemic liberality it seems to encourage.
Recall our discussion of Alston’s evaluation of the attempt to discredit CMP by
appeal to the fact that M-belief formation is amenable of fully naturalistic explanation.
The objection was that: reliable belief formation requires causal contact between the
object of belief and the believer; we may provide an explanation of M-belief formation in
which God need play no causal role; hence, M-belief formation is unreliable. The heart
of Alston’s response, with which I entirely agree, is that naturalistic explanations of
religious belief fail to show that CMP is unreliable unless they provide us with good
reason to believe that God is not among the causes of M-belief formation at all. That God
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is not among the proximate causes of M-belief formation need have no detrimental
implications tor CMP, so long as God figures somewhere in the causal chain leading up
to the formation of a given M-belief. Thus, that we can provide a complete
neurophysiological explanation of M-beliet-formation sheds no light on the epistemic
standing of CMP.
But does this dispose of the arguments proposed by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud? I
do not think so. The problem Marx, Nietzsche and Freud have with religious belief is not
that it has a complete natural explanation; the problem is, rather, that an adequate
explanation ot religious belief must have recourse to the wrong kind of cause. Among the
causes that figure in the generation of M-beliefs are pathological causes. The causal
history of religious belief is suspicious.
Alston realizes that his response does not fully convince and attempts to
supplement his argument. He does so by appealing to the autonomy of mystical
experience. "Why suppose that the conditions that make for accurate (inaccurate)
perception of the physical environment also make for accurate (inaccurate) perception of
God? On a typical hot sunny day in the Arizona desert a pair of sun glasses is an aid to
accurate observation; but they have quite the reverse effect on a cold foggy day in the
Aleutians. And surely God is more different from the Aleutians than the Aleutians are
from Arizona."" 1 The appeal to the Ontological Principle lurks in the background: the
nature of an object constrains the way it is rational to form beliefs about it; God is a very
different kind of object than are the normal, physical objects we perceive through sense-
51
. Perceiving God, p. 233.
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perception; hence we are constrained to form beliefs about God in ways that differ from
the way we perceive physical objects; and perhaps the way we are constrained to form
beliefs about God is one of the many ways we would fail to perceive a physical object. If
that is in tact the case, then the Freudian objection is just another instance of epistemic
imperialism.
Alston s response to Freud seems to be: God is very different from anything we
about which we naturally form beliefs; given the Ontological Principle, any way of
forming beliefs about God might be just the way we should form M-beliefs given God's
nature, even if that would involve us in forming beliefs on the basis of what would
normally be hallucinations. But this response is inadequate. He fails to connect the claim
that it is possible that perception of God occurs via regression to infantile states to any
feature or characteristic of God which would so constrain us. As J. S. Preus notes, mere
“possibilities come cheap" when the alternative is a richly articulated theory which
provides us with an explanation of M-belief formation and which entails the CMP is
unreliable . 52 To appeal to the distinctive nature of God to justify the mere possibility that
we are justified in forming beliefs in some (otherwise suspicious) way without identifying
what it is about God's nature that so constrains us is to employ a rationale which would
justify the possibility of forming beliefs about God (or anything else, for that matter) in
any way whatever. And that is clearly not what Alston intends. Rather, in arguing that a
given difference between CMP and other practices is legitimate, Alston needs to justify
what it is about the subject matter ofCMP which warrants that difference. In the
52
. J. Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion, p. 21 1.
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terminology developed earlier, he needs to identify the object-imposed constraints which
render the ban on what is normally hallucinatory behavior inappropriate. (I doubt he can
do so.)
Alston misunderstands this response and accuses the critic of asking for an
external proof of the reliability of MP. This would be quite a howler, given Alston’s
energetic (and in my estimation, successful) attempt to show that even SP lacks external
proof; the critic would be imposing a double standard on those who engage in CMP. Of
course, critics ol CMP do not hesitate to make just that inference: from the fact that we
have an explanation ot M-belief formation which implies that CMP is unreliable, they
claim that it is incumbent upon the theist to show that CMP is, after all, reliable and thus
that the proposed explanation is false. Preus claims that, in order to provide a serious
contender to the Freudian explanation of religious belief, those who engage in CMP must
provide "’evidence” which indicates that naturalistic explanations of religious belief are
false." ' Clearly, what he has in mind is some external justification of the reliability of
CMP.
But Preus and Alston overlook the alternative: when the critic asks for a
justification, for evidence, that God is accurately perceived in what would normally be an
unreliable way, she is asking - or at least, she should be asking - for an internal
justification of that claim. Given the understanding of God internal to CMP, why should
we believe that God is present only to those who regress to infancy? Given what those
who engage in CMP believe about God, what reason do we have to believe that
5\ J. Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion, p. 21 1.
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regressing to infantile states is an accurate mode of perceiving God? What features of
God (on a theistic accounting) render us incapable of perceiving God in more like the
normal way? If we can't provide such an internal justification, then Alston’s defense of
autonomy becomes the vacuous: God is different from physical objects; hence it is
possible that any way at all of forming beliefs about God is reliable and that means that
any evidence we have that M-beliefs are unreliably formed may be written off with
impunity.
We can put the point in this way. At the heart of Freud's explanation of religion
is the claim that religious belief promises to the believer the (illusory) satisfaction of
desires she cannot satisfy, since the actual satisfaction of those desires would be socially
destructive: religion is wish-fulfilment . 54 The objection is best understood as a
comparison-criticism. We learn from experience that beliefs formed about independently
existing objects which are proximately caused by wish-fulfillment tend not to be true.
That is, wishing that something were true doesn't make it so; hence, if wishing that
something is the case plays ‘too prominent' a role in the etiology of some belief, then that
belief has been unreliably formed. Religious belief-formation is similar in important
respects to wish-fulfillment; if Freud is correct, the desire that God exists plays too
prominent a role in the genesis and sustenance of religious belief. Hence, we have reason
to believe that M-beliefs are unreliably formed. Of course, its possible that wish-
54
. To modify a claim of Jeffrey Gordon’s, “although it remains possible that there is a benevolent
Creator, a moral order in the universe, and an afterlife, the truth of these claims would be a
remarkable coincidence, since they are based on [reasonably proximately] nothing more substantial
than wishes. If they turn out to be true, it would be similar to a case of amazingly fortuitous
guessing.” “Freud’s Religious Skepticism Resurrected,” in Religious Studies. 27/3 (1991): 313.
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fulfillment is reliable in the religious case. Perhaps CMP is autonomous in just that
respect. But perhaps not. In order to determine that in a non-question-begging way, we
need good reason to believe that CMP is autonomous in the relevant respect; what feature
of God necessitates us to form beliefs by wish-fulfillment? Alston’s central insight, to
which he does not adhere consistently enough, is to deny that we need to provide reason
from sources external to CMP to be justified in engaging in CMP; rather, the evidence we
acquire by CMP stands on all fours with that garnered by engaging in other practices. But
then we have to employ that evidence to provide an adequate response to the likes of
Freud, Marx and Nietzsche. And that is just what Alston fails adequately to do.
What’s the moral of this story? That successful invocation of autonomy to blunt
criticism of a given practice always requires that we indicate why the object of belief, if it
is as members believe it to be, constrains us to form beliefs in ways differently than we
form beliefs about other objects. Once again, this is not a matter of providing an external
justification of the reliability of a given practice, but a matter of showing how the object
of belief as understood internal to a practice constrains belief-formation. A practice for
which this cannot be done is vulnerable to comparison criticism. And that is as it should
be: Alston’s appeal to autonomy is not a protective strategy designed to insulate religious
belief from criticism, but an appeal for fair and constructive criticism.
3.7 Summary of the Argument
In the first chapter, I articulated Alston’s criteria [(EP9) and (EP10)] for
evaluating the epistemic status of any doxastic practice whatsoever. In the second
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chapter, I presented Alston's argument in support of the claim that, according to (EP9)
and (EP10), there is a religious doxastic practice that enjoys positive epistemic status. At
the heart of that argument was a constant appeal to CMP’s autonomy. Given that (I think
at least) the appeal to autonomy is one of the most interesting features of Alston’s work,
and given that he provides precious little by way of argument in support of his Autonomy
Thesis, I have attempted to provide that rationale in this chapter. But the appeal to
autonomy generates concerns about Alston’s strategy for defending religious experience:
appeals to autonomy look very much like attempts to protect CMP from criticism. I have
attempted to indicate why those concerns are unwarranted; in addition to Alston’s two
grounds for rejecting doxastic practices, I have indicated three more. Though more
difficult to evaluate than considerations of inconsistency, comparison criticism, immanent
critique, and misuse of autonomy are powerful kinds of objection and their importance
for the critique of religious belief puts bite into Alston's fallibilism. It is, then, possible
to show of presumptively innocent religious DPs that they are guilty.
If I have focused in this chapter on the second half of the Reformed claim that
religious doxastic practices are innocent until proven guilty, the first half merits attention
as well. If Alston is correct, that religious DPs are absolved of guilt is of little importance
if they are not presumptively innocent, since we cannot show CMP to be reliable. I will
focus on Alston’s formulation of the claim that CMP is presumptively innocent in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL ESTABLISHMENT, AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF
Alston's practical rationality argument is crucial to his attempt to vindicate the
epistemic status of CMP. And at the heart of his practical argument is an appeal to social
establishment. In fact, Alston's appeal to social establishment performs three distinct
functions in his scheme of things. It provides support for his claim (1) that it is rational
for members ot CMP to regard CMP as reliable unless shown to be unreliable, (2) that
even those who do not engage in CMP have reason to believe (1) to be true, but (3) that
the truth of (1) does not license an unacceptable epistemic promiscuity.
First, the appeal to social establishment gains CMP entre’ into the epistemic
ground floor— because socially entrenched, CMP enjoys a presumptive innocence. And
that is crucially important: were CMP presumptively unreliable until shown to be reliable,
CMP would be relegated to epistemic oblivion given Alston's denial that CMP is
amenable of non-circular support. After all, it's a lot harder to ride one of the old boys
out of the club than to keep him from entering in the first place: CMP stands a lot better
chance of hobnobbing with pillars of the epistemic community like SP and introspection
if it doesn’t have to prove itself at the door.
Second, as I noted at the end of the second chapter (2.5), Alston claims to have
provided an external rationale for the positive epistemic status of CMP. Anyone, whether
participant in CMP or not, can determine whether or not it is rational tor an agent to
engage in that practice. Although we lack any external indications that CMP is reliable,
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and thus that participants in CMP are epistemically justified in so participating, anyone
can determine that that practice is socially and psychologically established and that there
is no reason to believe it is massively inconsistent, and therefore that engaging in CMP is
at least moderately rational. The appeal to social establishment is crucial.
Third, the appeal to social establishment enables Alston to resolve what Alvin
Plantinga has called ‘The Great Pumpkin Problem." Alston's critics argue that he
succeeds in vindicating the epistemic status of religious belief only by so watering down
his epistemic standards that he is committed to regarding even obviously objectionable
practices as enjoying positive epistemic status. 1 Alston’s general epistemic position is
objectionable just because it provides us with inadequate grounds for denying positive
epistemic status to such dubious practices as astrology, witchcraft, divination, and the
like. Alston admits that his epistemic criteria are weaker than we would like them to be,
but denies that they are objectionably permissive. The claim that engaging in a given
doxastic practice is weakly rational only ifthat practice is socially established provides
Alston with principled grounds for addressing this concern. (More on this shortly.)
Having been content to articulate, explain and generally defend Alston for three
chapters, I turn now to criticism. Although there is much with which to disagree —
Alston’s reliabilism comes to mind, as does his Theory of Appearing, I will focus on what
I take to be the most objectionable feature of his version of Reformed Epistemology, viz.,
his practical argument. In 4.1, 1 provide a context for my objections by articulating The
\ See, for example, Matthew Bagger, “The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism, and Dirk-
Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism, pp. 37-52.
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Great Pumpkin Problem,’ Alvin Plantinga’s attempt to resolve that problem and how
Alston’s appeal to social entrenchment provides him with what he takes to be a more
satisfactory resolution of that problem than Plantinga’s. Then I begin to shie bricks at
Alston. In 4.2, 1 argue that, even if otherwise objectionable, Alston's appeal to social
establishment does not satisfy important extra-epistemic expectations imposed on the
epistemologist in pluralistic environments: Alston fails to address the moral and political
concerns motivating interest in epistemology. In 4.3, 1 note a crucial lacuna in Alston's
argument: he fails to identify or to justify in light of exactly which goals it is practically
raional for an agent to engage in socially established practices. As a consequence, he is
open to the objection that pursuing his epistemic policy (encapsulated) in (EP9) and
(EP10) is not the most rational course of action open to agents who find themselves in the
epistemic predicament I articulated in 1.3.2: social establishment seems neither necessary
nor sufficient for practical rationality. In 4.4, 1 argue that we have better epistemic reason
to impute presumptive innocence to ineluctable practices than to socially established
practices. That is, so long as the overriding goal in light of which we evaluate doxastic
practices is whether or not engaging in a given practice enables us to form a high ratio of
true beliefs, cognitive agents in our epistemic predicament would act more rationally
were they to adopt more austere criteria for presumptive innocence than Alston's
permissive social establishment criterion. (I will argue later that the ineluctability
criterion fails as well, but that it fails for instructive reasons.) In 4.5, 1 argue that even it
Alston can shore up his practical argument, event if he can show that the most rational
course of action for any agent in the human condition is to impute presumptive innocence
219
only to socially and psychologically entrenched practices, CMP does not count as rational
according to his argument. That is, even if (EP9) and (EP10) are true, CMP does not
count as moderately or strongly rational. In 4.6, 1 throw my last brick. I argue that
Alston’s defense of the rationality of CMP is afflicted by an inconsistency between two
projects at the heart of his defense. Alston’s defense of CMP is internally unstable: his
appeal to the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices undermines his attempt to articulate
and defend neutral, universally acceptable and applicable, epistemic criteria like (EP9)
and (EP10). In 4.7, 1 conclude by commenting on the implications of the demise of
Alston's appeal to social establishment for the rationality of religious belief.
4.1 The Great Pumpkin Problem
The general topic of this chapter is the Reformed claim that we are epistemically
justified in our ungrounded but defeasible commitment to religious doxastic practices.
That claim elicits a natural objection: the epistemic standards of the Reformed position
are so lax that they would license even belief in the Great Pumpkin. The innocent until
proven guilty claim and the Great Pumpkin Objection are flip sides of the same coin.
Given that the general theme of this chapter ands intimate relation to the Great Pumpkin
Problem, I will attempt to identify just in what that problem consists. In so doing, I will
formulate Plantinga’s more well-known and more frequently discussed analysis and
resolution of that Problem (4.1.1), Alston’s very different resolution (4.1.2), and then
discuss the implications of their different resolutions (4.1.3).
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4.1.1 Plantinga’s Resolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem
In his early work on religious epistemology, Plantinga exerts a great deal of effort
attempting to discredit what he calls the evidentialist objection to religious belief. 2
According to the evidentialist, belief in God is rational, justified, epistemically apt,
warranted, etc., iff a cognitive agent bases her belief in God on adequate evidence, where
what counts as evidence is restricted to her other, non-theistic, beliefs. An agent is
subject to epistemic blame, or, in increasing order of seriousness, she flaunts her
epistemic duties, or she abdicates from the search for the truth, if she persists believing
that God exists in the absence of adequate propositional evidence. But, according to the
evidentialist, an examination of the available arguments in support of God’s existence
reveals that the theist lacks the requisite support; proofs of God’s existence, whether
traditional, newly refurbished, or entirely novel, lack probative force. Even disregarding
the evidence against God’s existence furnished by the problem of evil, the lack of
adequate evidence for God’s existence is itself sufficient to render belief in God
irrational .
3
2
. See Plantinga’s “Reason and Belief in God,” pp. 20-39 and “Coherentism and the Evidentialist
Objection,” in Robert Audi and William Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief and
Moral Obligation: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University
Press, 1986), for an elucidation of evidentialism.
3
.
Thus, Anthony Flew: “It is by reference to this inescapable demand for grounds that the
presumption of atheism is justified. If it is to be established that there is a God, then we have to
have good grounds for believing that this is indeed so. Until or unless some such grounds are
produced we have literally no reason at all for believing; and in that situation the only reasonable
posture must be that of either the negative atheist or the agnostic.” The Presumption of Atheism,
(London: Pemberton, 1976), p. 22.
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There is, however, a fly in the evidentialist’s ointment. We don’t require of all of
our beliefs that they enjoy discursive redemption; not every belief is faced with the
evidentialist challenge. Is the Law of Non-Contradiction really a law of logic? Is our
memory reliable? Do I exist? Does anything exist? Do I have reliable access to the
contents of my mind, if I exist? Is sense perception reliable? Is modus ponens valid? At
least some of these questions must be answered in the affirmative, and without benefit of
discursive justification, if a cognitive agent is to articulate evidence for any belief
whatsoever. If we don't accord a presumptive innocence to some beliefs or others, the
activity ofjustifying beliefs never gets off of the ground. So Plantinga poses the innocent
question: if we must accord a presumptive innocence to some beliefs, why not to religious
beliefs? Why is belief in God singled out as requiring discursive redemption?4
This question is easily answered by those evidentialists who adopt the account of
rational belief-formation constitutive of classical foundationalism. 5 As I noted at the end
of the first chapter, classical foundationalism is an amalgam of two distinct claims. First,
afoundationalist claim about the structure ofjustification: a belief is justified iff (1) it is
based upon other justified beliefs, and those other beliefs are justified in virtue of being
based upon still other justified beliefs, and so on, until the transfer ofjustification
terminates with some immediately justified belief(s); or (2) it is based on something non-
doxastic like a perceptual experience. Second, a classical claim that every immediately
4
.
“Reason and Belief in God,” p. 24.
5
. The classical foundationalist version of the evidentialist objection is not the only formulation ot
the objection. Plantinga discusses and dismisses coherentist versions of the evidentialist objection
to religious belief in “Coherentism and The Evidentialist Objection.” It is nevertheless the most
prominent and provides the clearest reason why belief in God ought not be counted as properly
basic.
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Only certain, or incorrigible, or indubitable beliefs count as "properly basic,” as justified
without evidential support from other beliefs.
Why, according to the classical foundationalist, shouldn't belief in God count as
properly basic? The belief that God exists does not enjoy certainty, incorrigibility, self-
evidence, etc., and is therefore not immediately justified. 6 If she is correct, because the
belief that God exists is not immediately justified, it is mediately justified ifjustified at
all. And this provides for the propriety of the evidentialist objection to religious belief:
she requests that the theist produce a chain of reasoning in virtue of which belief in God
is putatively justified and politely denies that the theist is successful in so doing.
Given that evidentialism, in its most prominent and influential manifestation, is
parasitic on classical foundationalism, Plantinga joins the torrent of voices declaiming the
latter.
7 As I have already noted (1.8), Alston doesn’t have foundationalism itself in his
6
. “Now suppose that we return to the main question: Why should not belief in God be among the
foundations of my noetic structure? The answer, on the part of the classical foundationalist, was
that even if this belief is true, it does not have the characteristics a proposition must have to
deserve a place in the foundations. There is no room in the foundations for a proposition that can
be rationally accepted only on the basis of other propositions. The only properly basic
propositions are those that are self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Since the
proposition that God exists is none of the above, it is not properly basic for anyone; that is, no
well-formed, rational noetic structure contains this proposition in its foundations. “Reason and
Belief in God,” p. 59.
7
. Most centrally, Plantinga finds the classical version wanting because self-referentially
incoherent. Clearly, the claim that classical foundationalism is true must satisfy its own criteria for
inclusion in a rational noetic structure if an agent who adheres to classical foundationalism is to be
rational in so doing. But the claim that every belief must be either (1 ) certain and immediately
justified or (2) based, whether remotely or proximately, on certain and immediately justified
beliefs, is neither certain nor immediately justified. So, if an agent who adheres to the claim that
classical foundationalism is true is to be justified in so believing, the claim that classical
foundationalism is true must enjoy its justification in virtue of being based, whether remotely or
proximately, on certain and immediately justified beliefs. And that kind of support is hardly
forthcoming. Hence, the classical foundationalist is committed to the claim that it is not rational to
believe that classical foundationalism is true. See Alvin Plantinga, “On Taking Belief in God as
Basic,” in Joseph Runzo and Craig K. lhara, eds., Religious Experience and Religious Belief,
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sights; neither does Plantinga. Plantinga is interested in refuting classical
toundationalism in order to argue that we have no reason not to be quite a bit more
latitudinarian than the classical foundationalist with respect to what counts as properly
basic. He is interested in liberalizing classical constraints on proper basicality so as to
argue that there are no principled reasons why some religious beliefs do not count as
properly basic when formed in the appropriate circumstances. For some agents in some
circumstances, the belief that God exists is rationally held even though they can provide
no discursive justification for that belief.
But that liberalizing move opens Plantinga up to “The Great Pumpkin
Objection .” 8 Having rejected classical constraints on proper basicality, Plantinga
prescinds from articulating what he takes to be more adequate criteria for proper
basicality. He articulates no substitute for the classical claim that properly basic beliefs
must be certain, incorrigible, etc. As a consequence, he is regularly charged with opening
the door to relativism, subjectivism, and the like: if Plantinga is right about our epistemic
situation, we lack non-question-begging grounds for objecting to such obviously
objectionable beliefs as Charlie Brown’s conviction that the Great Pumpkin will return to
(Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 15.
8
.
“Reason and Belief in God,” pp. 74-78. Note that the Great Pumpkin Objection is distinct from
the accusation that the Reformed approach is just a protective strategy by which those with
religious convictions insulate themselves from the "unforced force' (Habermas) of rational
argumentation. The latter accusation is plainly false. Nowhere in the corpus of Reformed
Epistemology, so far as I am aware, does the position get aired that a cognitive agent who refuses
to consider objections to her religious convictions is rationally justified in so doing. Not to belabor
the point, the Reformed approach is at heart a rejection of the claim that an agent requires
propositional evidence for her belief that God exists if she is rational in so believing and that is
entirely consistent with the claim that she is rationally compelled to cease believing in God when
she is faced with adequate evidence to the contrary.
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the pumpkin patch on Halloween Eve. If Plantinga denies us the wherewithal to deny
positive epistemic status even to belief in the Great Pumpkin, then "anything goes’;
Plantinga s defense ot the rationality ot belief in God succeeds only by obliterating any
effective distinction between fanatical and rational ways of forming beliefs.
Exactly what is the Great Pumpkin Problem? Why is it a problem for Plantinga’
s
epistemology? Clearly, critics employ it to discredit Plantinga’s defense of the rationality
of religious belief: because Plantinga can articulate no relevant differences between belief
in God and belief in the Great Pumpkin, it is irrational for him to regard belief in God as
properly basic but not belief in the Great Pumpkin. But why is that a problem? Plantinga
denies vociferously that there are no differences; he just denies that he is in a position to
identify what those differences are. 9 This does not much mollify his critics: for Plantinga
to claim that there is a relevant difference between belief in God and in the Great
Pumpkin but that he lacks criteria for identifying that difference renders us incapable of
providing an argument against belief in the Great Pumpkin which we have reason to
believe that Charlie Brown should regard as probative. In fact, we have no argument at
all; we can only register our conviction, unsupported by any rationale we can articulate,
that we believe Charlie Brown is irrational. But then, isn’t decrying an agent’s belief as
irrational without having any rationale for that claim itself irrational? So long as we
9
. Alvin Plantinga, ""On Taking Belief in God as Basic,” pp. 14-15. Thus, Joseph Runzo mis-
characterizes Plantinga’s position when he asserts that, for Plantinga, "'a belief is properly basic
onlyfor some individual or community of individuals,” and that ""a belief is only properly basic
relative to some system of belief, some particular world view.” ""Worldviews and The Epistemic
Foundations of Theism,” in Worldviews and Perceiving God, p. 122. (Runzo s emphasis) For
Plantinga, whether or not some belief is properly basic is not up to a given individual or
worldview; rather, what an individual takes to be properly basic depends upon her worldview.
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assume that rational agents are willing and capable of providing reasons for their
convictions, Plantinga s defense of belief in God consigns to irrationality beliefs we hold
with great conviction.
Objections of this sort, according to Plantinga, are groundless: it is unreasonable
to expect that we are capable of articulating some neutral criterion for distinguishing
basic from non-basic beliefs. Why? His answer hinges on the way he believes we are
constrained to formulate criteria for proper basicality. We have no a priori insight into
what makes for a properly basic belief. Our procedure for articulating criteria for proper
basicality should, therefore, be an inductive one: start by identifying a suitable spread of
beliefs which we take to be obviously properly basic, as well as a suitable spread of
beliefs we take to be obviously non-basic, and attempt to identify the necessary and
sufficient conditions which demarcate the obviously basic from the obviously non-basic
beliefs .
10 Not having settled criteria for distinguishing obviously basic from obviously
non-basic beliefs will invariably result in differing convictions as to what counts as
obviously basic. Theists will tend to take belief in God to be obviously basic, and
therefore to count as part of the data set in light of which we identify the necessary and
sufficient conditions of proper basicality; non-theists will tend not to take belief in God to
be obviously basic, and therefore not to count as part of the data set in light of which we
identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality. Because the theist
and non-theist alike begin with differing convictions as to what counts as properly basic,
the criteria they formulate as a consequence of their ‘induction’ will just mirror the
10
. “On Taking Belief in God as Basic,” pp. 15-16.
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conflict of conviction at the deeper level. And because there is no appeal 'beyond' or
'beneath' an agent's deepest convictions, we should conclude that we lack a neutral way
of distinguishing between properly basic and non-basic beliefs of the sort to which the
classical toundationalists aspired. Hence, Plantinga avers, he can hardly be faulted for
failing to provide such a criterion."
4.1.2 Alston’s Resolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem
Whereas Plantinga formulates the evidentialist objection as an attempt to
undermine the epistemic status of the beliefthat God exists, Alston formulates that
objection as an attempt to undermine the epistemic status ofpractices of forming beliefs
about God. There is no reason, Alston argues, to assume that we are in any position to
show that religious doxastic practices, CMP in particular, are reliable by employing as
premises beliefs formed by engaging in any particular subset of our non-religious
".
I have been formulating Plantinga’s analysis of, and response to, the Great Pumpkin Problem
in his early work on epistemology. In his more recent work, he displays even less concern about
the possible promiscuity licensed by his epistemic position. Briefly put, Plantinga argues that a
belief B has warrant
,
that property which distinguishes true belief from knowledge, iff (1) B is
produced by a properly functioning module of our cognitive faculties (2) the segment of the
module which produces B is designed to produce true beliefs, (3) there is a high objective
probability that B is true when formed in the appropriate circumstances, and (4) the circumstances
in which B is formed are appropriate. See Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 3-20. What
counts as a properly functioning belief-forming faculty will generate at least as much dissensus as
what counts as a properly basic belief. For what counts as proper belief formation is a function of
metaphysical convictions as to the nature of human beings— a topic about which we expect
much, and tolerate considerable, conflict of opinion. Thus, Plantinga writes, “when we see that
the de jure question is really about the human design plan, we see that the epistemological
question as to the rationality or lack thereof of Christian belief has anthropological, and hence
ontological and ultimately religious roots. What you properly take to be rational, at least in the
sense in question, depends on what sort of metaphysical and religious stance you adopt; it depends
upon the kinds of beings you think human beings are, and what sorts of beliefs their noetic
faculties will produce when they are functioning properly.... And so the dispute as to whether
theistic belief is rational cannot be settled just by attending to epistemological considerations; it is
at bottom not merely an epistemological dispute but a metaphysical or theological dispute.
“What’s the Question?,” p. 41
.
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doxastic practices— and there is no reason to assume that even ifCMP is as reliable as
you please. Moreover, any requirement that we show CMP to be reliable by employing
premises formed by memory, introspection, sense-perception and reason is arbitrary: we
can t do that for SP, so why CMP? But then his own version of the Great Pumpkin
Problem arises: if CMP needs no external justification, why does astrology, witchcraft or
the reading of chicken entrails? 12
Alston, unlike Plantinga, worries about possible permissive implications of his
argument. He is as allergic as is anyone else to the prospect of the philosophically acute
witch or astrologer— not to mention racist or bigot ~ employing his strategy for
defending CMP to vindicate the practices in which they engage. Unlike Plantinga,
however, he has built into his general epistemic position criteria which exclude such
(epistemic) undesirables from co-opting his defense of CMP. Because of the way he has
formulated the problem of the status of religious belief — what should we do given that
we can provide no non-circular proof of the reliability of basic doxastic practices?, Alston
may avail himself of resources for answering the Great Pumpkin Problem which are
unavailable to Plantinga . 15 His practical argument for engaging in socially established
practices provides him with grounds for claiming, not just that it is moderately rational
for an agent to engage in SP. memory, and other respectable doxastic practices, but also
that idiosyncratic practices like astrology, divination, and telepathy need something by
12
.
Dirk-Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism,” pp. 40-5;
Matthew Bagger, “The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism,” p. 302; Charles Daniels,
“Experiencing God,” pp. 490-91.
13
.
“A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology," p. 23.
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way of truth-conducive support for their reliability. If Cedric is in the habit of forming
beliefs about the future of the stock market by reading tea leaves, Alston argues, we
should not presume that his practice is reliable unless he can show that it is reliable;
because his practice does not enjoy the social entrenchment shared by CMP and SP alike.
Cedric needs to show that his idiosyncratic practice is reliable by appealing to
considerations generated by practices with a more impressive pedigree. If those on the
fringes of society dabble in the magical arts in order to communicate with the dead, then
we may regard the beliefs they form thereby with suspicion. If some cult springs up in
the backwoods of Appalachia the members of which form predictions about future
mutations influencing the evolutionary prospects of humankind by ingesting a rare and
hallucinatory fungus, those newcomers must prove to us that their practice is reliable if
they are to act in an epistemically upstanding manner. Alston’s epistemic standards, then,
do not license an agent to engage in any practice whatsoever; his appeal to social
establishment does not allow everyone and anyone, even the Great Pumpkin, access to
that select club of presumptively innocent practices. By employing (EP9) and (EP10), we
have available to us arguments which we may employ to show that idiosyncratic practices
are epistemically objectionable.
To be sure, Alston’s social establishment criterion might not be as strong as we
would like; we may look wistfully back to the foundationalist's privileging of
introspection, memory, reason and (sometimes) sense-perception. But our disappointed
expectations should not move us to give his policy short shritt.
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First, the social establishment criterion undoubtedly excludes from presumptive
innocence many of the doxastic practices we are likely to reject outright; it is likely that
there will be a significant correlation in the actual world between those practices Alston's
social establishment criterion excludes and those we are likely to regard as effective
counter-examples to set of epistemic standards in light of which they are putatively
proper. After all, if some practice has enjoyed widespread participation by many
generations of the members of our society, then we will be less likely to regard that
practice as simply and utterly beyond the epistemic pale and therefore as not even a
candidate for presumptive innocence.
Second, Alston intends for the social establishment criterion to work in concert
with the various grounds for excluding doxastic practices which distinguish mere weak
rationality from moderate rationality. An agent, you will recall, is moderately rational for
engaging in a given practice only when that practice is socially established and not itself
massively inconsistent or massively inconsistent with other deeply rooted practices (or, if
I may add, subject to debilitating comparison criticism or immanent critique). And it is
likely to be the case that we will have some such grounds for denying positive epistemic
status to those socially established doxastic practices which are obviously objectionable:
even if there were a socially entrenched astrological practice, do we really have to worry
that the astrologer’s predictions will be correct often enough to avoid massive
inconsistency with SP and testimony?; can't we provide a convincing immanent critique
of the Azande’s witchcraft practice?
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4.1.3 Neutrality, Social Establishment and Rational Discourse
Let me remark briefly on the significance of some of the differences between
Alston and Plantinga's responses to the Great Pumpkin Problem. One way of
formulating Plantinga's resolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem is that he denies that
we can discover any neutral criteria by employing which we may determine whether or
not a given belief is properly basic and thus that he can hardly be held accountable for
failing to articulate such criteria. 14 Alston denies Plantinga’s denial. In Alston's Theory
of Doxastic Practices, (EP9) and (EP 1 0) express the equivalent of a criterion for proper
basicality — they constitute criteria for identifying those practices it is epistemically
proper for an agent to regard as reliable until shown to be unreliable. (EP9) and (EP10)
are neutral in the sense that they are supported by arguments which employ premises to
which any human being has access: they do not depend for their justification on premises
available to Alston as a consequence of his engaging in particular doxastic practices like
CMP. Because we are all in the same epistemic predicament, and because Alston
l4
. On neutral criteria, see Alasdair MacIntyre’s characterization of the Encyclopaedic tradition in
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. For example, “For Adam Gifford and almost all his
educated Edinburgh contemporaries, it was a guiding presupposition of thought that substantive
rationality is unitary, that there is a single, if perhaps complex, conception of what the standards
and the achievements of rationality are, one which every educated person can without too much
difficulty be brought to agree in acknowledging. The application of the methods and goals of this
single and unitary conception to any one particular subject matter is what yields a science.” Three
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 14. Again, “Liberalism, in moving toward that
replacement, appealed to two sets of premises, one true and one false. The true premises concerned
those injustices to individuals and to groups of which the preliberal university was surely guilty.
The false premises propounded the thesis that human rationality is such, and the methods and
procedures which it has devised and in which it has embodied itself are such that, if freed from
external constraints and most notably the constraints imposed by religious and moral tests, it will
produce not only progress in enquiry but also agreement among all rational persons as to what the
rationally justified conclusions of such enquiry are.” Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p.
225.
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articulates his epistemic criteria on the basis of reflection on the human condition
( 1 .4.2. 1 ), any human being can
and should recognize their legitimacy. Any human being who carefully reflects on the
arguments Alston lays out in his corpus should conclude that (EP9) and (EP10) are
correct.
Why is Alston so desirous of articulating neutral criteria for evaluating beliefs? I
take it that neutral criteria are valuable because they enable us rationally to resolve
conflicts of belief; because they make it possible for ego rationally to persuade alter to
change her beliefs. That we believe that there are such neutral criteria is a condition of
the possibility of rational discourse. Appeal to neutral criteria makes it possible for ego
to articulate grounds for some proposition that she has good reason to believe that alter
will also regard as a good reason for that proposition. After all, if the criteria in light of
which ego judges that her reasons for belief are probative are genuinely neutral, then
alter, whether or not she adheres to those criteria, is nevertheless capable of apprehending
the legitimacy of ego’s epistemic standards and therefore of ego's argument. There is
then some hope of persuading her by presenting the argument. If ego doesn't make this
assumption, if she doesn’t believe that alter will regard the reasons she articulates in
support of her position as probative, then there is little point in presenting her argument.
And if ego believes that she has available to her no reasons in support of her position that
alter would take to be a good reason, perhaps because their criteria as to what counts as a
good reason are fundamentally at odds, then there is little point in the presentation ot
arguments at all. In order to foreclose the possibility that ego and alter will find
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themselves at such an epistemic impasse, we aspire to articulate neutral criteria. Neutral
criteria are of importance, then, because they make possible rational resolution of
conflicts of belief
.
15
Alston employs his neutral criteria in order to make good on that possibility with
respect to belief in God. I began this chapter by indicating that Alston’s appeal to social
establishment is crucial both to his external rationale for the rationality of engaging in
CMP and to his response to the Great Pumpkin Problem. It turns out that the feature of
social establishment which makes it do double duty is that it provides a neutral criterion
of the sort I have just been discussing. Alston can reasonably claim to have provided an
external rationale for CMP just because CMP counts as enjoying proper epistemic status
in light of epistemic criteria the legitimacy of which is accessible to any cognitive agent
whomever, regardless of whether she engages in CMP (or any other parochial doxastic
practice). Similarly, Alston is able to provide principled and non-question-begging
grounds for denying positive epistemic status to obviously objectionable practices like
astrology just because those who engage in that practice are able to judge that his
epistemic criteria are correct and that in light of those criteria their idiosyncratic doxastic
. I realize that there is plenty more to be said about this. For example, the argument I just
presented indicates why two agents might aspire to articulate criteria which are neutral as between
them without worrying about whether they are neutral for all rational agents. So long as they share
criteria of rationality, why would they concern themselves with whether or not other agents, agents
to whom they do not address their arguments, also share those criteria? There is a distinction
between criteria which are neutral as between two interlocutors and those which are universally
neutral. Alston is interested in the latter. Why? For my money, pluralism plays an important and
formative role here. For those who live in a society as pluralized as Alston does (and we do), its
nearly impossible to engage in discourses without running into interlocutors of fundamentally
different persuasions. And that pushes Alston (us) to develop criteria of rationality which are
persuasive to any human being— universally neutral criteria.
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practice requires a truth-conducive justification it lacks. In both cases, the neutrality of
Alston’s general epistemic position, its legitimacy regardless of particular or parochial
associations, is essential to his project.
As one would expect, Plantinga’s willingness to abdicate from the task of
articulating criteria for proper basicality which are recognizable as legitimate regardless
of parochial commitments, is internally related to his inability to mount an external
rationale for belief in God. Just because the criteria for proper basicality to which theists
adhere differ from the criteria for proper basicality to which non-theists adhere, and just
because belief in God counts as rational because properly basic, he can hardly expect to
be able to provide an argument to the conclusion that belief in God is rational which will
employ epistemic criteria non-theists will regard as unobjectionable.
4.2 Social Entrenchment, Epistemology and Pluralism
Alston’s appeal to social entrenchment is, then, crucial to his version of the
Reformed project of vindicating the positive epistemic status of religious belief. It is also
extremely problematic. There are any number of reasons why Alston’s appeal to social
entrenchment is objectionable; I can’t and won't discuss all of them. Five, which I will
articulate in ascending order of importance, will keep me more than occupied.
The first objection is actually not an objection at all; it is, rather, an attempt to
explain why Alston’s putative dissolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem cannot but lack
persuasive power to those to whom Alston addresses his work. I should warn the reader
that in what follows I will make a number of grandiose and unsupported claims about the
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function of epistemology in modem society— what follows is less argument than hunch.
Nevertheless, I hope that it is an interesting hunch.
As Peter Berger, et. al., have argued, modernity is distinctive in the degree to
which a plurality of worldviews, religions, political ideologies, and the like co-exist
within the same political, economic, and social framework
.
16
Fundamentally different
and often conflicting value-perspectives thrive within the same social space. Christians,
Nationalists, Marxists, Buddhists, Mormons, Agnostics, Jews, etc. live, move and have
their being (to wax theological) while shopping at the same supermarkets, going to the
same theaters, playing the same sports, attending the same schools, and, of course,
participating in the same political processes. Pluralism, however, generates problems of
social coordination. How so?
Social order requires cooperative relations between (in large-scale societies with
complex economies) often anonymous agents. The behavior of diverse agents is typically
‘pre-coordinated’ as a consequence of socialization into shared institutions. Socialization
into shared institutions insures that members of a given society govern their everyday
activity in light of commonly held expectations as to what counts as legitimate behavior
in various stereotypical situations .
17 When that 'pre-established' harmony breaks down.
16
. Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernization
and Consciousness, (New York, NY.: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 64-82; see also Peter Berger,
The Sacred Canopy, pp. 127 ff
.
17
.
Habermas calls that taken-for-granted background of our everyday interaction 'the Lifeworld.'
“Subjects acting communicatively always come to an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld.
Their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background
convictions. This background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by
participants as unproblematic. ... It is the conservative counter weight to the risk of disagreement
that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding.’’ The Theory of Communicative
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when the assumptions as to what counts as a legitimate expectation conflict, social agents
have to ‘become’ interlocutors— they have to restore the disturbed consensus by
communicating with one another. Restoration of disturbed consensus is routed through
the communicative activity of the relevant agents: alter, in uttering a given speech act,
raises various validity claims, which acquire their capacity to guide ego’s activity as a
consequence of the reasons she is prepared to offer ego in their defense .' 8 By relying on a
unthematized, taken-for-granted background of assumptions, rules, values, etc., alter is
able to repair the broken consensus by providing ego with what ego takes to be good
reason to act in such-and-such a way.
This low-level incarnation of rationality — what Habermas calls communicative
rationality — is crucially important to maintaining social order in modernity . 19 If this
employment of rational argumentation in everyday life breaks down, if agents fail to
resolve their dispute by recourse to some shared set of considerations, and if individual
Action, vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, p. 70. See also pp. 335-37; The
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System, Thomas McCarthy, trans.,
(Boston, MA.: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 140-48, 121-26; Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason,
p. 14ff.
18
. Habermas writes, “Owing to the fact that communication oriented to reaching understanding
has a validity basis, a speaker can persuade a hearer to accept a speech-act offer by guaranteeing
that he will redeem a criticizable validity claim. In so doing, he creates a binding/bonding effect
between speaker and hearer that makes the continuation of their interaction possible. Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen,
trans., (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 59. See William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity:
The Discourse Ethics of Jurgen Habermas, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press,
1994), p. 28; Maeve Cook, Language and Reason, p. 12; Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of
Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System, p. 74, 126-27, 262; A Reply to My
Critics,” in Habermas: Critical Debates, John B. Thompson and David Held, eds., (Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 234.
19
.
Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Frederick Lawrence, trans.,
(Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1987), p. 322.
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agents and communities guide their activities by privatistic and eccentric standards of
propriety, then recourse to manipulation, deception, force to resolve disputes becomes
more likely
.
20 But recourse to force on a systematic basis is unstable. Unfortunately,
pluralization renders more and more difficult the sustaining of consensus by
communicative action and not by power. Simply put, the less two agents agree on prior
to some dispute, they more difficult it will be for them to agree as to the nature of their
dispute, and the more difficult it will be for them to arrive at a rationally grounded
resolution of that dispute.
It seems to me, and I admit that this is pure speculation, that one of the reasons
why many regard epistemology as of particular importance is that the epistemologist
purports to provide us with the means necessary to make good on a moral conviction
which is crucially important in a pluralistic society. If the social cooperation necessary
for social order breaks down, and if it breaks down (in part) because those who need to
communicate to restore consensus lack the shared values and commitments necessary to
resolve their differences, and if most of us want to avoid restoring consensus by
censorship, power, domination, then we crave some means of restoring consensus without
the appeal to force. That we want to maintain social cooperation without undue or
unnecessary force provides the epistemologist, the guardian of the canons of rationality,
with an important social and moral mandate. What is that mandate?
20
. It seems to me that this is the heart of Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue. Moral
claims, devoid of any rational justification, are in fact attempts to manipulate others in order to
achieve one’s own preferences.
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An essential part of the epistemologist’ s calling is to articulate and vindicate those
standards ot rationality which we must assume we share in order to engage in meaningful
and rational argumentation. (This is one of those grandiose claims for which I have no
evidence, empirical or otherwise, but which I think is nevertheless plausible.) If a given
epistemologist denies that there are criteria which enable us rationally to resolve the
disputes generated by the pluralization of worldviews, if her position undermines our
ability to negotiate our way out of the disputes which arise in the ordinary interaction of
everyday life in pluralistic societies, then she has failed in the very task which lends her
vocation its point. I use the normative terms ‘calling’ and ‘vocation' intentionally, for the
expectations placed on the epistemologist in a pluralistic society are unavoidably moral.
A ‘good society’ is one in which disputes among people of good will are not resolved by
the application of power to compel belief. But we are able to avoid compelling belief
through coercion only if we are capable of engaging in rational argumentation. And the
epistemologist is called to show that we are so capable. Otherwise put, only if someone -
- and who else but the epistemologist? — succeeds in articulating criteria by which we
may rationally resolve our differences do we have the option of living in a society free of
(unnecessary) domination. As Charles Taylor has argued, “the moral vision burns at the
heart of epistemology .’’21
Plantinga has forsaken this element of the vocation of epistemology. If things are
as Plantinga claims they are, if members of different communities come complete with a
set of convictions as to what counts as properly basic, and if they form their criteria for
2I
. Sources of the Self, p. 407.
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identifying properly basic beliefs in light of those convictions, then the hope of forging
consensus via communicative action in pluralistic societies evaporates. Absent neutral
criteria, criteria to which Plantinga denies we have access, we seem incapable of
articulating arguments which we can in good faith believe provides our interlocutors with
grounds they have reason to regard as compelling.
Alston purports to provide us with neutral criteria, those which agents should
recognize as legitimate regardless of parochial convictions, and thereby to have fulfilled
his epistemic calling. But it seems clear that, even if (EP9) and (EP10) are otherwise
unobjectionable — which they are not, nevertheless, they do not provide us with criteria
which satisfies the desiderata mandated by the pluralistic context in which we find
ourselves. For in pluralistic societies, there are numerous socially established doxastic
practices each of which is, according to Alston, presumptively innocent. The social
establishment criterion has the same implications Plantinga’ s more intransigent
dissolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem has: an retrenchment of communal
commitments as to what counts as rational belief-forming activity and no means of
adjudicating doxastic disputes among members of different communities. In a society in
which there were no deep-rooted conflicts of belief between communities, a society, say,
in which only one religious doxastic practice enjoyed hegemony, then perhaps Alston s
doxastic practice approach would provide us with epistemic criteria we could employ to
discourage pluralization. But in those societies which are already pluralized to a high
degree, societies whose members include those to whom Alston addresses his work, the
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appeal to social establishment does not address the concerns motivating the Great
Pumpkin Problem.
Let me be clear about what I have been claiming. I am banking on the claim that
the epistemologist’s contribution to the division of intellectual labor is to provide us with
some way of resolving our disputes without employing force; that’s what we want from
her, what (we think) we need from her if we are to make good on some of our most
deeply felt moral convictions. That she may be able to provide us with such neutral
criteria is why she has an audience. When one of them argues, as Plantinga explicitly and
Alston implicitly do, that we cannot have that which our moral convictions require, then
their epistemic positions cease to be of interest. That their epistemic positions cease to
interest us is no argument against them; on the merits Plantinga or Alston may very well
be correct. It is, rather, an explanation of why we turn them off when we see where they
are headed and listen to someone else who claims to provide that which they argue is
unavailable.
4.3 Social Establishment neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality
If Alston’s appeal to social establishment fails to satisfy the social mandate
imposed on the epistemologist by concerns outside of her discipline, it is also defective in
light of standards internal to epistemology. Alston argues that an agent is practically
rational for engaging in a given practice if she has a going concern in that practice and she
has a going concern in that practice if and only it it is socially and psychologically
established. But (1) an agent may act rationally even if she engages in practices which
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not socially established and (2) it may not be practically rational for her to engage in
practices which are socially established. Hence, the social establishment of a practice is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the practical rationality of engaging in that practice.
First, necessity. Suppose that Amie lives in a society in which CMP is deeply
entrenched, that he is socialized into that practice so that it is deeply rooted in his psyche,
and that he is privy to no good reasons to believe that CMP is unreliable. Amie is, if
Alston is correct, at least moderately, and perhaps strongly, rational for engaging in CMP.
Unfortunately, Amie’s society is overrun by brutal but highly devout polytheists who
impose draconic measures which they intend to discourage participation in any religious
doxastic practices other than their polytheistic practice. (Note that the polytheistic
imperialists provide no grounds for regarding CMP as unreliable; they have read Alston’s
work and concluded that objections to CMP they once took to be compelling are in fact
afflicted with epistemic imperialism!) In a couple of generations, Amie’s oppressors
have nearly eradicated CMP; Amie is one of those faithful few who have persisted in
practicing CMP into their dotage. CMP, we may stipulate, has in the course of Amie's
lifetime been denuded of its Constantinian trappings — it no longer enjoys the social
entrenchment it once had. :: Is it no longer practically rational for Amie to engage in that
22
. Is he therefore required to produce non-circular justification for CMP now that it lacks social
entrenchment? If Alston is correct that there is no non-circular justification of CMP, has CMP
been consigned to epistemic oblivion as a result of its having been forcibly suppressed? Surely
not. Arnie cannot have acquired the obligation to show that CMP is reliable, and thereby to be
committed to rejecting CMP, because his culture has fallen to the imperialist. He should take into
account the manner of its demise; because the reasons why CMP has been denuded of social
establishment are entirely unrelated to any indications of its reliability, it should have the same
epistemic status it enjoyed prior to the coming of the imperialist.
This raises an interesting problem for Alston. It is a truism (whether true or not!) that
modern societies are more secular than pre-modern societies. The term ‘secular’ is famously
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practice? Hardly. He has sacrificed greatly in order to continue to participate in CMP; he
has been the object of persecution and ridicule. And he could hardly have endured that
had CMP not been deeply rooted in his psyche. Isn’t the fact that CMP is deeply rooted
in Amie’s psyche, that it provides his sacrifices with meaning and significance, that he
would despair of his life were his theological convictions false, sufficient for its being
practically rational for him to engage in it? And is that not the case even though CMP is
no longer socially entrenched?
Second, sufficiency. Imagine a culture in which CMP is deeply entrenched—
there is a state-sponsored church body, the most powerful politicians participate in it, big
business supports it, etc. In particular, suppose that the beliefs formed by the members of
CMP tend to legitimate the current social order— religion plays its customary
ideological role. And then suppose that there are a few dissidents who, not only do not
ambiguous, but if we mean by the secularization thesis that the political, social and economic
influence of religious institutions and symbols has decreased as modernity has developed, then the
secularization thesis implies that religious doxastic practices are less entrenched now than they
once were. And, of course, in the formulations of certain sociologists, the secularization thesis
amounts to the claim that the process of de-institutionalization is inevitable. Why does this raise a
problem for Alston? If CMP's presumptive innocence depends upon its social entrenchment, and
if its social entrenchment is decreasing and will do so inevitably, then Alston has to take a stand on
what the causes of secularization are. If, for example, some “barrier theory” is true, viz., it it is the
case that the progressive and inevitable process of secularization is best explained by the
increasing cultural influence of modern science, or of increases in the level of education of modern
individuals, then the best explanation of secularization would seem to impugn CMP’s reliability.
But if the best explanation of secularization does not entail CMP’s unreliability, tor example, it
religion is less attractive to moderns because they deny that moral claims have cognitive status, as
Alasdair MacIntyre argues, or simply because moderns have available to them alternative, non-
religious, moral sources, as Charles Taylor argues, or if religion doesn t decrease in influence, but
only transforms the manner of its expression, as Robert Wuthnow argues, then Alston is entitled to
regard CMP as reliable even if it lacks social establishment entirely. That is, if the best
explanation of the erosion of CMP’s social entrenchment has little or nothing to do with its
unreliability, then its lacking social establishment shouldn t count against it. Whatever tack he
takes, the way in which Alston frames the issue as to the epistemic status of religious belief forces
him to take a position on topics often regarded as irrelevant to that issue.
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engage in CMP, but believe that it is inimical to a just social order— that CMP is a pillar
of support to a social order which is disguised repression. Is it practically rational for
those dissidents to engage in CMP? Hardly. They believe that CMP legitimates ordered
disorder, repression disguised as justice, and that a genuinely orderly society would
require dismantling the current regime. Clearly, then, that a doxastic practice is socially
established is not sufficient for an agent's being practically rational in engaging in that
practice.
Although these examples indicate that something is wrong with the way Alston
employs the social establishment criterion in his practical argument, they do not specify
exactly what that is. Here is what I think has gone wrong. Practical rationality is
synonymous with instrumental, or means/ends rationality. To claim that an action is
practically rational is to claim that it is instrumental in bringing about a desired end, that
it is the most (an) efficient means available to a given end. Adopting the policy of
imputing presumptive innocence to socially established practices is supposed to be
practically rational, that is, the most (an) efficient means to some end. But to what end?
In light of what goals does Alston propose that we evaluate the practical rationality of a
given action? An action is never practically rational tout court
;
whether or not some
action is practically rational depends, in part, on the goals in light of which that action is
properly to be judged . 2 ' The martyr may count as stupifyingly irrational if her actions are
judged as to whether or not they maximize expected utility yet count as supremely
23
. With one important exception: under no circumstances is it practically rational for an agent to
adopt some policy or pursue some course of action which it is impossible for her to consummate.
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rational it judged as to whether or not she discharges her moral obligations. As Richard
Foley has argued, judgements of rationality are elliptical: “...whenever someone claims
that it is rational to believe some proposition (or to perform some action) and a fortiori
whenever someone tries to give an account of what is involved in such claims, we are
entitled to ask two questions: Rational for what, with respect to what goal? And rational
from what perspective?”24
Alston claims that the most basic way in which the policy of engaging only in
socially established practices is practically rational is that it maintains social order .25 If an
agent’s action is practically rational only if that action maintains established modes of
social life, then perhaps it is the case that the most rational policy to pursue would be to
engage in only those practices which enjoy social establishment. At least, that claim is
not obviously false. But if an action is practically rational only if it maintainsjust modes
of social life, then it is unlikely to be the case that the most rational policy to pursue
would be to engage in only those practices which enjoy social establishment. And if an
action is practically rational only if it conduces to the maximization of a given agent’s
expected utility — surely this is a common understanding of rationality, then it is unclear
24
. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, p. 138. He writes further that “the main thesis here is
that claims of rationality— claims about the rationality of a person’s actions or beliefs— tend to
be elliptical, and the corresponding thesis is that such claims tend to be elliptical because they fail
to make explicit the point of view from which they are made. A point of view, in turn, can be
identified by identifying a goal and by identifying a perspective from which the evaluation
concerning how effectively the person is satisfying the goal is made. Accordingly, one may
remove the ellipsis from a claim of rationality by making explicit the point of view it
presupposes.” The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, p. 140.
25
.
Perceiving God, p. 276.
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whether or not it would always and everywhere be rational to engage in only those
practices which enjoy social and psychological establishment.
Alston tails to articulate any kind ot a justification for privileging the maintenance
of social order. Unless he can provide some such justification, unless he can show that
maintaining social order (the de facto social order and not even some idealized social
order) is the goal in light of which we should make judgements of practical rationality,
then his restriction on those practices in which it is practically rational for an agent to
engage is simply gratuitous. I can’t conjure up an argument in Alston’s support which
has any plausibility at all. Hence, I take it that Alston’s social entrenchment restriction on
those practices it is practically rational to impute presumptive reliability is indefensible.
4.4 Social Establishment versus Ineluctability
In the previous subsection, I noted that whether or not a given action is practically
rational depends upon the goal(s) in light of which such judgements are made. There are
any number of goals in light of which an agent may evaluate the practical rationality of a
given action; the same action may count as practically rational in light of some of those
goals and irrational in light of others. If Alston’s practical argument is to go through, he
has to provide some justification for the claim that the most rational policy is for an agent
to regard socially established practices as innocent until proven guilty. He has not done
so. I will argue in this subsection that there is a plausible alternative practical argument.
I will argue that an agent desirous of discharging her central epistemic aim who finds
herself in the epistemic predicament generated by her inability to provide non-circular
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justification for her basic epistemic practices would be best served by imputing
presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic practices and to require of all
eluctable practices that they be shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging only
in ineluctable practices. Although I will conclude that this argument is itself defective, I
also believe that it is vastly superior to Alston’s, and therefore undercuts his claim that
imputing defeasible innocence to socially established practices is the most rational policy
available to agents.
4.4.1 Practical Rationality and Ineluctable Doxastic Practices
Before I turn to that argument, I will begin by indicating why Alston dismisses the
relevance of my alternative from the start. Simply put, Alston claims that the question as
to whether it is rational for an agent to engage in a given doxastic practice does not even
arise if we believe that she has no option but to engage in that practice. A human being
has no choice but to engage in the standard package of sense-perceptual, introspective,
inferential, and mnemonic doxastic practices; these practices are not only socially
established but also ineluctable. If an agent cannot but engage in the standard package,
then there is no issue as to whether or not it is practically rational for her to do so. That a
course of action is ineluctable is grounds for denying the relevance of practical
considerations: "one objection to thinking of this as practical rationality is that it is not
clear, in many cases, that it is possible for [an agent] to adopt any other course .”
2 '1
But, if
26
.
Perceiving God, p. 168. Again, “if I lack the power effectively to decide whether to A or to
not-A, it is not appropriate to think of me as choosing, selecting, or employing A as a means to a
goal. ‘Means-end’ talk along with ‘pursuit of goals’ talk and ‘acting with a purpose' talk, is
indissolubly bound up with the possibility of effective voluntary control of the alleged ‘means.' It
we don’t have that control, this conceptual scheme is inapplicable.” William Alston, “Richard
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true, this would undercut Alston’s employment of practical considerations to determine to
which practices we should impute presumptive innocence.
Alston suggests that we adopt the curious policy of entering into a hypothetical
’original position' in which we assume that we need not engage in the standard package.
While assuming that hypothetical attitude, Alston suggests that we attempt to determine
what the practically rational course of action would be for an agent who found herself in
the dire epistemic straits generated by the ubiquity of epistemic circularity. What would
the most rational course of action be for an agent if she could choose in which practices
she engages? That actual human beings lack that choice is beside the point. So, not to
put too fine a point on it, when Alston attempts to determine how a rational agent would
form beliefs given epistemic circularity, he assumes that that agent believes that all of her
doxastic practices are eluctable.
This assumption is doubly unfortunate: it is ill motivated and it cooks the game in
favor of the practical rationality criterion. Why is it ill motivated? Alston’s reasons for
denying the relevance of practical questions given ineluctability are unconvincing. That
an agent has no choice but to adopt some course of action is compelling reason to regard
it as practically rational for her to pursue that course of action. For an agent to attempt
not to engage in a practice she knows to be ineluctable is supremely irrational. As Alston
Foley’s Theory of Epistemic Rationality,” p. 136. This seems to me clearly wrong. Suppose that
the only way I can communicate is by employing a computer which transposes thoughts to words.
(I am suffering from Parkinson’s Disease and have lost the requisite motor skills.) That I lack a
spread of alternative means of communicating doesn't entail that the computer is not the means by
which I communicate. And it surely doesn’t entail that it is neither practically rational nor not
practical rational for me to employ the computer as a means.
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remarks in a different context, “by the time honored principle that 'Ought implies can,'
...it makes no sense to speak of S's being permitted or forbidden to do A if S lacks an
effective choice as to whether to do A.” 27 The strongest argument in support of the
practical rationality of pursuing a given course of action is to show that no other course of
action is a real possibility. 28
There is, of course, an explanation as to why it seems that issues of practical
rationality do not arise when an agent has one and only one course of action open to her.
The practical rationality question only seems moot because it is definitively settled by the
unavailability of alternative courses of action. When an agent has but one course of
action available to her, what it is rational for her to do is so obvious that she does not
need to deliberate about it. Far from being irrelevant to the question as to whether or not
an agent is practically rational for pursuing some course of action, the ineluctability of
that course of action is the strongest kind of evidence we can adduce in support of the
rationality of her so acting.
In what respect does Alston’s denial of the relevance of ineluctability to practical
questions cook the game in favor of his social establishment criterion? Because the
spread of options open to an agent may affect which course of action it is practically
rational for her to pursue. Suppose, to take perhaps an overly simple example, that an
agent who wishes to travel from Los Angeles to New York as quickly as possible may
drive a car, ride in a bus, or take a train. Assuming that the latter option will get her to
27
. “The Deontological Conception of Episteinic Justification,” p. 118.
28
. Alston seems to recognize that in an earlier essay, “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,”
p. 133.
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New York more quickly than the first two options, and that the time it will take to reach
her destination is the only goal in light of which the alternatives are to be judged, the only
rational choice would be to take the train. Obviously, if we add a fourth option, e.g., fly
on a plane, we will have to recalculate and will no doubt conclude that flying is the only
rational choice. We would be mistaken if we introduced the fourth option but refused to
recalculate.
I believe that by claiming that the ineluctability of some course of action renders
questions of practical rationality moot Alston commits a similar blunder. By stipulating
that he is interested in determining what course of action it is practically rational for an
agent to pursue ifan she had a choice as to in which practices she engages
,
he assumes
for purposes of the argument that all of our practices are eluctable. He thereby brackets
one of the options open to actual human beings: if there are no ineluctable practices, the
claim that it is practically rational for an agent to impute presumptive innocence only to
ineluctable doxastic practices is unworthy of consideration. And just as it is practically
rational for an agent to whom flying is not an option to take only a train, so also is it,
perhaps, 2 ^ practically rational for an agent who can opt out of any of her doxastic
practices to engage only in those practices in which she has a going concern. But if we
reintroduce the bracketed option (flying on a plane/adhering to the epistemic policy that
an agent is rational to impute presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic
practices), does the original calculation go through? I do not believe so. I shall attempt
to show that in the next section.
29
. If Alston can resolve the problem I pointed out in the previous section.
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4.4.2 Ineluctability as a Criterion for Determining Presumptive Innocence
Suppose that we agree that, in those possible worlds in which an agent may
choose in which doxastic practices she will engage, the ‘social and psychological
establishment’ criterion suffices to cull out those practices it is moderately rational for her
to regard as innocent. But in those possible worlds (which includes the actual one) in
which she cannot but engage in a given set of practices, it is rational for her to impute
presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic practices. That is, when we re-
introduce the excluded option, the epistemic policy Alston recommends is not as rational
as any other. At least, that is what I will attempt to show.
Consider the following epistemic principles. (I have just substituted ‘ineluctable’
for ‘socially established’ and ‘eluctable’ for ‘non-socially established’ in (EP9) and
(EP10).
(EP1 1): It is rationalm for an agent to regard as epistemically justified a DP
iff that DP is ( 1 ) ineluctable, substantially internally consistent, and coheres
sufficiently with other ineluctable DPs; or (2) an eluctable practice that has
been shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging in practices in
which it is, in virtue of satisfying (1), already rationalmors for her to engage.
(EP12): It is rational,, for an agent to regard a given DP as epistemically
justified iff that DP is (1) ineluctable, substantially internally consistent,
coheres sufficiently with other ineluctable DPs, and enjoys significant
self-support; or (2) an eluctable practice that has been shown to be reliable
by premises formed by engaging in practices in which it is, in virtue of
satisfying ( 1 ), already rational,, for her to engage.
Three brief notes about (EP1 1) and (EP12).
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First, a note about ineluctability. I assume that actual, living, breathing human
beings cannot but engage in the practices constitutive of the standard package. All human
beings have dispositions to enter into and engage in their memory, introspective,
perceptual, and inferential practices. Because part of our natural endowment, our
dispositions to engage in practices cannot be modified, adjusted, altered (barring an
unexpected and improbable scientific discovery, supernatural intervention, or visitations
from extraterrestrials!).
This does not preclude the possibility that different agents in different natural and
social environments will develop different bfds even though they engage in the same
doxastic practice. Although we cannot but engage in SP, that we tend to form beliefs
about trees whenever we have a tree-like sensory input depends upon whether or not there
are any trees in our environment. Moreover, given that we have formed this tendency, we
may develop the capacity to discriminate more or less finely amongst different types of
trees. But not at all to form beliefs about the social and natural worlds by sense
perception is not possible for actual human beings.
Second, a note on overriders of the presumptive innocence to be imputed,
according to (EP1 1) and (EP12), to ineluctable doxastic practices. Given that actual
human beings cannot but employ the standard package of SP, introspection, memory and
inference when forming beliefs, an agent can hardly be irrational for engaging in those
practices. This is, of course, entirely consistent with the claim that she might be
epistemically defective for so doing. It is certainly possible that an agent is
constitutionally compelled to engage in SP, for example, and yet for SP to be massively
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inconsistent with introspection, memory and inference. Were this the case, though she
could hardly be regarded as practically irrational were to she engage in SP, so engaging is
not conducive to her achieving her epistemic aim. Though weakly rational in engaging in
SP, she is not moderately rational; the weak rationality of engaging in SP would be
overridden by its massive inconsistency with more well-established practices. Hence, she
would not be moderately rational for engaging in even ineluctable practices.
Third, a note about eluctable practices. At the heart of Alston’s doxastic practice
approach to epistemology is the attempt to provide non-question-begging grounds for
requiring of some practices that they enjoy non-circular justification without laying down
that requirement for all practices. The relevant difference between the former and the
latter is practical: the former practices lack social entrenchment, the latter enjoy it. In the
alternative approach encapsulated in (EP1 1) and (EP12), I have kept with precedent and
provided practical grounds for distinguishing between presumptively innocent and
presumptively guilty practices. Ineluctable practices are presumptively innocent; thus, SP,
memory, and the rest of the standard package are presumptively innocent. According to
(EP1 1) and (EP12), under which conditions would a rational agent be practically rational
for engaging in eluctable practices like, say, CMP, crystal ball reading, and astrology?
Presumably under conditions parallel to those Alston lays down for Cedric’s idiosyncratic
practice of reading sun-dried tomatoes to determine the future of the stock market, viz.,
that his practice be shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging in ineluctable
doxastic practices.
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Note the similarities between (EP9) and (EP1 1) and between (EP10) and (EP12).
Each presupposes that there is no non-circular justification of doxastic practices (whether
crystal ball reading or SP). In light of that, each provide practical grounds for taking a
subset of the available practices as reliable (SP but not crystal ball reading). Each further
requires that all practices not in that subset (crystal ball reading) be shown to be reliable
from premises formed by engaging in those in that subset (SP).
In spite of these similarities, Alston's criteria allow him to conclude that it is
moderately rational for an agent to engage in practices other than the standard package.
My criteria are not as permissive: it is moderately rational for an agent to engage in her
mnemonic, introspective, inferential, and sense perceptual doxastic practices (or whatever
practices turn out to be ineluctable) so long as those practices are free of massive internal
and external inconsistency. Although Alston sometimes appears to claim that there
simply isn't any other alternative to the one for which he plumps, clearly, all he needs to
argue for is that there are “no alternatives that commend themselves to rational reflection
as superior” to his candidate.’
0 But it is not. Why?
Because we are engaged in an epistemic discourse, we want to allow as few
practices as is possible exemption from being shown to be reliable. And that means that
we should be as restrictive as is possible in delimiting those practices we take it to be
rational for an agent to engage in without proof ot reliability. Because we are attempting
to determine what the rational course of action is given our epistemic predicament, and
30
.
Perceiving God, p. 168.
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given the overriding goal to believe the true and not the false, we should be as miserly as
possible in letting doxastic practices in the door without a pass.
Perhaps the best way to put this point is the following: by nature, we are stuck
engaging in certain doxastic practices; we cannot do otherwise. Hence, we cannot but
regard those practices as reliable, even though we cannot show them to be reliable. We
are going to have to use them to form beliefs whether we like it or not. But there are
plenty of other practices of forming beliefs in which we can refrain from engaging; we
should not regard them as reliable until provided with reason to do so. How should we go
about showing that eluctable practices are reliable? By showing their reliability from
premises formed by engaging in ineluctable practices. We are committed to believing
that imposing this restriction will increase the chances that we will form true beliefs -
once again, even though we lack truth-conducive reason for believing that the premises
we must use to show that eluctable practices are reliable are themselves reliably formed.
The moral of the story? Different practices have different non-epistemic
properties. A difference of non-epistemic property may warrant drawing a different
conclusion as to which course of action it is practically rational for an agent to pursue. If
one set of practices has the property of being difficult not to engage in, and another has
the property of being impossible not to engage in, an agent will have at her disposal two
different arguments which purport to show that she is rationally permitted to engage in
two different sets of practices. Hence, there are as many practical arguments in support of
the rationality of engaging in doxastic practices as practices possess interestingly different
non-epistemic properties. Which argument we accept ought to be determined by
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epistemic reasons, if those are sufficient to decide the issue. And the relevant epistemic
reason is that we ought to exempt as few doxastic practices from being shown to be
reliable as is possible. The multitude of practical arguments that we saw in the previous
subsection are available in support of the practical rationality of a given course of action
may be reduced to only one: regarding only ineluctable practices as presumptively
reliable is the most rational course of action available to us given the ubiquity of
epistemic circularity.
4.4.3 Is Privileging Ineluctable Practices Arbitrary?
Has Alston already discredited the alternative approach I have sketched? He cites
Thomas Reid's critique of Hume and Descartes approvingly . 31 Both Hume and Descartes
privileged introspection and deduction by requiring that all other practices be shown to be
reliable by premises formed by engaging in those practices. Reid argues that their
strategy suffers from an "undue partiality": the lack of epistemically relevant differences
between the various practices renders arbitrary any attempt to privilege one or some of
those practices.
' 2
In like manner, perhaps my attempt to privilege an agent's ineluctable
over her eluctable practices is guilty of undue partiality.
It should be clear that to claim that Reid’s undue partiality response holds against
my alternative epistemic criteria would be to confuse practical rationality with epistemic
justification. Recall the importance of distinguishing between practical rationality and
epistemic justification. At the current level of argument, we have eschewed epistemic
31
.
Perceiving God, pp. 150-51; and “Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 119.
32
. Perceiving God, p. 151.
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considerations (because they fail us) in order to determine in which practices it is rational
for an agent to regard as reliable without argument. Practical considerations are therefore
relevant to determining in which practices it is practically rational for an agent to engage.
In addressing the classical foundational ist privileging of the standard package, Alston
objects to the propriety of privileging certain doxastic practices on epistemic grounds -
there are no good epistemic reasons for according presumptive innocence to memory but
not to CMP. He is correct in so objecting. But he fails to provide us with reason not to
privilege certain practices on practical grounds. In fact, privileging certain practices for
practical reasons is just what Alston's argument is all about; he just seems to overlook the
possibility of alternative practical arguments.
The alternative I have sketched in this subsection neither implies nor presupposes
that there is something epistemically wrong with the particularity ofCMP and like
practices, i.e., that engaging in such practices is not likely to produce true beliefs because
only a proper part of the population engages in them. It is true that we ought not accord
to particular the same epistemic status that we ought to accord to universal practices. But
that is because there is a contingent correlation (in the actual world) between eluctability
and particularity. Every normal human being finds engaging in her most familiar and
widely shared practices ineluctable; hence, every normal human being engages in those
practices. Not every normal human being finds engaging in CMP ineluctable; hence,
naturally, some engage and some do not engage in CMP.
Of course, it could have been, though it is not actually, the case that every human
being happened to engage in what is for actual human beings an eluctable practice.
256
According to (EP1 1) and (EP12), a universal and eluctable practice would have lower
epistemic status than an universal and ineluctable practice. The former would have to be
shown to be reliable by premises drawn from the latter. Hence, our grounds for
privileging ineluctable practices do not rest on an unjustifiable prejudice against
particularity.
4.5 The Social Establishment Criterion Undermines CMP
Suppose that Alston provides an adequate response to the argument I articulated
in the three previous subsections. Suppose, then, that adopting the social establishment
criterion is the most rational policy for an agent in Alston’s hypothetical thought
experiment. Even if that is the case, I will argue that CMP does not enjoy proper
epistemic status according to (EP9) or (EP10). There is a standing defeater of the
presumptive innocence we should accord to CMP in virtue of it social establishment.
Some doxastic practices have been socially established as long as human beings
have been able to form beliefs, viz., memory, introspection, sense-perception, reason, etc.
Other doxastic practices ‘have a history.’ CMP is one of those practices. Perhaps we
may simplistically periodize the history of the CMP into three phases: during the first
phase, there were no Christians at all and thus there was no such practice as CMP — this
is a Pre-Christian Era ; then some people learned to form beliefs by engaging in CMP
although that practice was not socially established — this is a Transitional Era\ and
shortly after that (world-historically speaking), CMP acquired social standing and thereby
social entrenchment — this is the Age ofConstantine. (Perhaps we find ourselves at the
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cusp of another stage in the history of Christianity, viz., when the Church loses the social
entrenchment it once enjoyed - this would be a post-Christian era.)
What was CMP's epistemic status during the pre-Christian and Transitional eras?
According to (EP9) and (EP10), an epistemically fastidious agent desirous of engaging in
CMP during those two phases in the history of Christianity would be epistemically out of
order were she to engage in CMP without having in hand some non-circular argument to
the conclusion that CMP is reliable. But, as we have seen, Alston believes that no such
argument was, is, or will be extant: he denies that we can show that CMP is probably
reliable on the evidence furnished to us by any subset of our non-theistic doxastic
practices. Hence, Alston seems to be committed to the claim that any agent who engaged
in CMP prior to the Age of Constantine is epistemically out of order for so doing.
This is exceedingly strange. If Alston is correct, those in the Age of Constantine
govern their beliefs in good epistemic order only ifCMP is socially established and yet
CMP can achieve social entrenchment only if some cognitive agents in the pre-Christian
and Transitional eras flaunt their epistemic obligation to the truth and engage in non-
socially established practices for which they can provide no non-circular justification.
That is, a causal condition of the possibility of the proper epistemic status of some agent's
engaging in CMP is that some other (ancestral) agents fail to discharge their obligation to
pursue the truth.
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It seems to me that this undermines whatever support its social establishment
generates tor CMP. In order to determine why, recall the function of practical
considerations in Alston's argument. That a practice is socially established has as a
consequence that it is practically rational for its members to engage in it; that it is
practically rational for an agent to engage in a given practice commits her to the claim
that that practice is reliable. None of this, of course, shows that her practice is reliable; it
only shows that she has non-truth-conducive reason to believe that it is reliable. An
implication of Alston's position is that the epistemic support a practice enjoys in virtue of
its social establishment is not a consequence of its social establishment’s being best
explained by its reliability (see 1 .4.2.3). But this is entirely consistent with the claim that
the support a practice enjoys in virtue of its social establishment may be overridden if the
best explanation of that practice entails its unreliability. Just as massive internal
inconsistency undermines whatever support its social establishment affords some
doxastic practice, so also does the fact that the social establishment of a given doxastic
practice is best explained by supposing it to be unreliable undermine whatever support its
social establishment affords that practice.
If Alston is correct that CMP enjoys no non-circular justification, any adequate
explanation of CMP's social establishment ofCMP must include the claim that it enjoys
social establishment because, at least in part, its originators flaunted their epistemic duties
as laid out in (EP9) and (EP10). To be sure, just because those prior to the Age of
Constantine failed to adhere to (EP9) and (EP10) does not entail that CMP is unreliable —
it just means that they failed to provide non-circular justification for their idiosyncratic
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practice. But it should count against the positive epistemic status ofCMP that the best
explanation ofCMP s social establishment must incorporate the claim that it enjoys
social establishment only because those in the phases prior to the Age of Constantine
failed to adhere to the best available epistemic criteria. That agents in the Age of
Constantine should be rationalmors only because their ancestors' engagement in CMP
lacked rationality
mors overrides the prima facie reliability we accord to CMP.
It may seem strange that events of which an agent is entirely unaware could affect
the epistemic status ot her beliefs. Thus, it will be highly counter-intuitive to those with
internalist predilections that events which occurred (or failed to occur) in the distant past
could undermine the positive epistemic status of the beliefs of those who may very well
be uninformed of those events. The simple believer may never have thought about the
history of her practice, or mistakenly believe that it has always enjoyed social
entrenchment; and for her, according to the internalist, the fact that her ancestor’s
abdication from pursuit of the central epistemic aim was causally necessary for the
entrenchment of her doxastic practice matters not a whit to the epistemic status of her
participation.
But this is an internal critique of Alston’s defense of CMP; what matters is what
Alston takes epistemic justification to be and he has no such internalist qualms.
According to Alston, facts about which agents have no ken can influence the epistemic
status of her beliefs. If an agent forms beliefs about God’s nature and purposes on the
basis of her reading of some sacred text, and if that text is in fact a fabrication, then she
forms her beliefs unreliably. And, even if she lacks any reason at all to believe that what
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she takes to be a sacred text is a fabrication, she lacks epistemic justification for so
forming her beliets. She may be epistemically blameless in forming beliefs about God's
nature and purposes on the basis of her reading of he fabricated sacred text, but she is not
epistemically justified in so doing (see 1.1.1).
Similarly, if the best explanation ot the genesis ofCMP incorporates the claim
that its founding members engaged in a non-socially-established practice without having
some non-circular justification ot its reliability, and if that explanation constitutes an
overrider to the moderate rationality of engaging in CMP, then an agent who engages in
CMP is not moderately rational tor engaging in CMP— regardless of her ignorance of
CMP’s dubious history.
We may generalize this point to include all doxastic practices which both (1) were
at some point in their history not socially entrenched and (2) are not amenable of non-
circular support. According to (EP9), an agent is moderately rational for regarding a
given non-socially entrenched practice as reliable only if she can provide non-circular
justification for that practice. So long as Alston accepts the general claim that there is no
reason to expect that a given doxastic practice can be shown to be reliable on the
evidence generated by other practices, then he seems to be committed to the claim that
those practices which have not always enjoyed social entrenchment are socially
entrenched, at least in part, as a consequence of their originating agent’s failure to adhere
to (EP9). The best explanation of their entrenchment cannot but, therefore, make
reference to their disreputable origins. Thus, every agent who engages in a doxastic
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practice which has not always been socially entrenched has a standing defeater to the
moderate rationality of regarding that practice as reliable.
4.6 Alston’s Epistemic Antinomianism
I have presented the following objections to Alston’s appeal to social
establishment. First, that Alston’s appeal to social establishment, even if otherwise
unobjectionable, fails to provide that neutral criterion he needs in order to mount an
external rationale for CMP and to resolve the Great Pumpkin Problem (4.2). Second, that
the appeal to social establishment succeeds only if Alston can articulate and justify goals
in light of which adopting the social entrenchment criterion counts as practically rational,
that he has not done so, and that he is unlikely to do so (4.3). Third, that, even if he
succeeds in providing that justification, we would nevertheless have good epistemic
reason to adopt an alternative proposal, viz., that only ineluctable practices should be
accorded presumptive innocence (4.4). Fourth, even if Alston can defend the claim that
adopting the social establishment criterion is the most rational course of action even in an
epistemic discourse, CMP does not enjoy positive epistemic status according to that
criterion (4.5).
Suppose that Alston has a ready and compelling response to each of these
objections. I have one last trick up my sleeve. I will argue that a fundamental
incoherence vitiates Alston’s defense of the rationality of religious belief: Alston's
defense of the autonomy of distinct practices undermines his attempt to vindicate
generally applicable restrictions on the practices rational agents regard as presumptively
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innocent. Alston's antinomian defense of the autonomy of distinct DPs undermines his
nomian appeal to social entrenchment.
4.6.1 Nomians and Antinomians
Alston s argument in support of CMP’s moderate rationality proceeds in two
distinct stages (related in chapters one and two respectively). In the first stage, Alston
attempts to lay down the epistemic law about doxastic practices, a law encapsulated in
(EP9) and (EP10). (EP9) and (EP10) are doubly universal: they provide us with criteria
for evaluating the epistemic status of any and every doxastic practice with which we
might come into contact and they recommend themselves to us as a consequence of
rational reflection on the human cognitive situation and therefore to any and every agent
who is sufficiently reflective about her cognitive limitations. I call Alston’s intention to
articulate universally acceptable and applicable epistemic principles— epistemic laws—
his nomian project.
In the second stage, Alston attempts to insure that the law is fairly and
evenhandedly applied. When we evaluate a given doxastic practice, we should make
allowances for its distinctive features; our application of universal epistemic principles
does not warrant a homogenization of the practices available to us. Hence, Alston
jealously guards the autonomy of CMP. In so doing, he employs a rationale (which I
articulated in chapter three) for vindicating the autonomy of any practice whatever. I call
Alston's concern for and attempt to vindicate the autonomy of distinctive doxastic
practices his antinomian project.
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Both projects serve Alston's overriding goal of defending CMP’s positive
epistemic status. Alston s nomian project makes possible an external rationale for CMP.
provides him with a response to the Great Pumpkin Problem, and, most importantly,
allows him to claim that CMP is innocent until proven guilty. Having secured its
presumptive innocence, Alston has to respond to accusations of guilt. And to respond to
those accusations, Alston avails himself of considerations of autonomy. Both projects
work well in concert. The first absolves Alston of the need to show CMP is reliable, the
second provides him with the materials to respond to claims that CMP is unreliable.
Although in his hands the appeal to autonomy is tightly controlled, it has
implications for epistemic discourse disturbingly similar to those antinomianism has for
moral discourse. What are those implications for moral discourse? Antinomianism, a
heresy which recurs intermittently in the history of Christianity, is the doctrine that the
convert is no longer obliged to adhere to otherwise universally binding moral norms (like
those constitutive of the Decalogue). Whether because she believes she cannot sin, or
that God will forgive her no matter what she does, the antinomian believes that she need
not rely on external moral norms in order to determine how to act. As a consequence,
appealing to moral considerations to dissuade the antinomian from pursuing some course
of action she is intent on pursuing is of no avail. Thus, a “Free Spirit” reciting her
catechism to her spiritual director: “When a man has truly reached the great and high
knowledge he is no longer bound to observe any law or command, for he has become one
with God. God created all things to serve such a person, and all that God ever created is
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the property of such a man.”J -’ Along the same line of thought, “it would be better that the
whole world should be destroyed and perish than that a ‘free man’ should refrain from
one act to which his nature moves him. '4 The antinomian is immune from external
critique, those actions she is inclined to perform are in fact permissible; she is a law unto
herself.
Why does Alston’s appeal to autonomy have antinomian implications for
epistemic discourse? If the argument I presented in support of the Ontological Principle
is sound, there are no substantive epistemic norms which are universal in the senses in
which (EP9) and (EP10) are universal. 35 For any such norm N, we may conjure up some
possible doxastic practice D to which N is inapposite, that is, such that N would render D
epistemically improper even if it is as reliable as you like. Just be creative. (I provide a
couple of examples shortly.) Because we may conjure up such counter-examples to any
substantive epistemic norm, then the project of articulating and defending universally
applicable norms is doomed to failure. Every substantive epistemic norm will have only
limited application, viz., application to only those practices the nature and characteristics
of the subject matter of which do not render those norms epistemically indefensible. But
that substantive epistemic norms are of limited applicability undermines attempts like
Alston's to provide criteria universal criteria like (EP9) and (EP10). More precisely, it
33
. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical
Anarchists of the Middle Ages, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 179.
34
. Ibid., p. 178.
35
. The qualification ‘substantive’ is important. In indicate what it means shortly.
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undermines the constraints on presumptive innocence built into (EP9) and (EP10), viz.,
the appeal to social establishment.
4.6.2 Instrumental Imperialism
In chapter two, I noted various violations of CMP’s autonomy: for example, CMP
is supposed to be unreliable because it does not generate publicly checkable predictions
even though the nature of the object of M-beliefs does not act predictably. This objection
counts as epistemically imperialist because it would undermine the claim that CMP is
epistemically adequate even if it were entirely reliable. But imperialism, in addition to
its epistemic varieties, assumes at least one other, instrumental, guise. Whereas Alston
deftly detects instances of the former, he fails to recognize that his own position is
vitiated by an instance of the latter. Just because (EP9) and (EP10) are guilty of
instrumental imperialism, that is, just because they violate the autonomy of certain
doxastic practices, I claim that Alston's antinomian impulse conflicts with his nomian
impulse.
In order to comer our quarry, consider the alternative epistemic policy I sketched
in 4.4. According to (EP1 1), a rational agent accords presumptive innocence only to
ineluctable practices and requires of all others that they be shown to be reliable. CMP is
neither ineluctable nor amenable of non-circular justification. Hence, CMP is left out in
the epistemic cold. But according to the understanding of the way God interacts with
humanity internal to CMP, whether or not an agent engages in CMP, or, more generally,
believes in God, is a matter of how she exercises her ‘free will.’ But if belief in God is
supposed to result in part from the free employment of an agent’s cognitive capacities.
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then belief in God cannot be ineluctable. According to the understanding of God’s way
of interacting with humanity internal to CMP, CMP must be eluctable. Now, if we agree
with Alston that CMP, like SP, is not amenable of non-circular proof, then adopting
(EP1 1) is tantamount to claiming that we should regard CMP as unreliable regardless of
whether or not it is reliable. And for that there is no epistemic justification. Hence, there
can be no good epistemic justification for an agent who engages in CMP to adopt (EP1 1 ).
What this shows is that practical requirements of the sort to which Alston appeals
in formulating his general epistemic position can violate the autonomy of a doxastic
practice just as surely as can epistemic requirements. Just as requiring that M-beliefs be
intersubjectively evaluable violates its autonomy, so also does requiring that CMP be
ineluctable in order to enjoy presumptive innocence violate its autonomy: even if
everything is going just as it should, even ifCMP is an infallibly reliable source of
information about God, it cannot be ineluctable. Indeed, if it is infallible, it must be
eluctable.
If (EP 1 1 ) and (EP 1 2) violate CMP's autonomy in the sense that CMP could be
perfectly reliable and yet would violate both of those principles, what about (EP9) and
(EP 1 0)? Do they violate CMP s autonomy? Of course not; there is no reason internal to
CMP which supports the claim that it is impossible for CMP to enjoy social
establishment. But its not hard to conjure up hypothetical examples of practices the
autonomy of which is violated by (EP9) and (EP10). And because Alston's epistemic
principles aspire to universality, the mere possibility of a counter-example undermines
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the claim that (EP9) and (EP10) are universally applicable, that is, that they are properly
employed to evaluate any and every doxastic practice.
Consider what course of action Alston would enjoin an agent - call him
Cromwell - to pursue were he to claim that he has recently been directly presented with a
being identical in all respects to God, save that that being is evil. Call that being Egod.
Suppose that as a consequence of being aware of that being, Cromwell has learned that
Egod presents herself only to isolated individuals — those of a particularly vile and
vicious character - and does so only intermittently, as a consequence of her indifference
to human affairs. An isolated subject (say, one every several hundred years) who forms
beliefs about Egod would certainly not be engaging in a socially established DP, and
would therefore, by (EP9), have to show that her newly acquired practice of forming
beliefs — call it EMP — is reliable. That being unlikely, Alston seems to make short work
of Cromwell (as with Cedric and Charlie Brown before Cromwell).
But, of course, Cromwell will respond by availing himself of the strategy Alston
articulates in defense of CMP. Given what Cromwell has learned about the very nature
of Egod, the social establishment of a practice of forming beliefs about Egod is
impossible - even though EMP may yet be highly reliable. Egod is an “absolutely
elusive" being, one who presents herself to our cognitive faculties only when she wishes
to do so -- and Egod seldom wishes to contact us. 36 Alston, in virtue of attempting to
impose (EP9) on Cromwell, is guilty of imperialism, viz., instrumental imperialism. Just
as Alston denies that beliefs formed by engaging in CMP need be intersubjectively
6
. David Conway, “Mavrodes, Martin, and the Verification of Religious Experience,” p. 164.
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evaluable in virtue of the nature of the object about which those who engage in CMP
form beliefs, so also EMP need not be socially established in virtue of the nature of the
object about which those who engage in EMP form beliefs. In the first case, epistemic
restrictions are inappropriately imposed on CMP; in the second case, instrumental
restrictions are inappropriately imposed on EMP.
Things only seem to get worse from here. For suppose that Cromwell learns that
the only individuals to whom Egod deigns to present herself are agents who are alike her
in being, not just evil, but also indifferent. Hence, suppose that Egod reveals herself to
only those agents who care not a whit that she does so. What an agent learns by engaging
in EMP explains why that practice can not be psychologically established and
nevertheless might be highly reliable. Were this the case, it would again be imperialistic
to require of an agent that she have a going concern of any sort whatsoever in order to be
presumptively innocent in regarding that practice as reliable
.
37
37 We don't have to make things up, however. Consider the likely response of believers in faeries
to Alston’s (EP9) and (EP10). Keith Thomas writes, “for one striking aspect of faerie-beliefs was
their self-confirming character. The man who believed in faeries could, like the astrologer or the
magician, accept every setback and disappointment without losing his faith. He knew that he
could never count on seeing the faeries himself, for the little people were notoriously jealous of
their privacy and would never appear to those who were so curious as to go looking for them.
Mrs. Parish told Wharton that the faeries had a way of beckoning to any person they wanted to talk
to which was ‘so quick... that none but those for whom it was intended could see it.’ Nor would
they ever reappear to those who betrayed their secrets. [That would render social establishment
quite difficult!] Joan Tyrry said in 1555 that she would never again see the faeries after having
been made to confess her dealings with them before an ecclesiastical court. Everyone knew that a
regular supply of faerie gold would dry up immediately its recipient bragged of it to anyone else.
It was this elusiveness which made the fairies such admirable vehicles for the confidence trickster.
Alice West, for example, impressed upon one of her intended victims that ‘there was nothing so
necessary as secrecy, for if it were revealed to any, save them three whom it did essentially
concern, they should hazard not only their good fortune, but incur the danger of the fairies, and so
consequently lie open to great mishaps and fearful disasters.’ ... There was an impenetrability
about fairy beliefs which protected them from easy exposure. As Sir John Falstaff said: ‘they are
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What conclusion should we draw from the case of Cromwell and Egod? That
Alston's antinomian project undermines his nomian project. The strategy he employs to
vindicate the autonomy ofCMP may be employed to vindicate the autonomy of non-
socially established practices and thus the falsity of (EP9) and (EP10). Alston can't have
it both ways; he can't adhere to the rationale for the Ontological Principle I articulated in
the third chapter, and thus to his defense ofCMP as articulated in the second chapter,
without jettisoning his attempt to justify the universally applicable epistemic principles I
formulated in the first chapter. And with a little creative imagining, we can conjure up
examples of doxastic practices the autonomy of which is violated by any substantive
epistemic norm you please.
4.6.3 Formal vs. Substantive Criteria
In the third chapter, after having articulated a rationale for the Ontological
Principle and thus for the legitimate autonomy of relevantly different doxastic practices, I
spent some time and energy defending Alston from the claim that his defense of the
autonomy ot CMP is just a protective strategy designed to undermine the possibility of
external critique. I noted that, in addition to the consistency criteria (external and
internal) Alston incorporated into (EP9) and (EP 1 0), there are other grounds for critique,
viz., comparison criticism, immanent critique, and misuse of appeals to autonomy. Does
the argument I have been pursuing in this section work against the grain of that earlier
discussion? Is there a tension or inconsistency between my earlier attempt to defend
fairies; he that speaks to them shall die.”’ Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 614.
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Alston from the claim that his defense ofCMP is too permissive and the argument in this
subsection that his antinomian project undermines his nomian project?
After all, the thesis for which I have been arguing is completely general.
Although I have had my sights on Alston’s appeal to social establishment, and have
shown that laying down the restriction that we should accord presumptive innocence only
to socially established practices violates the autonomy of EMP, the generality of my
argument requires that I identify its implications for other epistemic norms. And this
raises a disturbing question. In my eagerness to discredit Alston’s appeal to social
establishment, have I taken out any innocent bystanders? Does my claim that Alston’s
appeal to autonomy undermines the appeal to social establishment commit me to claiming
that it also undermines the universality of less dubious epistemic norms?
To take the most extreme example, what about the various overriders of
presumptive innocence Alston builds into his epistemic principles? Could the antinomian
project be of use in defending the positive epistemic status of a practice which generates a
set of massively inconsistent beliefs? Its not as if this point of view lacks advocates.
After all, haven't some Christians claimed that the doctrine of the Incarnation is logically
inconsistent? And didn't Luther (proudly and with disdain) dismiss the pretensions of
“that whore. Reason" in claiming that human wills are so infected with sin that they
cannot freely choose to obey God and yet that they are capable freely of choosing to not
to obey God? (If that’s not a contradiction, it comes pretty close.) Doesn't Tertullian
express the sentiment motivating such dismissals of logical consistency by admonishing
us to believe Christian creeds just because they are absurd? And can't Luther and
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Tertullian defend the internal inconsistency of their doctrinal systems by appeal to the
inscrutability of God or the mysteriousness of the Incarnation? And if it is possible that
contradictory beliefs be conjointly true, are we not over and done with the epistemic
evaluation of an agent's beliefs? After all, if it is epistemically defensible to assent to
contradictions, then what isn’t epistemically defensible?
In order to broach this problem, I need to distinguish, albeit crudely, between
formal and substantive norms. Epistemic norms are more or less substantive, more or
less formal. A formal norm expresses a requirement that beliefs formed in a given
doxastic practice enjoy a certain structure, whatever their content; thus the norm that a
doxastic practice should not generate massively inconsistent beliefs, that is, that a
doxastic practice should not generate beliefs of the structure p and ~p, is a formal norm.
That our beliefs should be free, not just of formal inconsistency, but also of probabilistic
inconsistency is also a norm of a formal nature; thus, that we should govern our belief-
forming activity in light of Bayes’ Theorem falls on the formal end of the continuum.
Substantive norm is a wastebasket category. I define it negatively: a substantive norm is
any epistemic norm which requires of a doxastic practice some characteristic or property
of a non-formal nature. Thus, to require of a given doxastic practice that the beliefs
formed therein be publically checkable, that every agent be disposed to engage in that
practice, that it provide us with accurate predictions of future events, that it is socially
established, that it is ineluctable, or that beliefs formed therein be incorrigible, infallible,
indubitable, are substantive norms.
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It seems to me very plausible that every doxastic practice, no matter its subject
matter, should generate beliefs which, on the whole, conform to formal norms like that
proscribing adherence to formally inconsistent beliefs. Thus, whatever the content of the
beliefs formed in a given doxastic practice, whether about God's nature, one’s own
mental states, the mental states of others, or physical objects, those beliefs should not
have the structure p and not p. Formal norms are doubly universal: they are acceptable to
any and every rational agent and they are applicable to the beliefs generated by any and
every doxastic practice. This is not the case with substantive norms: the more substantive
a norm, the less universally applicable and the less likely to be compelling to every agent.
For example, the requirement that beliefs should be publically checkable is appropriately
required of some practices not others. And appeal to autonomy will be crucially
important in determining whether or not a given substantive norm is appropriately
employed to evaluate a given doxastic practice. Thus, the more formal a norm, the less
relevant the autonomy of a given practice; the more substantive a norm, the more relevant
the autonomy of a given practice. I am inclined, therefore, to deny that formal norms are
of limited applicability. The autonomy of a given doxastic practice is relevant only to the
applicability of substantive epistemic norms.
Here, then, is my considered opinion. Formal epistemic norms like the Law of
Non-Contradiction and Bayes’ Theorem are universally applicable and acceptable: they
are appropriately employed to evaluate any and every doxastic practice and they should
be accepted by any rational agent. But formal norms are insufficient to settle most
doxastic disputes. Hence, we cannot but supplement them with more substantive criteria.
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Those substantive criteria will be of limited application, e.g., sense-perceptual beliefs
should admit of discontinuation via failed prediction whereas introspective and M-beliefs
need not, and they will be of limited acceptability, e.g., theists may regard consistency
with sacred texts to be the sine qua non of any M-belief, non-theists will regard such
consistency to be of no relevance to the epistemic status of a given belief. Whether or not
a given substantive criticism is legitimate is a much more difficult affair than determining
whether or not a given formal criticism is legitimate, given that evaluation of the former
and not the latter requires that we determine whether or not the criticism in question
violates the autonomy of the practice criticized. And at the heart of determining whether
or not a given substantive norm violates the autonomy of a given practice will be whether
or not applying it to a given practice violates the Ontological Principle.
The rationale for the Ontological Principle, then, does undermine a mechanical
application of substantive epistemic norms to any practice whatever, without regard for
the peculiarities of its subject matter. In order to level an effective critique of a given
doxastic practice, we need to allow for the possibility that the criteria in light of which we
evaluate a given practice may be inapplicable: according to the understanding of the
subject matter internal to that practice, agents are forming their beliefs exactly as they
should even though in so forming they violate some privileged criterion we are
accustomed to employ to evaluate other practices. In order to level an effective critique
of a given practice, we need to engage in ‘hermeneutics’ in order to arrive at an
understanding of how things ought to go in light of the self-understanding of the object of
our critique. Perhaps that understanding will render ineffective objections which are
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appropriately leveled at other practices. But once these constraints have been identified,
once we identify the kinds of criticisms a given practice renders superfluous and those it
does not, we may initiate the process of evaluation. And in evaluating a doxastic
practice, we may avail ourselves of any and all ot the kinds of criticisms Alston and I
have articulated. Given the limited applicability ot epistemic norms, having access to
more criteria tor evaluation is better than having access to less.
4.6.4 Alston’s Choice
Alston’s two stage argument in defense of CMP is internally unstable. The
antinomian strategy prominent in the second stage undermines the nomian strategy
prominent in the tirst. He therefore faces a dilemma. Either he represses his nomian
impulse or he represses the antinomian impulse. If the former, the consequences are
substantial. He cannot reasonably claim to have provided an external rationale for CMP
and he still faces the Great Pumpkin Problem. Indeed, the Great Pumpkin Problem
intensifies: not only does he have no reason to deny Charlie Brown’s belief in the Great
Pumpkin presumptive innocence, but Charlie Brown and the rest of the Great Pumpkin’s
followers may avail themselves of Alston’s strategy for defending the autonomy of their
practice. The prospects for a successful external critique of fanatical or idiosyncratic
doxastic practices are dim. And, if that is the case, Alston joins Plantinga at the margins
of the epistemic community.
If the latter, Alston can attempt to articulate perhaps more adequate epistemic
principles. But then his defense of CMP’s autonomy, and thus his defense of CMP, needs
to be completely reworked and who knows whether it will emerge unscathed from its
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reworking. If M-beliefs are held to the same standards to which sense-perceptual beliefs
are held, I doubt it.
Which option should Alston adopt? I believe that he should opt for the latter. My
reasons tor this are fairly simple. We cannot but assume that at least some of the doxastic
practices in the standard package are reliable. In order to think at all, we must impute
presumptive innocence to memory, inference, sense-perception, and introspection, or to
some subset thereof. But the practices constitutive of the standard package display
considerable diversity. Memory differs in important aspects from sense-perception, both
from introspection, and all three from inference. But if such diversity inhabits the core of
our cognitive endowment, if we tolerate considerable autonomy within the standard
package, we have no justification for not tolerating autonomy outside it as well. We
should, therefore, place no restrictions at all on the kinds of practices to which an agent
should impute presumptive innocence. Attempting to sift the epistemic wheat from the
chaff by wielding principles like (EP9), (EP10), (EP1 1), or (EP12) will invariably violate
the autonomy of some practice or other. The universal substantive claims internal to
them, viz., the appeal to social entrenchment and ineluctability, are of doubtful epistemic
value.
4.7 The Great Pumpkin Problem Again
I claimed earlier that neither Plantinga nor Alston's attempts to resolve the Great
Pumpkin problem have met with general acceptance and suggested that the reason why
their attempts have failed is because they seem to undermine the possibility of negotiating
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doxastic disputes without recourse to force. Both succeed in vindicating the rationality of
religious belief by denying (Plantinga explicitly and Alston by implication) that we have
access to neutral criteria in light of which we may rationally resolve our doxastic
disputes. And this violates the moral impulse at the heart of epistemology. In order
successfully to defend Alston, that is, to address the concerns which I believe motivate
rejection of his version of Reformed Epistemology, I would have to do so on normative
grounds. I will leave that task for another venue. But not before providing something of
a coming attraction.
An opposition between religious belief and scientific belief seems to me to
pervade, not only popular culture, but also the more rarified airs of the philosophy of
religion. Much of the recent work in the philosophy of religion is, crudely, divisible into
two camps, both of which presuppose some important distinction between ‘religion’ and
‘science.’
First, many simply assume that ‘science’ is, though fallible, our privileged means
of accessing reality. Truth claims about objective reality, if made, must enjoy the
imprimatur of the scientific community. The rational, critical process by which the
scientist pursues the truth contrasts sharply with the uncritical, authority-ridden,
credulous commitments underlying religious faith. This prejudice results in either of two
outcomes, viz., that religious convictions are dismissed as irremediably irrational, or that
the way religious adherents form beliefs is, after all, just like the way scientists form
beliefs. The first outcome is classically exemplified in the positivist critique of religion;
the latter in the less widely known evidentialist arguments in support of central religious
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doctrines like the resurrection of Jesus Christ. (I will ignore the latter option for the
duration.)
The second camp into which recent philosophy of religion has congregated
denudes religious creeds of their truth-claims altogether. Faced with the positivist
critique, members of this ' Wittgensteinian camp' like D. Z. Philips resolve religion into a
way of hie that, somehow or other, makes and presupposes no truth claims about reality.
Religion is a way of life or an expression of emotion or something like that. Because
religious doxastic practices do not make truth claims, well, then members of such
practices may form beliefs in as distinctive and eccentric a way as they like.
Both camps presuppose that if religious beliefs make truth claims about an
independently existing reality, then they must be evaluated in light of the epistemic
criteria we employ in our sense-perceptual and scientific doxastic practices. Both options
leave a great deal to be desired. The positivist critique is clearly unacceptable to those
with religious convictions and the Wittgensteinian revision loses too much in the
transmutation— religious people act on their convictions in part because they believe
them to be true and would not so act were they to believe their convictions false . 38 (And
,8
. It seems to me that the ‘interpretation of religion’ philosophers like D. Z. Philips articulate
should be regarded more as a program for reforming religion than as a description of the actual
forms of life to which religious agents are committed. And as a program for reforming religion 1
find it entirely without merit. To denude religious forms of life of reference to reality, to excise
from CMP truth claims about God and God’s interaction with creation, would undermine the
potential for critique (both of an agent’s individual life and of society) internal to religious ways of
life. Why would an agent risk her own welfare in the attempt to undermine some unjust social
practice because she believes that God hates injustice if she was not thereby committed to claiming
that God exists independently of our conception of God and has opinions about what's right and
wrong which don’t depend for their existence or legitimacy on what we take God to believe about
those matters? (I must confess, I have a difficult time figuring out what Phillips means by a lot of
the more radical ‘anti-metaphysical’ statements he makes. If I’ve misread him, I apologize in
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it seems quite a short step from the claim that religious beliefs are false to the claim that
they are neither true nor false.)
Perhaps as a consequence of the manifest inadequacy of the available options.
Reformed Epistemology has emerged as a third alternative to positivism and
sprachspielism. Alston neither cedes to science the status of sole arbiter of truth nor does
he denude religious creeds of their truth claims. Religious doxastic practices afford their
members access to the truth in a way which is different from, but complementary to, that
which science affords. To those for whom religious belief is both important and yet not
merely expressive, the Reformed alternative is likely to be more attractive than both the
positivist and the Wittgensteinian.
Articulating some such alternative is important, not just for members of religious
traditions, but also for those who engage in no religion at all. Why?
It seems to me, quite frankly, that religious and moral doxastic practices are
subject to much the same criticisms so long as the criteria in light of which we evaluate
them are lifted from 'modem science.’ Neither moral nor religious beliefs fare very well
when evaluated in light of criteria properly employed to evaluate scientific beliefs.
(Neither religious nor moral claims, for example, are amenable of intersubjective
evaluation; both admit of considerable diversity; both may be explained by proximate
natural causes, etc.) Given that moral belief-formation differs in important respects from
scientific belief-formation, we have, roughly, the same three options open to us that we
have open to religious belief. First, we may admit that moral claims are truth claims but
advance.)
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that, because they are formed and evaluated differently very differently from the way we
form and evaluate scientific beliefs, those who adhere to them are irremediably irrational,
or at least seriously in error. Second, we may deny that moral claims enjoy cognitive
status and assert that they are merely expressive (or the like). Third, we may admit that
moral claims are putatively true, that they are differently formed and evaluated than
scientific beliefs, but that, where different, they are properly different.
The third option, by my lights, is hands down the most preferable. Moral
convictions, if they are worth acting upon, are worth acting upon only if true. They only
have the power to motivate us to sacrifice our own well-being for the good of others if
they are more than expressions of emotion, or constitutive of a form of life into which we
have been socialized, or the like.
It this is correct, then we can hardly sustain our moral qualms about the
antinomian implications of Alston s version of Reformed Epistemology, and more
particularly, his defense of the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices. If our reason for
rejecting the Reformed approach is that it undermines the possibility of making good on
our conviction that disputes amongst people of good will should be resolved without
recourse to force, that is, if our real concern is a moral one, then that conviction itself
should be more than a mere preference, an irrational urge, or a private conviction. But it
is more than an irrational urge only if moral convictions are autonomous in some respect
— for we certainly don’t form and evaluate moral beliefs like we form and evaluate
scientific beliefs. But religious and moral doxastic practices are similar in many of the
respects in which both differ from scientific beliefs. The very rationale which enables us
280
to vindicate the cognitive status ot moral claims in general undermines our particular
conviction that we should resolve disputes among people of good will without recourse to
force. Hence, far from undermining our deepest moral convictions, Alston's defense of
autonomy is a condition of the possibility of vindicating them.
Of course, I am not claiming that vindicating the rationality of the way we form
and justify moral beliefs depends upon whether or not we can vindicate the rationality of
religious belief. I am not, that is, defending a version of Karamozov’s Theorem, viz., that
if God is dead anything is permissible . 39 I am claiming that a failure to appreciate the
autonomy of distinct doxastic practices, especially those doxastic practices which are
importantly different from SP and modem science, threatens the rationality not only of
the ways we form beliefs about God but also the way we form beliefs about what’s right
and wrong, just and unjust. A successful case for the autonomy of the former, then,
cannot but aid the case for the latter as well . 40
39
. Although he inhabits a very different philosophical world than Alston, 1 believe that Jurgen
Habermas has attempted to do for matters ofjustice what Alston has attempted to do for mystical
experience. Habermas has argued that (1) engaging in moral critique requires that we vindicate
the rationality of the way we form moral beliefs, (2) moral beliefs are formed rationally when they
conform to a suitable version of the principle of universalization, (3) and that conformity to the
principle of universalization constitutes the uniqueness of moral belief-formation. And Habermas
is anything but a theist.
40
. I have not forgotten the point I made in the previous chapter that, because the ‘objects’ of moral
belief do not exist independently of those who form moral beliefs, reliable belief-formation about
matters of right and wrong does not require causal relations between believer and the object of
belief. Thus, the case for the autonomy of religious belief will differ from the case for the
autonomy of moral belief.
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4.8 Concluding Comments
I would like to conclude with two general comments about Reformed
Epistemology. As I have remarked several times, at the heart of Reformed Epistemology
is the claim that religious doxastic practices are innocent until proven guilty. Where does
the preceding discussion leave that claim?
First, innocence. Nothing I have said or argued is inconsistent with the claim that
religious doxastic practices like CMP enjoy presumptive innocence. Alston is correct: we
can provide no non-circular justification for any of our basic doxastic practices and
should not therefore discriminate against religious doxastic practices because they are not
amenable of non-circular proof. To discriminate in that way would be to impose a double
standard on practices like CMP. CMP, as with SP, introspection, and memory, is
presumptively innocent.
However, the claim that religious doxastic practices are presumptively innocent is
distinct from the claim that religious doxastic practices are presumptively innocent
because socially and psychologically established. The latter presupposes a criterion for
distinguishing between presumptively innocent and presumptively guilty practices which
is entirely without merit. Furthermore, I do not believe that we have access to any
criterion by which to make that distinction in a non-arbitrary and non-imperialist way.
That the social and psychological establishment criterion lacks merit puts paid
Alston's practical argument in support of regarding religious practices like CMP as
reliable. Hence, Alston's ambitions of providing some external rationale in support of
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CMP, a rationale recognizable as compelling regardless of one’s parochial convictions,
fail utterly.
That the social and psychological establishment criterion lacks merit, and thus that
Alston s practical argument tails, does not, however, discredit all practical arguments in
support of the innocent-until-proven-guilty thesis. There is a much more powerful
practical argument in support of regarding a given practice as presumptively reliable than
Alston's, although, I am afraid, it is of no avail at all in helping us to solve the Great
Pumpkin Problem (as Alston hoped his appeal to social establishment would be). For
human beings, constructed as we are and living in the environment we do, have no option
at all but to form some beliefs or other and thus to engage in some doxastic practices.
Because we cannot but engage in some doxastic practices, and because it is practically
rational for an agent to perform those actions she cannot but perform, we have all the
practical reason that we need for engaging in doxastic practices. Of course, that we must
engage in some doxastic practices provides us with no help at all in determining in which
practices we should engage. But that this practical argument proscribes no practices is
just the flip side of the claim that it enjoys some legitimacy: just because it lays down no
substantive criteria by which we might exclude certain practices from enjoying
presumptive innocence, it is not vulnerable to the antinomian implications of Alston's
appeal to autonomy.
Second, guilt. Does the preceding discussion provide us with any reason to
believe that we should not require of innocent practices that they be vindicated from
accusations of guilt? Otherwise put, have we reached any conclusions which render it
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impossible to show of a innocent practice that it is guilty? Otherwise put again, does the
appeal to the autonomy of distinct practices undermine attempts to show that those
practices which we provisionally regard as reliable are in fact unreliable? If so, then the
claim that we should adhere to the innocent-until proven-guilty policy is empty.
The shortest answer to these questions is that I have provided no reason at all to
believe that innocent practices cannot be shown to be unreliable. I have shown, however,
that showing that a given practice is unreliable is more complicated than some would
like. So long as we appeal to formal norms like those proscribing massive internal and
external inconsistency in order to discredit a given practice, critique is fairly simple: just
determine whether or not the outputs of a given doxastic practice are massively
inconsistent with the outputs of another practice. Attempts to discredit a practice on such
grounds do not discriminate against a practice on the basis of its enjoying or lacking some
non-formal property and are therefore not complicated by considerations of autonomy.
Appeal to substantive norms is another matter. When we criticize some doxastic practice
D because it violates some substantive norm, we need to insure that D would not violate
that norm even if it were entirely reliable. Invariably, some practice or other will violate
a substantive norm and others will not. As a consequence, attempts to show that a given
practice is unreliable are unavoidably piecemeal: what works for one practice will violate
the autonomy of others. But this does not show that we cannot show of a given practice
that it is unreliable. That ‘something goes’ for one practice, say astrology, that doesn’t
’go’ for another, say SP, does not entail that anything goes for SP (or for that matter,
astrology).
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The innocent-until-proven-guilty policy, then, emerges unscathed when
dissociated from Alston's appeal to social establishment. This brings me to the second
comment.
I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation that one of Alston’s
achievements was to situate the Reformed position on the rationality of religious belief
where it occurs anyway: in specific practices which have a definite location in social
space and historical time. Whether or not it is rational to believe in God is not a matter
simply of whether or not the cognitive faculties with which all human beings are outfitted
function properly when generating beliefs about God but of whether or not the social
practices by engaging in which an agent forms beliefs afford her reliable access to an
independently existing reality. As I have argued, however, the uses to which Alston puts
the social incarnation of religious belief fail miserably. What starts as a promising
reorientation of the issue derails quickly in an appeal to the brute facticity of social
entrenchment. This is unfortunate, given that his recognition of the social dimensions of
belief could have provided Alston with the opportunity to reflect on the various moral and
political questions with which the question of the rationality of religious belief is
ineradicably entwined. And it is doubly unfortunate, given that Reformed
Epistemologists have consistently ignored those questions.
This is particularly striking in Alston's case because of the history of ‘enthusiasm'
in western culture and even of the influence of enthusiasm on modem philosophy. That
some agents have claimed to be privy to direct dispensations from God has consistently
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been recognized as an epistemic claim with important political consequences
.
41
(Ironically, given Alston's appeal to the social entrenchment of CMP, those political
implications are often of a radical nature: God often seems to be telling the enthusiast to
tear down the existing order, including that of the established church!) So long as the
enthusiast resists privatizing her religious practice, so long as she is willing to act in the
public realm on the basis of private revelations from God, whether or not an agent has
private access to the divine intentions she claims to have becomes a politically important
question. Simply put, the reliability ofCMP raises the spectre of agents who can and
need provide no publically defensible justification for extremely controversial political
activities. Epistemic antinomianism threatens political anarchy via religious enthusiasm.
Alston’s failure to address the political and moral implications of his epistemic
policies renders him vulnerable to much the same objection commonly leveled at his
more well-known counterpart (Plantinga), viz., that in his haste to vindicate the epistemic
status of religious belief, he fails to accord systematic significance to the ways in which
moral turpitude, power relations, envy, pride, etc. corrupt the ways we form beliefs. In
theological terminology, Alston underplays the epistemological importance of sin, and
overplays the epistemological relevance of providence or of the doctrine of creation . 42 In
41
. See, for example, the brief description of Luther’s conflict with Muntzer in chapter two.
42
. This is particularly apparent in Plantinga’s version of Reformed Epistemology. According to
Plantinga, a crucial component in what it takes for a belief to be enjoy epistemic warrant is for that
belief to result from the proper functioning of cognitive faculties designed (successfully) to
produce true beliefs. Not surprisingly, we find a sustained discussion of the concepts of ‘proper
function’ and ‘design.’ Of course, the notion of design harks to the doctrine of creation: an agent
forms beliefs rightly when she forms her beliefs as God created her to. Nowhere does one find a
sustained analysis of the concept of corrupted cognitive faculties, of ways of forming beliefs which
are vitiated by power, for example.
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SO doing, Alston succumbs to what I take to be the perennial failing of religious believers,
viz., a failure to distinguish between what is and what ought to be. His appeal to social
establishment betrays little sensistivity to the manner of a given doxastic practice’s
entrenchment and of the dubious record of religious doxastic practices in that regard.
Alston need not have done so. That religious doxastic practices are socially
established has as a consequence that religious belief may be infected with power
relations which render religious belief unreliable. If, for example, religious belief is
prone to legitimating the current social order, and thus if the continued entrenchment of
some religious doxastic practice is functional for the status quo, then the way in which its
social entrenchment is achieved and maintained may indicate that that practice is
unreliable. A Marxist critique of religious belief, which Alston dismisses so lightly,
naturally follows from the way in which Alston formulates the issue of the rationality of
religious belief. Moreover, such a critique is justifiable on theological grounds: a proper
recognition of sin renders the careful examination of the power relations undergirding
religious doxastic practices not just appropriate, but also a matter of faithfulness.
Alston's version of Reformed Epistemology provides a helpful framework within
which to provide an analysis and critique of the political and moral implications of
religious truth claims and the doxastic practices in which those claims are generated.
Alston, however, fails adequately to consider or answer those questions. But by
identifying the inadequacies and oversights of his defense of the rationality of religious
belief, we may discern a more appropriate task for the religious epistemologist.
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A more adequate Reformed Epistemology would consist, not just of attempts to
vindicate the presumptive innocence of religious belief, and not just of attempts to defend
religious belief from imputations of unreliability from its critics, but also of an element of
self-criticism, i.e., an attempt to determine how one's own, and one’s community’s, ways
of forming beliefs have been compromised by power, greed, hubris, self-deception, and
the like. Its hard to imagine that religious doxastic practices like CMP could maintain
their epistemic innocence if they are not also substantially free of injustice.
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